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Spain Western Sahara (formerly Spanish Sahara)

## DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

**CONFIDENTIAL**

FILE No.

935 | 28 | 2

PART No. ....

28 OCTOBER 1980

**OFFICE/POST**

...C.R.

**TITLE**

Spain



\*935/28/2 4C\*

1158

## WESTERN SAHARA (FORMALLY SPANISH SAHARA)

## RELATED FILES

FILE No.	TITLE	DATE COMMENCED
		10-8-80
		DATE FINISHED
		26-11-81

## PREVIOUS PAPERS

PT 3

## SUBSEQUENT PAPERS

## ARCHIVAL ACTION

FILE No. .... 935 / 28 / 2

PART No. .... 4

28 OCTOBER 1981



\*935/28/2 4C\*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

RE8.

Department of Foreign Affairs

File Number 935/28/2

Part Number ..... 4 .....

# FILE CLOSED

This part opened on 10/8/80

This part closed on 26/11/81

Subsequent correspondence on Part/File Number ..... 5 .....

CENTRAL REGISTER  
D.F.A.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

93572872

INFORMATION.

DEC 2 10 09 AM '81

LONDON

INWARDS

UN NEW YORK

ALGIERS

CLASSIFICATION.

IN REPLY  
QUOTE

6488  
M. PA [REDACTED]

DATE. 26 November 1981

REGISTRY  
CODE

TO. CANBERRA

RÉF. M.

TO FILE. 93572872

FM. PARIS EMB

FM. FILE. 226/3/1, 226/3/7

POST  
SEQUENCE  
NUMBER

4511

SUBJECT. UNGA 36 : WESTERN SAHARA

As foreshadowed in O.PA94941 we attach a copy of our Note of 26 November to the Moroccan Embassy, based on O.CH000331. A copy will also be passed direct to the Moroccan Foreign Ministry.

*Ian Chace*

(I.S. Lincoln)  
First Secretary

*[Signature]*  
ENCLOSURES ATTACHED

CHECKED  
GR  
17-2181



File 226/3/1, 226/3/7

Note No. 80

L'Ambassade d'Australie présente ses compliments  
à l'Ambassade du Royaume du Maroc et a l'honneur de communiquer la réponse du Gouvernement australien à la démarche effectuée le 16 novembre 1981 par l'Ambassade du Maroc auprès de la Haute Commission australienne à Londres concernant le vote de l'Australie sur la résolution relative au Sahara Occidental proposée par l'Algérie à l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies.

La présente réponse est communiquée par l'Ambassade d'Australie à Paris puisque l'Ambassadeur australien à Paris est également accrédité auprès du Gouvernement du Royaume du Maroc; il convient par conséquent de transmettre toutes communications de cette nature par l'intermédiaire de cette mission.

La démarche du Gouvernement marocain a pour origine l'impression que l'Australie aurait voté en faveur de la résolution proposée par l'Algérie. Il s'avère en effet que l'Australie s'est abstenu à cette occasion, pour les motifs

evoqués dans la Note marocaine, à savoir que la teneur de la résolution algérienne allait à l'encontre des efforts du comité de mise en oeuvre de l'OUA en vue de parvenir à une solution dans le Sahara Occidental acceptable par toutes les parties. L'Australie a voté en faveur de la brève résolution proposée par le Kenya relative au Sahara Occidental et qui appuyait les travaux de l'OUA.


Si l'intérêt de l'Australie à la question du Sahara Occidental est plutôt indirect, le Gouvernement australien n'en souhaite pas moins jouer son rôle en soutenant une solution acceptable par toutes les parties, et dans ce contexte il entend appuyer les efforts actuels du comité de mise en oeuvre de l'OUA. L'Australie estime que la résolution exprimant un consensus sur la question du Sahara Occidental proposée par le Kenya est conforme à l'esprit et aux intentions des décisions prises par le comité de mise en oeuvre.

Lors de la session plénière, l'Australie a donc l'intention de s'abstenir de nouveau à l'occasion du vote sur la résolution algérienne, et de soutenir celle de l'OUA.

L'Ambassade serait très reconnaissante à l'Ambassade du Maroc à Paris de bien vouloir transmettre aux autorités marocaines intéressées ces précisions relatives à la vote de l'Australie sur les deux résolutions sur le Sahara Occidental,

et également aux voies de communication entre les  
Gouvernements marocain et australien.

L'Ambassade d'Australie saisit cette occasion  
pour renouveler à l'Ambassade du Royaume du Maroc les  
assurances de sa très haute considération.

ch.  
  
PARIS

le 26 novembre 1981

**RESTRICTED**

933728/2

ACTION: IO  
COPY NO. 2

**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

O.PA94941 NASH  
TOR 01.05 27.11.81

Q PA94941 1430 26.11.81 CLA

TO.  
RR CANBERRA/0039 UN NEW YORK/1215 ALGIERS/718  
RR LONDON/1490

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 226/3/1 REF 0.CH000331

**MISCHIEF**

## UNGA 36 : WESTERN SAHARA

WE HAVE DELIVERED A NOTE BASED ON YOUR REFTEL TO THE MOROCCAN EMBASSY HERE, AND WILL SEND A COPY DIRECT TO THE MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTRY. WE ARE SENDING COPIES OF THE NOTE BY BAG TO ALL ADDRESSEES.

ACTION: FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DIA

PRIME MINISTER FOREIGN MINISTER MIN DEFENCE  
DEP DEFENCE DEP P M AND CABINET JIO

ACTION: IO OGBAAAAA  
AME JBAE

SEC	DEPSEC-A	DEPSEC-C	LA	EX	MCO
PA	FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(EANZ)	EUR	
CN	FAS(DN)	NUC	DEF	DPR	FAS(TOAME)
	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	IL	FAREP-M	FAREP-P
	FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB			

RESTRICTED

**CONFIDENTIAL**

935728/2

ACTION: IO  
COPY NO. 1

**OUTWARD CABLEGRAM**

OUT

O.CH000331 DRHA

O.CH000331 1722 25.11.81 CLA

TO.  
PP PARIS EMB/8805 ALGIERS/8035 LONDON/4064  
PP UN NEW YORK/7051

*n/a*

RP.  
RR NAIROBI/9551

FM. CANBERRA / FILE 935/28/2 REF O.LH18162 O.UN22428 O.CH999672

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

UNGA 36 : WESTERN SAHARA

REF O.PA94731 O.AL5348

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

AS POSTS HAVE NOTED, THE MOROCCAN APPROACH, WHICH PARALLELS ONE TO THE NEW ZEALANDERS IN MOROCCO ON 18 NOVEMBER, OVERLOOKS THE FACT THAT THIS YEAR WE ABSTAINED ON THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION IN THE FOURTH COMMITTEE BECAUSE, AS THE MOROCCANS THEMSELVES POINT OUT IN THEIR NOTE, THE TENOR OF THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION CUT ACROSS THE EFFORTS OF THE OAU IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE TO ENCOURAGE A SOLUTION IN WESTERN SAHARA ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES.

2. WE PROPOSE TO MAINTAIN OUR ABSTENTION ON THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION IN PLENARY. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS INFLUENCING OUR VIEW ARE THE POSITIONS ADOPTED BY LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES IN THE FOURTH COMMITTEE, OUR GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH BOTH ALGERIA AND MOROCCO AND THE FACT THAT AUSTRALIA HAS A LIMITED DIRECT INTEREST IN THE WESTERN SAHARA QUESTION. WE WILL OF COURSE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE KENYANS CONSENSUS RESOLUTION, WHICH WE CONSIDER TO BE MORE IN LINE WITH THE SPIRIT AND INTENT OF THE OAU IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE'S DECISIONS ON WESTERN SAHARA.

3. WE AGREE THAT THE MOST APPROPRIATE CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE MOROCCANS SHOULD BE THROUGH OUR EMBASSY IN PARIS AND WE WOULD LIKE THIS POINT TO BE MADE TO THE MOROCCAN EMBASSIES IN BOTH LONDON AND PARIS.

FOR ALGIERS

4. AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO CORRECT POLISARIO'S MISUNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION (PARA 1. ABOVE). YOU SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THIS DOES NOT REFLECT ANY CHANGE IN OUR VIEWS ON THE RIGHT OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE TERRITORY TO SELF-DETERMINATION, WHICH PROMPTED OUR SUPPORT FOR THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION IN THE PAST.

*. . wa*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

OUT

RESTRICTED

935728/2

ACTION: IO  
COPY NO. 1

INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.UN22492 PLRY  
TOR 14.31 25.11.81

O.UN22492 2105 24.11.81 CLA

IN

TO.  
PP CANBERRA/1506

FM. UN NEW YORK / REF F.UN901

R E S T R I C T E D

UNGA 36: WESTERN SAHARA

PLENARY TODAY 24 NOVEMBER ADOPTED THE ALGERIAN SPONSORED DRAFT ON WESTERN SAHARA BY 76-9-57 (AUSTRALIA). THE ALGERIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE LOBBIED THE 4 WESTERN DELEGATIONS (AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, FINLAND AND SWEDEN) WHICH HAS SUPPORTED THE ALGERIAN DRAFT AT UNGA 35 NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE VOTE RATHER THAN MAINTAIN THE ABSTENTIONS THEY CAST IN THE FOURTH COMMITTEE. ALL FOUR DECLINED IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ALGERIAN WILLINGNESS TO ALTER THEIR DRAFT. (WE WERE ABLE TO CLEAR THIS WITH THE MINISTER). WE DID NOT EXPLAIN OUR VOTE.

2. VOTING RECORD BY FAX TO CANBERRA (F.UN901)

3. THE KENYAN SPONSORED DRAFT DECISION WAS SUBSEQUENTLY ADOPTED WITHOUT A VOTE.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

ACTION: FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ACTION: IO OGBC

SEC	DEPSEC-A	DEPSEC-B	DEPSEC-C	PPU
EX	MCO	PA	FAS(IOAME)	

R. James

RESTRICTED

93.72812

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

**FACSIMILE MESSAGE**

Precedence: PP

Date / Time of Lodgement: 24.11.81 1950

UNCLASSIFIED

TO CANBERRA

FM UN NEW YORK

For Information:

FM FILE

TO FILE

Ref. C.U.N 2272

NO. OF PAGES 1

Subject Heading or Summary of Text: UNGA 36: WESTERN SAHARA

FOLLOWING IS VOTING RECORD:

DEPARTMENTS: FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Action : 10

FAS(10AME)

F.UN 90/1

THIRTY-SIXTH SESSION

24/11/81 11:34 AM

PLENARY MEETING

MEETING NO. 70

VOTE NO. 1 ITEM NO. 19

SUBJECT: QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

1/36/677

RECORDED VOTE

76 YES 9 NO 57 ABSTAIN

RESOLUTION 36/46

Y AFGHANISTAN	A DOMINICA	Y LESOTHO	N SENEGAL
Y ALBANIA	A DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	Y LIBERIA	Y SEYCHELLES
Y ALGERIA	Y ECUADOR	Y LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA	A SIERRA LEONE
Y ANGOLA	A EGYPT	A LUXEMBOURG	SINGAPORE
ANTIGUA-BARBUDA	N EL SALVADOR	Y MADAGASCAR	A SOLOMON ISLANDS
Y ARGENTINA	N EQUATORIAL GUINEA	A MALAWI	A SOMALIA
A AUSTRALIA	Y ETHIOPIA	A MALAYSIA	SOUTH AFRICA
A AUSTRIA	Y FIJI	Y MALDIVES	A SPAIN
Y BAHAMAS	A FINLAND	Y MALI	A SRI LANKA
A BAHRAIN	A FRANCE	Y MALTA	A SUDAN
Y BANGLADESH	N GABON	Y MAURITANIA	Y SURINAME
Y BARBADOS	A GAMBIA	Y MAURITIUS	Y SWAZILAND
A BELGIUM	Y GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REP.	Y MEXICO	A SWEDEN
Y BELIZE	A GERMANY, FEDERAL REP. OF	Y MONGOLIA	Y SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
Y BENIN	Y GHANA	N MOROCCO	A THAILAND
Y BHUTAN	Y GREECE	Y MOZAMBIQUE	Y TOGO
A BOLIVIA	Y GRENADA	Y NEPAL	Y TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
Y BOTSWANA	A GUATEMALA	A NETHERLANDS	A TUNISIA
Y BRAZIL	A GUINEA	A NEW ZEALAND	A TURKEY
V BULGARIA	Y GUINEA-BISSAU	Y NICARAGUA	Y UGANDA
A BURMA	Y GUYANA	A NIGER	Y UKRAINIAN S.S.R.
Y BURUNDI	Y HAITI	A NIGERIA	Y UNION OF SOVIET SOC. REP.
Y BYELORUSSIAN S.S.R.	A HONDURAS	A NORWAY	A UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
A CANADA	Y HUNGARY	A OMAN	A UNITED KINGDOM
Y CAPE VERDE	A ICELAND	A PAKISTAN	A UNITED REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON
N CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	Y INDIA	Y PANAMA	Y UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
Y CHAD	A INDONESIA	PAPUA NEW GUINEA	N UNITED STATES
N CHILE	Y IRAN	PARAGUAY	UPPER VOLTA
CHINA	IRAQ	PERU	A URUGUAY
A COLOMBIA	A IRELAND	PHILIPPINES	Y VANUATU
A COMOROS	A ISRAEL	POLAND	Y VENEZUELA
Y CONGO	A ITALY	A PORTUGAL	Y VIET NAM
Y COSTA RICA	IVORY COAST	A QATAR	Y YEMEN
Y CUBA	Y JAMAICA	ROMANIA	Y YUGOSLAVIA
Y CYPRUS	A JAPAN	RWANDA	N ZAIRE
Y CZECHOSLOVAKIA	A JORDAN	SAINT LUCIA	Y ZAMBIA
A DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA	A KENYA	Y SAINT VINCENT - GRENADINES	ZIMBABWE
DEMOCRATIC YEMEN	KUWAIT	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	
A DENMARK	Y LAO P.D.R.	A SAUDI ARABIA	
A DJIBOUTI	A LEBANON		

ENDS

CONFIDENTIAL  
FIRST

ACTION: IO  
COPY NO. 1

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

OUT

O.CH999672 GAFR

O.CH999672 1511 23.11.81 CLA FIRST

TO.

PP UN NEW YORK/6990

RP.

PP LONDON/3806 ALGIERS/8028 PARIS EMB/8738

FM. CANBERRA / FILE 935/28/2 REF O.LH18162/PA94731/UN22428/AL5348

C O N F I D E N T I A L

UNGA 36: WESTERN SAHARA

YOU SHOULD MAINTAIN ~~AN ABSTENTION~~ ON THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION IN PLENARY. WHILE WE WOULD PREFER YOU NOT/NOT TO MAKE AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE, YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO DO SO IN THE COMPANY OF LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHO THIS YEAR MOVED FROM VOTING IN FAVOUR TO ABSTENTION, I.E. AUSTRIA, SWEDEN, FINLAND, KENYA AND NIGERIA. ANY EXPLANATION OF VOTE SHOULD BE ALONG THE LINES OF OUR O.CH996812 AND PARA 2 OF O.UN22428.

2. SEPARATE MESSAGE FOLLOWS REGARDING OUR RESPONSES TO VARIOUS APPROACHES (O.LH18162 AND O.AL5348)

ACTION: FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
DEP DEFENCE

FOREIGN MINISTER  
DEP P M AND CABINET

MIN DEFENCE  
JIO

ACTION: IO  
AME

SEC	DEPSEC-A	DEPSEC-B	DEPSEC-C	LA
EX	MCO	PA	FAS(EANZ)	EUR
FAS(DN)	DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)	CN
FAS(LT)	IL			FAS(ECO)

*N Jones*

CONFIDENTIAL  
FIRST

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

935-12812

INFO: IO  
COPY NO. 1

**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

O.AL5357 RHOW  
TOR 02.07 23.11.81

O AL5357 1300 22.11.81 UNC

TO.  
PP CANBERRA/4003

R.P.

RR PARIS EMB/906 UN NEW YORK/192 WASHINGTON/61  
RR NAIROBI/34 MADRID/141 LONDON/381  
BB CAIRO/105 ACCRA/12 MOSCOW/15  
BB DAR ES SALAAM/14 SALISBURY/09

FM. ALGIERS / FILE 862/98/1 REF 0-AL5348 0-AL5349

U N C L A S S I F I E D

WESTERN SAHARA

POLISARIO IS CONTINUING ITS POLITICAL OFFENSIVE AGAINST INCREASED UNITED STATES MILITARY AID TO MOROCCO.

2. "'EL MOUDJAHID' REPORTS THAT IN A LETTER DATED 16 NOVEMBER ADDRESSED TO EUROPEAN HEADS OF STATE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE POLISARIO FRONT EXPRESSED GRAVE CONCERN THAT ''THE LATEST STEP IN AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN THE SAHARAN CONFLICT COULD ONLY LEAD TO ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT DESPITE THE EFFORTS OF THE UN AND THE OAU TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION''. THE LETTER STATES THAT ''MOROCCO MORE THAN EVER BEFORE WANTS TO PRESENT THE QUESTION OF THE DECOLONIZATION OF THE WESTERN SAHARA AS AN EAST-WEST CONFLICT IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY FOREIGN INTERVENTION ON THE SIDE OF ITS FORCES''.

3. THE PAPER REPORTS THAT ON 19 NOVEMBER THE RASD (POLISARIO) FOREIGN MINISTER TESTIFIED BEFORE "THE AFRICAN SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS".

ACTION: FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DNA

PRIME MINISTER FOREIGN MINISTER MIN DEFENCE  
DEP DEFENCE DEP P M AND CABINET JIO

**ACTION:** AME JBAE

SEC	DEPSEC-A	DEPSEC-C	LA	EX	MCO
PA	FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(EANZ)	EUR	
CN	FAS(DN)	NUC	DEF	DPR	FAS(TOAME)
IO	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	FAREP-M	FAREP-P	
FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB				

**CONFIDENTIAL**

9372872

INFO: IO  
COPY NO. 1

**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

0.AL5349 RHOW  
TOR 04.35 23.11.81

0.AL5349 1200 21.11.81 CLA

TO.  
PP CANBERRA/3996

RP.  
PP UN NEW YORK/191 PARIS EMB/905 WASHINGTON/60  
PP NAIROBI/33 MADRID/140 LONDON/380  
BB CAIRO/104 ACCRA/11 MOSCOW/14  
BB DAR ES SALAAM/13 SALISBURY/08

FM. ALGIERS / FILE 862/98/1 REF 0.AL5338 0.AL5348

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

**WESTERN SAHARA**

HABIBOULAH (DEPUTY POLISARIO REPRESENTATIVE IN ALGIERS) CALLED ON AMBASADOR ON 18 NOVEMBER TO EXPRESS POLISARIO'S CONCERN OVER THE RECENT VISIT TO RABAT BY THE UNITED STATES ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENCE (WEST) AT THE HEAD OF A HIGH RANKING MILITARY DELEGATION. MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION, INCLUDING TWO GENERALS, HAD ENTERED DISPUTED TERRITORY IN THE WESTERN SAHARA. THE SUPPLY OF MORE ADVANCED MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS CLEARLY UNDER CONSIDERATION. THIS OVERT SUPPORT FOR MOROCCO COULD ONLY INCREASE RABAT'S INTRANSIGENCE AND REDUCE ANY INCENTIVE FOR HASSAN TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS. THE HEIGHTENED AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT RISKED "INTERNATIONALISATION" OF THE CONFLICT.

2. WE SOUGHT HABIBOULAH'S COMMENTS ON RECENT CLAIMS THAT "NON-AFRICANS" HAD USED SOPHISTICATED SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES AGAINST MOROCCAN AIRCRAFT. HE REPLIED THAT HASSAN HAD BEEN MAKING UNPROVEN ASSERTIONS FOR YEARS. THERE WAS NO COMPARISON BETWEEN THE MILITARY MATERIAL AVAILABLE TO MOROCCO AND THAT AT THE DISPOSAL OF POLISARIO. POLISARIO GOT WHAT IT COULD FROM WHEREVER IT COULD GET IT. HE CLAIMED THAT IT WAS THE MORALE OF POLISARIO'S FORCES THAT ACCOUNTED FOR THEIR SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE.

3. THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, WHICH HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THIS POLISARIO APPROACH, SAYS THAT THE MILITARY MISSION'S VISIT WAS INTENDED TO DEMONSTRATE CONTINUED UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR HASSAN IN THE DIFFICULT DOMESTIC SITUATION CONFRONTING MOROCCO. ONLY RELATIVELY LIMITED ADDITIONAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO MOROCCO WAS CONTEMPLATED. THE AMERICANS BELIEVED THAT SAM-6S HAD BEEN USED TO DOWN THE MOROCCAN AIRCRAFT BUT DOUBTED CLAIMS OF "NON-AFRICAN" INVOLVEMENT SINCE SEVERAL AFRICAN ARMIES (INCLUDING ALGERIA AND LIBYA) ALREADY HAD THE SAM-6.

.../2

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

IN

**CONFIDENTIAL**

INFO: IO  
COPY NO. 1

**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

2-O.AL5349

IN

**COMMENT**

4. THE POLISARIO LEADERSHIP HAS RECENTLY SENT LETTERS TO THE CHAIRMAN AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT THE UNITED STATES' DEEPENING POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND MILITARY SUPPORT OF MOROCCO. THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED FOLLOWING THE VISIT LAST WEEK OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF MAURITANIA TO ALGERIA ALSO EXPRESSED ''SERIOUS PREOCCUPATION IN THE FACE OF THE GRAVE MENACES TO PEACE POSED BY THE CONFLICT IN THE WESTERN SAHARA''. THE ALGERIAN MEDIA HAS BEEN SHARLY CRITICAL OF THE FURTHER AMERICAN TILT TO MOROCCO REFLECTED IN ITS UNITED NATIONS VOTE, IN THE VISIT OF THE MILITARY MISSION AND IN RECENT STATEMENTS BY THE NEWLY APPOINTED AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO RABAT. THE TIMING OF THESE AMERICAN MOVES DURING THE COURSE OF A UNITED NATIONS DEBATE DESIGNED TO FACILITATE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE WESTERN SAHARA IS, TO SAY THE LEAST, UNFORTUNATE.

5. WE INTERPRET THE POLISARIO APPROACH AS INTENDED TO CONVEY A MESSAGE ABOUT THEIR HEIGHTENED CONCERN ABOUT THE CURRENT DIRECTION OF AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS MOROCCO. WE TAKE THEIR REFERENCE TO ''INTERNATIONALISATION'' AS IMPLYING THAT UNLESS THE AMERICANS EXERCISE RESTRAINT POLISARIO WOULD BE OBLIGED TO SEEK ADDITIONAL AND PRESUMABLY MORE SOPHISTICATED ARMAMENTS FROM THEIR OWN SOURCES - PRESUMABLY THE USSR VIA LIBYA.

6. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR HAS RECEIVED A SIMILAR APPROACH FROM POLISARIO.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

**ACTION: FOREIGN AFFAIRS**  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
DEP DEFENCE

FOREIGN MINISTER  
DEP P M AND CABINET

MIN DEFENCE  
JIO

**ACTION: AME**

JBAE

SEC	DEPSEC-A	DEPSEC-C	LA	EX	MCO
PA	FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(EANZ)		ANZ
EUR	CN	FAS(DN)	NUC	DEF	DPR
FAS(IOAME)	IO	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)		FAREP-M
FAREP-P	FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB			

**CONFIDENTIAL**

IN

RESTRICTED

ACTION: IO  
COPY NO. 1

IN

INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.AL5348 RHOW  
TOR 04.31 23.11.81

O.AL5348 1200 21.11.81 CLA

TO.  
PP CANBERRA/3995

RP.  
PP UN NEW YORK/190 PARIS EMB/904 WASHINGTON/59  
PP NAIROBI/32 MADRID/139 LONDON/379  
BB CAIRO/103 ACCRA/10 MOSCOW/13  
BB DAR ES SALAAM/12 SALISBURY/07

NJ

FM. ALGIERS/ FILE 862/98/1 REF O.AL5338

R E S T R I C T E D

UNGA 36 : WESTERN SAHARA

DURING THE COURSE OF A CALL (OUR O.AL5349) HABIBOULAH (DEPUTY POLISARIO REPRESENTATIVE) NOTED THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME AUSTRALIA HAD ABSTAINED ON THE WESTERN SAHARA RESOLUTION. WE SAID THAT A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS HAD BEEN CONCERNED THAT THE ALGERIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION WENT BEYOND THE TERMS OF THE OAU RESOLUTION. INDEED, SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE OAU IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE HAD ABSTAINED. HE RESPONDED THAT THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAD VOTED FOR THE RESOLUTION. SO HAD GREECE AND MANY OF OUR PACIFIC NEIGHBOURS. HOWEVER, HE COULD UNDERSTAND THAT SOME MEMBERS OF THE OAU IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE WOULD FEEL THE NEED TO MAINTAIN A NEUTRAL POSITION. POLISARIO WAS CONFIDENT OF PICKING UP THE VOTES OF SOME ABSENTEES IN PLENARY.

2. HABIBOULAH SAID THAT THE OAU RESOLUTION CONTAINED THE PRINCIPLES FOR A SETTLEMENT BUT WAS SHORT ON SOME ESSENTIAL DETAILS. IF THE UNITED NATIONS SIMPLY REAFFIRMED THAT RESOLUTION MOROCCO WOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ITS SO-CALLED AMBIGUITIES TO SOW CONFUSION AND CONTINUE TO AVOID DOING ANYTHING. THE DECOLONIZATION COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HAD ITS OWN RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH IT COULD NOT AVOID.

3. WE SAID THAT AUSTRALIA ACCEPTED, OF COURSE, THAT POLISARIO WAS A PARTY TO THE CONFLICT AND WE ACCEPTED THAT IT HAD A ROLE TO PLAY IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS (O.CH923808). BUT WE TOOK IT THAT WHAT CONCERNED OUR DELEGATION IN NEW YORK WAS THAT THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION IMPOSED ITS OWN INTERPRETATION OF THE NEGOTIATING MECHANISM RATHER THAN A GENERALLY ACCEPTED OAU INTERPRETATION. HIS RESPONSE WAS THAT THERE HAD BEEN A WAR GOING ON WHILE THEY HAD WAITED TWO YEARS FOR THE OAU TO REACH GENERALLY ACCEPTED CONCLUSIONS. IT WAS NOW TIME FOR UN MEMBERS TO DECLARE WHETHER OR NOT THEY SUPPORTED CEASEFIRE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN POLISARIO AND MOROCCO. HE CLAIMED THAT THE

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
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UNITED STATES DELEGATION IN NEW YORK HAD LOBBIED HARD ON BEHALF OF THE MOROCCANS.

COMMENT

4. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE UN DEBATE IS TO LEAVE AUSTRALIA FOR THE FIRST TIME ABSTAINING ON AN ESSENTIALLY QUITE MODERATE WESTERN SAHARA RESOLUTION. UNLIKE MOST OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN ABSTAINERS, AUSTRALIA ACCEPTS THAT THE MERITS OF THE TWO SIDES ARE NOT EQUAL AND THAT IT IS MOROCCO WHICH IS CONTINUING TO REFUSE TO PERMIT A GENUINE ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION (O.CH923808). THE MAIN THRUST OF THE RESOLUTION, CALLING ON THE TWO BELLIGERENTS TO NEGOTIATE, IS SCARCELY OBJECTIONABLE. WE FIND IT HARD TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE IDENTIFICATION OF POLISARIO AND MOROCCO AS THE PARTIES WHO MUST NEGOTIATE SHOULD HAVE CAUSED US DIFFICULTY. IT OBVIOUSLY SUITS THE INTERESTS OF SOME EUROPEANS (INCLUDING MOROCCO'S ARMS SUPPLIERS) TO REST ON A DESIRE NOT TO ''PREJUDGE'' THE OAU RESOLUTION TO JUSTIFY AN ABSTENTION. BUT THERE SEEMS TO US TO BE SOME JUSTICE IN THE ARGUMENT THAT THE UNITED NATIONS HAS ITS OWN RESPONSIBILITY TO JUDGE THE MERITS OF THE TWO SIDES' CASES AND TO MOBILISE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN AN ESCALATING MILITARY SITUATION (OUR O.AL5349).

5. WE WOULD BE GLAD IF YOU WOULD LOOK AT OUR VOTING POSITION AGAIN BEFORE THIS ITEM IS TAKEN IN PLENARY. (PLEASE ALSO SEE OUR O.AL5338 DESPATCHED BY BAG 18 NOVEMBER.) IF, FOR REASONS THAT ARE NOT YET CLEAR TO US, WE ARE UNABLE TO SUPPORT THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION, WE FEEL IT IMPORTANT THAT AUSTRALIA SHOULD EXPLAIN ITS VOTE IN PLENARY. THIS MIGHT BE ALONG THE LINES THAT AUSTRALIA HAS LONG ACCEPTED THAT POLISARIO IS A PARTY TO THE CONFLICT AND THAT IT HAS A ROLE IN THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. WE ARE CONCERNED AT WHAT APPEARS TO BE THE TREND TO ESCALATION IN THE MILITARY OPERATIONS OF BOTH SIDES AND IN THAT CONTEXT BELIEVE THAT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES WHO ARE ACTUALLY FIGHTING IS NOW URGENT. WE COULD SAY THAT WE HAVE ABSTAINED ON THE RESOLUTION OUT OF A DESIRE NOT TO BE THOUGHT TO BE PREJUDGING THE WORK OF THE OAU COMMITTEE BUT SAY THAT THE UN HAS ITS OWN RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE FIELD OF DECOLONIZATION WHICH CANNOT INDEFINITELY BE DEFERRED.

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UNGA 36 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : MOROCCAN REPRESENTATIVES ON  
WESTERN SAHARA

1 WE AGREE THAT FORMAL REPLY TO THE MOROCCAN NOTE SHOULD POINT OUT  
THAT AUSTRALIA DID ABSTAIN ON THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION IN THE FOURTH  
COMMITTEE. WE WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, SUPPORT THE SUGGESTION IN PARA 3  
OF O.PA94731 THAT WE SHOULD ALSO SAY THAT OUR ABSTENTION IS IN  
ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL AUSTRALIAN POLICY ON SUCH DISPUTES.

2. AT UNGA 34 AND UNGA 35 WE SUPPORTED THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION. WE  
DID NOT DO SO THIS YEAR BECAUSE WE TOOK THE POSITION THAT THE  
ALGERIAN RESOLUTION WAS NOT IN LINE WITH THE SPIRIT AND INTENT OF THE  
DECISIONS ON WESTERN SAHARA OF THE OAU IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE.

3. A FURTHER POINT IS THAT OUR ENDORSEMENT OF SUCH A PROPOSITION AS  
PARA 3 OF O.PA94731 MIGHT BIND US TO FUTURE VOTING POSITIONS IN THE  
UNITED NATIONS WHEN IT IS PREFERABLE FOR US TO MAINTAIN OUR  
FLEXIBILITY.

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UNGA FOURTH COMMITTEE : MOROCCAN REPRESENTATIONS ON WESTERN SAHARA

GIVEN THE AMBASSADOR'S ACCREDITATION TO MOROCCO, WE CONSIDER THAT IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO REPLY IN LONDON TO THE MOROCCAN REPRESENTATIONS. WE THINK IT IMPORTANT TO REINFORCE PARIS AS THE CHANNEL FOR FORMAL EXCHANGES WITH THE MOROCCANS.

2. WE RECOMMEND THAT THE MOROCCAN EMBASSY IN LONDON BE ADVISED ORALLY THAT AUSTRALIA'S RESPONSE WILL BE CONVEYED THROUGH THE PARIS EMBASSY. AS THE VOTE IS DUE ON 23 NOVEMBER, A PARALLEL RESPONSE MIGHT ALSO BE GIVEN IN NEW YORK.

COMMENT

3. DESPITE THE ERROR THE MOROCCANS HAVE MADE REGARDING THE CHANNEL, IT IS OF INTEREST THAT, FOR THE FIRST TIME AS FAR AS WE ARE AWARE, THEY HAVE MADE A FORMAL BILATERAL APPROACH TO US ON THE WESTERN SAHARA VOTE. WE UNDERSTOOD, HOWEVER, FROM O.UN22234 THAT AUSTRALIA HAD ABSTAINED IN THE FOURTH COMMITTEE ON THE ALGERIAN TEXT, NOT VOTED FOR IT AS THE MOROCCAN REPRESENTATION CLAIMS. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS VOTE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN PLENARY (SEE O.PA94401 AND O.PA94331). THE FORMAL REPLY TO THE MOROCCAN NOTE MIGHT THEREFORE VERY BRIEFLY CORRECT THE RECORD AND STATE THAT OUR ABSTENTION IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL AUSTRALIAN POLICY ON SUCH DISPUTES.

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UNGA : 4TH COMMITTEE : WESTERN SAHARA

MOROCCO CHARGE D'AFFAIRES UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM RABAT CALLED ON HIGH COMMISSIONER TODAY 19 NOVEMBER TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS ON BEHALF OF HIS GOVERNMENT TO URGE THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT TO RECONSIDER ITS POSITION OF SUPPORT FOR THE ALGERIAN SPONSORED RESOLUTION IN THE FOURTH COMMITTEE AND TO REJECT THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION WHEN IT COMES TO A VOTE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 23 NOVEMBER.

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A THIRD PERSON NOTE DATED 16 NOVEMBER OUTLINING THE MOROCCAN POSITION, WHICH THE CHARGE' HANDED TO THE HIGH COMMISSIONER (YOU WILL NOTE THE REFERENCE TO TIMOR):-

" THE EMBASSY OF THE KINGDOM OF MOROCCO PRESENTS ITS COMPLIMENTS TO THE HIGH COMMISSION OF AUSTRALIA AND HAS THE HONOUR TO REFER TO THE DEBATE OF THE SAHARA QUESTION TAKING PLACE AT THE CURRENT UNITED NATIONS SESSION.

THE FOURTH COMMISSION HAS ADOPTED BY GENERAL CONSENSUS A KENYAN SPONSORED RESOLUTION WHICH WAS DRAFTED IN CONSULTATION WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE OAU IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE AND WHICH CONFORMS WITH THE SPIRIT CREATED BY THE LAST OAU SUMMIT.

IT WAS MOST UNFORTUNATE THAT THE SAME FOURTH COMMISSION WAS MADE TO ADOPT AN ALGERIAN SPONSORED RESOLUTION. THE LATTER IS IN BLATANT CONTRADICTION WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE NAIROBI SUMMIT AND SUBSEQUENT MEETING OF THE OAU IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE, AND THREATENS TO THWART THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED BY THE AFRICAN HEADS OF STATES IN THEIR SEARCH TO PUT AN END TO TENSION AND RESTAURE PEACE TO NORTH WEST AFRICA.

THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT WAS DISHEARTENED TO NOTE THAT AUSTRALIA VOTED FOR THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION. ITS DISAPPOINTMENT WAS ALL THE DEEPER WHEN IT NOTED THAT ON A FUNDAMENTALLY SIMILAR ISSUE - THE QUESTION OF TIMOR - AUSTRALIA SUPPORTED INDONESIA.

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CALLING TO MIND, ON THE ONE HAND, AUSTRALIA'S TRADITIONAL  
ENDEAVOUR TO ENCOURAGE PEACE IN ALL THE AREAS OF THE WORLD, AND ON  
THE OTHER HAND, THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS SHE HAS OVER THE YEARS  
MAINTAINED WITH MOROCCO, THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT COULD NOT HELP BUT  
SEEK AN EXPLANATION OF THE CONTRADICTIONS OUTLINE ABOVE.

THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT THE GENERAL CONSENSUS GENERATED BY THE KENYAN RESOLUTION CALLS FOR A REVIEW OF AUSTRALIAN'S ATTITUDE AND LOGICALLY IMPLIES THE WITHDRAWAL AND IF NOT, THE REJECTION OF THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION.

THIS IS WHY THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT IS URGING THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA TO RECONSIDER IT POSITION AND REJECT THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION WHEN IT COMES UP TO VOTE AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE 23RD NOVEMBER 1981.

THE EMBASSY OF THE KINGDOM OF MOROCCO WILL BE EXTREMELY GRATEFUL FOR THE TRANSMISSION OF THE ABOVE CONCERN AND REQUEST TO THE HIGHEST AUTHORITIES IN CANBERRA AND AVAILS ITSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW TO THE HIGH COMMISSION OF AUSTRALIA THE EXPRESSION OF ITS HIGHEST CONSIDERATION. "

3. GRATEFUL FOR CABLED TEXT OF REPLY TO MOROCCAN NOTE.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
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UNGA 36 : WESTERN SAHARA

MOROCCAN CHARGE CALLED ON HIGH COMMISSIONER TODAY ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM RABAT TO SEEK RECONSIDERATION OF OUR VOTING POSITION ON ALGERIAN SPONSORED RESOLUTION IN FOURTH COMMITTEE WHICH COMES TO VOTE IN PLENARY ON 23 NOVEMBER. CHARGE, WHO WILL BE MAKING SIMILAR REPRESENTATIONS TO AUSTRALIANS, GAVE ORAL ACCOUNT OF BACKGROUND AND LEFT A FORMAL NOTE, TEXT OF WHICH FOLLOWS. THE MAIN POINT OF HIS PRESENTATION WAS THAT THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION, PARTICULARLY THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH CALLING UPON MOROCCO AND POLISARIO TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON A CEASEFIRE, DEVIATES FROM THE SPIRIT OF THE OAU IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE'S AUGUST RECOMMENDATION WHICH URGED "THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO AGREE ON A CEASEFIRE THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE". MOROCCO WAS DISHEARTENED BY NZ SUPPORT FOR THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION, PARTICULARLY SINCE ON THE "FUNDAMENTALLY SIMILAR ISSUE" OF TIMOR NZ HAD SUPPORTED INDONESIA. THE CONSENSUS GENERATED BY THE KENYAN RESOLUTION, IN MOROCCO'S VIEW, CALLS FOR A REVIEW OF NZ'S POSITION AND WITHDRAWAL OF SUPPORT FOR THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION.

2. SINCE WE ARE NOT UP WITH PLAY (LATEST MESSAGE WE HAVE IS YOUR 1426 TO NEW YORK WHICH ENVISAGED ABSTENTION ON ALGERIAN DRAFT) HIGH COMMISSIONER OFFERED NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT AND SIMPLY UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY REPRESENTATION TO YOU AND SEEK YOUR COMMENTS.

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3. SUBSTANTIVE PORTION OF MOROCCAN NOTE READS:  
BEGINS:

THE FOURTH COMMISSION HAS ADOPTED BY GENERAL CONSENSUS A KENYAN SPONSORED RESOLUTION WHICH WAS DRAFTED IN CONSULTATION WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE OAU IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE AND WHICH CONFORMS WITH THE SPIRIT CREATED BY THE LAST OAU SUMMIT.

IT WAS MOST UNFORTUNATE THAT THE SAME FOURTH COMMISSION WAS MADE TO ADOPT AN ALGERIAN SPONSORED RESOLUTION. THE LATTER IS IN BLATANT CONTRADICTION WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE NAIROBI SUMMIT AND SUBSEQUENT MEETING OF THE OAU IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE, AND THREATENS TO THWART THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED BY THE AFRICAN HEADS OF STATES IN THEIR SEARCH TO PUT AN END TO TENSION AND RESTORE PEACE TO NORTH WEST AFRICA.

THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT WAS DISHEARTED TO NOTE THAT NEW ZEALAND VOTED FOR THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION. ITS DISAPPOINTMENT WAS ALL THE DEEPER WHEN IT NOTED THAT ON A FUNDAMENTALLY SIMILAR ISSUE - THE QUESTION OF TIMOR - NEW ZEALAND SUPPORTED INDONESIA.

CALLING TO MIND, ON THE ONE HAND, NEW ZEALAND'S TRADITIONAL ENDEAVOUR TO ENCOURAGE PEACE IN ALL THE AREAS OF THE WORLD, AND ON THE OTHER HAND, THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS SHE HAS OVER THE YEARS MAINTAINED WITH MOROCCO, THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT COULD NOT HELP BUT SEEK AN EXPLANATION OF THE CONTRADICTIONS OUTLINED ABOVE.

THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT THE GENERAL CONSENSUS GENERATED BY THE KENYAN RESOLUTION CALLS FOR A REVIEW OF NEW ZEALAND'S ATTITUDE AND LOGICALLY IMPLIES THE WITHDRAWAL AND IF NOT, THE REJECTION OF THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION.

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THIS IS WHY THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT IS URGING THE  
GOVERNMENT OF NEW ZEALAND TO RECONSIDER ITS POSITION AND REJECT  
THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION WHEN IT COMES UP TO VOTE AT THE GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY ON THE 23RD NOVEMBER 1981. ENDS

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TO WELLINGTON 1175 ROUTINE  
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UNGA 36 : WESTERN SAHARA

LONDON'S 12236 TO YOU.

1. THE MOROCCANS HAVE GOT THEIR FACTS WRONG. NEW ZEALAND, IN THE COMPANY OF THE MAJORITY OF WESTERN COUNTRIES INCLUDING AUSTRALIA ABSTAINED ON THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION ON THE WESTERN SAHARA FOR PRECISELY THE REASONS OUTLINED IN LONDON'S PARAGRAPH 1. WE MADE OUR POSITION WELL-KNOWN TO THE MOROCCANS HERE. WE SHALL TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS OUR SURPRISE AT THE APPROACH TO THE HIGH COMMISSIONER WHEN WE NEXT SEE OUR MOROCCAN COLLEAGUE.

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UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



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A/36/677  
17 November 1981

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Thirty-sixth session  
Agenda item 19

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING  
OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

Chapters of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation  
with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the  
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples  
relating to specific Territories not covered by other agenda items

Report of the Fourth Committee (Part I)

Rapporteur: Mr. Ibrahim O. ADDABASHI (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 4th plenary meeting, on 18 September 1981, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the General Committee, decided to include in the agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled:

"Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples:

- "(a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
- "(b) Report of the Secretary-General."

At the same meeting, the Assembly decided to refer to the Fourth Committee those chapters of the report of the Special Committee relating to specific Territories.

2. The chapters of the Special Committee's report concerning the Territories which were not covered by other agenda items related to the following specific Territories:

<u>Territory</u>	<u>Relevant chapter of the report of the Special Committee</u>
Western Sahara	A/36/23 (Part V), chap. IX
Gibraltar	A/36/23 (Part V), chap. XI
Brunei	A/36/23 (Part V), chap XII
Cocos (Keeling) Islands	A/36/23 (Part V), chap XIII
Pitcairn	A/36/23 (Part V), chap XIV
St. Helena	A/36/23 (Part V), chap XV
Guam	A/36/23 (Part V), chap XVI
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands	A/36/23 (Part V), chap XVII
Bermuda	A/36/23 (Part V), chap XVIII
British Virgin Islands	A/36/23 (Part V), chap XIX
Montserrat	A/36/23 (Part V), chap XX
Cayman Islands	A/36/23 (Part V), chap XXI
Turks and Caicos Islands	A/36/23 (Part V), chap XXII
United States Virgin Islands	A/36/23 (Part V), chap XXIII
Falkland Islands (Malvinas)	A/36/23 (Part V), chap XXIV
Antigua, <u>1/</u> St. Kitts-Nevis and Anguilla	A/36/23 (Part VI), chap. XXV
Tokelau	A/36/23 (Part VII), chap. XXVII
American Samoa	A/36/23 (Part VII), chap. XXVIII

3. At its 3rd meeting, on 7 October, the Fourth Committee decided to hold a general debate covering agenda items 19, 92, 93, 95 and 12, 96 and 97, on the understanding that individual draft resolutions on matters covered by those items would be considered separately. The Committee held the general debate on those items at its 9th to 20th meetings, between 19 October and 4 November.

4. The Fourth Committee considered item 19 at its 9th to 21st meetings, between 19 October and 9 November (see A/C.4/36/SR.9-21).

5. At the 9th meeting, on 19 October, the Rapporteur of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples made a statement in which he gave an account of the relevant activities of the Special Committee during 1981 and drew

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1/ Antigua acceded to independence on 1 November 1981 as Antigua and Barbuda, which was admitted to membership in the United Nations on 11 November 1981 (General Assembly resolution 36/26).

attention to the relevant chapters of the report of that Committee, referred to in paragraph 2 above, as well as the relevant documentation of the Committee (A/AC.109/643-646, 647 and Corr.1, 648-651, 654, 655, 657, 658, 659 and Corr.1, 661, 662 and Corr.1, 665, 667, 670, 671. The Fourth Committee also had before it the following communications addressed to the Secretary-General:

- (a) Letters dated 23 March, 29 July and 17 September 1981 from Argentina (A/36/155, A/36/412, A/36/522);
- (b) Letter dated 23 March 1981 from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/36/156);
- (c) Letter dated 9 September 1981 from Madagascar (A/36/488);
- (d) Letter dated 14 September 1981 from Kenya (A/36/512-S/14692).

6. In addition, the Fourth Committee had before it the following communications addressed to the Chairman:

- (a) Letter dated 6 November 1981 from Morocco (A/C.4/36/8);
- (b) Letter dated 6 November 1981 from Algeria (A/C.4/36/9).

7. Further, the Fourth Committee had before it the report of the Secretary-General (A/36/602) submitted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 35/19 of 11 November 1980 on the question of Western Sahara.

8. The Fourth Committee granted the following requests for hearing in connexion with its consideration of the item:

<u>Petitioner</u>	<u>Meeting at which request for hearing was granted</u>
Hakim Ibrahim and others, Frente popular para la liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO) . . .	3rd
Thomas Jallaud, Association des amis de la République Arabe Sahraouie Démocratique (A/C.4/36/4/Add.1) . . . . .	3rd
W. G. Brown, Bermuda Constitutional Conference (A/C.4/36/3) . . . . .	3rd

9. The Fourth Committee heard statements of the petitioners as follows: Mr. Jallaud, at its 15th meeting, on 28 October; and Mr. Brahim Mokhtar, on behalf of the Frente POLISARIO, at its 15th and 19th meetings, on 28 October and 3 November. Mr. W. G. Brown did not appear before the Committee.

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## II. CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSALS

10. The Fourth Committee adopted a draft resolution and a draft decision relating to the question of Western Sahara under agenda item 19.

11. At the 12th meeting, on 22 October, the Chairman drew attention to the following two draft resolutions:

(a) Draft resolution A/C.4/36/L.2 submitted by Morocco, Senegal and Zaire, which read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Having considered the question of Western Sahara,

"Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and its resolution 1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960,

"Recalling also its resolutions relating to the question of Western Sahara,

"Taking account of the resolution on the question of Western Sahara adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its eighteenth ordinary session, held at Nairobi from 24 to 27 June 1981, 2/

"Also taking account of the decision adopted by the Implementation Committee on Western Sahara of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session at Nairobi held from 24 to 26 August 1981, 3/

"Considering the statements made to the General Assembly giving very broad support to the decisions of the Organization of African Unity and to the Implementation Committee in fulfilling its mandate,

"Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the question of Western Sahara, 4/

"Recalling its resolution 35/117 of 10 December 1980 on co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity;

"1. Takes note of and welcomes the resolution on the question of Western Sahara adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its eighteenth ordinary session concerning the organization of a self-determination referendum in Western Sahara;

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2/ See A/36/534, annex II, resolution AHG/Res.103 (XVIII).

3/ See A/36/512-S/14692, annex.

4/ A/36/602.

"2. Also takes note of the decision of the Implementation Committee on Western Sahara established by the Organization of African Unity determining the conditions of the cease-fire and the modalities for organizing and conducting the referendum;

"3. Welcomes the readiness of all parties to co-operate fully with the Implementation Committee;

"4. Authorizes the Secretary-General to give all necessary assistance to the Implementation Committee in carrying out its mandate;

"5. Invites the Secretary-General to report on this question to the General Assembly and the Security Council."

(b) Draft resolution A/C.4/36/L.3, submitted by Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, the Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mexico, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Uganda, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, subsequently joined by Barbados, Costa Rica, Iran, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Panama, Togo and Trinidad and Tobago, which read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Having considered in depth the question of Western Sahara,

"Recalling the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Recalling its resolution 35/19 of 11 November 1980 on the question of Western Sahara,

"Having considered the relevant chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 5/

"Having heard the statements made on the question of Western Sahara, in particular the statements of the representative of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, 6/

"Recalling its resolution 35/117 of 10 December 1980 on co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,

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5/ A/36/23 (Part V), chap. IX.

6/ A/C.4/36/SR.15, paras. 21-26 and A/C.4/36/SR.19, paras. 3-5.

"Taking note of the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its eighteenth ordinary session, held at Nairobi from 24 to 27 June 1981, to organize throughout the Territory of Western Sahara general and free self determination referendum of the people of Western Sahara, 7/

"Taking note of the decision adopted by the Implementation Committee on Western Sahara of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session held at Nairobi from 24 to 26 August 1981 concerning the establishment of appropriate machinery to enable the people of Western Sahara to express themselves freely and democratically on their future, 8/

"1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Organization of African Unity;

"2. Welcomes the efforts made by the Organization of African Unity and its Implementation Committee on Western Sahara with a view to promoting a just and definitive solution to the question of Western Sahara;

"3. Takes note of the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its eighteenth ordinary session to organize throughout the Territory of Western Sahara a general and free self-determination referendum of the people of Western Sahara;

"4. Welcomes the steps taken by the Implementation Committee with a view to organizing and conducting the referendum;

"5. Appeals to the two parties to the conflict, Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, to observe a cease-fire in accordance with the decisions of the Organization of African Unity and its Implementation Committee;

"6. Urges, to that end, Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro to enter into negotiations with a view to establishing an immediate cease-fire and concluding a peace agreement permitting the fair conduct of a general and free self-determination referendum in Western Sahara;

"7. Reaffirms the determination of the United Nations to co-operate fully with the Organization of African Unity in the fair and impartial organization of the referendum;

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7/ See A/36/534, annex II, resolution AHG/Res.103 (XVIII).

8/ See A/36/512-S/14692, annex.

"8. Requests, to that end, the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to ensure that the United Nations participates in the organization and conduct of the referendum;

"9. Also requests the Secretary-General to report on this subject to the General Assembly and the Security Council;

"10. Requests the Secretary-General to co-operate closely with the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity with a view to the implementation of the decisions of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity and of the Implementation Committee, and of this resolution;

"11. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to continue to consider the situation in Western Sahara as a matter of priority and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session."

12. At the 15th meeting, on 28 October, the Chairman drew attention to amendments (A/C.4/36/L.6) to draft resolution A/C.4/36/L.2, submitted by Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Madagascar, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe and Seychelles, subsequently joined by Cape Verde and Nicaragua, by which:

(a) The sixth preambular paragraph would be replaced by the following:

"Considering the statements made on the question of Western Sahara, in particular the statements of Morocco and of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, giving very broad support to the decisions of the Organization of African Unity and to the Implementation Committee in fulfilling its mandate;".

(b) The following paragraph would be inserted as operative paragraph 1 and the remaining paragraphs would be renumbered:

"1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;".

(c) Former operative paragraph 1, now renumbered as operative paragraph 2, would be replaced by the following:

"2. Takes note of and welcomes the resolution on the question of Western Sahara adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its eighteenth ordinary session concerning the organization of a general and free self-determination referendum of the people of Western Sahara;".

/...

(d) Former operative paragraph 4, now renumbered as operative paragraph 5, would be replaced by the following:

"5. Requests the Secretary-General to co-operate fully with the Organization of African Unity in carrying out the decisions of its Implementation Committee;"

(e) The following new paragraph would be added as operative paragraph 7:

"7. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to continue to consider the situation in Western Sahara as a matter of priority and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session;".

13. On 28 October, the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/36/L.3 submitted a revised draft resolution (A/C.4/36/L.3/Rev.1), by which:

(a) Operative paragraph 8 was replaced by the following:

"8. Requests, to that end, the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to ensure that the United Nations participates in the organization and conduct of the referendum, and to report on this subject, and on the measures requiring a decision by the Security Council, to the General Assembly and the Security Council;".

(b) Operative paragraph 9 was deleted and the remaining paragraphs were renumbered.

14. On 2 November, the Secretary-General submitted, in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, a statement of the administrative and financial implications (A/C.4/36/L.8) relating to draft resolutions A/C.4/36/L.2 and A/C.4/36/L.3/Rev.1.

15. At the 20th meeting, on 4 November, the representative of Mexico, on behalf of the sponsors, who were now joined by Ghana and Swaziland, introduced the revised draft resolution (A/C.4/36/L.3/Rev.1). Subsequently, Guyana and Mauritania became sponsors of the revised draft resolution.

16. At the same meeting, the representative of Morocco, in drawing attention to document A/C.4/36/8 (see para. 6 above), withdrew draft resolution A/C.4/36/L.2 on behalf of the sponsors.

17. At the 21st meeting, on 9 November, the Chairman drew attention to a draft decision submitted by Kenya (A/C.4/36/L.19) and to a revised statement submitted by the Secretary-General (A/C.4/36/L.8/Rev.1), in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, concerning the administrative and financial implications relating to the revised draft resolution (A/C.4/36/L.3/Rev.1) and the draft decision (A/C.4/36/L.19).

/...

18. At the same meeting, the representative of Kenya introduced the draft decision (A/C.4/36/L.19).

19. The Fourth Committee then took the following action on the revised draft resolution (A/C.4/36/L.3/Rev.1) and on the draft decision (A/C.4/36/L.19): 9/

(a) The Fourth Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.4/36/L.3/Rev.1 by a recorded vote of 73 to 7, with 54 abstentions (see para. 20 below). The voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Iran, Jamaica, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Morocco, Senegal, United States of America, Zaire.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Bolivia, Burma, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, Uruguay.

(b) The Fourth Committee adopted draft decision A/C.4/36/L.19 without objection (see para. 21 below).

9/ Statements in explanation of vote were made by the following Member States: Argentina, Austria, Central African Republic, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Norway, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

/...

### III. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FOURTH COMMITTEE

20. The Fourth Committee recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolution:

#### Question of Western Sahara

The General Assembly,

Having considered in depth the question of Western Sahara,

Recalling the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling its resolution 35/19 of 11 November 1980 on the question of Western Sahara,

Having considered the relevant chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 10/

Having heard the statements made on the question of Western Sahara, in particular the statement of the representative of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, 11/

Recalling its resolution 35/117 of 10 December 1980 on co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,

Taking note of the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its eighteenth ordinary session, held at Nairobi from 24 to 27 June 1981, to organize throughout the Territory of Western Sahara a general and free self-determination referendum of the people of Western Sahara, 12/

Taking note of the decision adopted by the Implementation Committee on Western Sahara of the Organization of African Unity at the first ordinary session held at Nairobi from 24 to 26 August 1981, concerning the establishment of appropriate machinery to enable the people of Western Sahara to express themselves freely and democratically on their future, 13/

10/ A/36/23 (Part V), chap. IX.

11/ A/C.4/36/SR.15, paras. 21-26, and A/C.4/36/SR.19, paras. 3-5.

12/ See A/36/534, annex II, resolution AHG/Res.103 (XVIII).

13/ See A/36/512-S/14692, annex.

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Organization of African Unity;
2. Welcomes the efforts made by the Organization of African Unity and its Implementation Committee on Western Sahara with a view to promoting a just and definitive solution to the question of Western Sahara;
3. Takes note of the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its eighteenth ordinary session to organize throughout the Territory of Western Sahara a general and free self-determination referendum of the people of Western Sahara;
4. Welcomes the steps taken by the Implementation Committee with a view to organizing and conducting the referendum;
5. Appeals to the two parties to the conflict, Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, to observe a cease-fire in accordance with the decisions of the Organization of African Unity and its Implementation Committee;
6. Urges, to that end, Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro to enter into negotiations with a view to establishing an immediate cease-fire and concluding a peace agreement permitting the fair conduct of a general and free self-determination referendum in Western Sahara;
7. Reaffirms the determination of the United Nations to co-operate fully with the Organization of African Unity in the fair and impartial organization of the referendum;
8. Requests, to that end, the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to ensure that the United Nations participates in the organization and conduct of the referendum, and to report on this subject, and on the measures requiring a decision by the Security Council, to the General Assembly and the Council;
9. Requests the Secretary-General to co-operate closely with the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity with a view to the implementation of the decisions of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity and of the Implementation Committee, and of the present resolution;
10. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to continue to consider the situation in Western Sahara as a matter of priority and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

/...

\* \* \*

21. The Fourth Committee also recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft decision:

Question of Western Sahara

The General Assembly, taking account of the resolution adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its eighteenth ordinary session, held at Nairobi from 24 to 27 June 1981, 14/ by which it decided, inter alia, to establish an Implementation Committee on Western Sahara, and the decision adopted by the Implementation Committee at its first ordinary session, held at Nairobi from 24 to 26 August 1981, 15/ requests the Secretary-General to give assistance, in consultation and co-operation with the Organization of African Unity, to the Implementation Committee in the discharge of its mandate regarding the question of Western Sahara arising from the above resolution and decision and to report thereon to the Assembly and the Security Council, as appropriate.

14/ See A/36/534, annex II, resolution AHG/Res.103 (XVIII).

15/ See A/36/512-S/14692, annex.

DRAFT PIR ITEM

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43/81

93572812

UNGA 36 - WESTERN SAHARA

In this year's UNGA Fourth Committee, Algeria again tabled a pro-Polisario draft resolution, but this time in defiance of widespread hopes that an agreed OAU draft could have been tabled based on recent efforts of the OAU Implementation Committee to encourage a solution in Western Sahara acceptable to both Morocco and Algeria. Algeria's uncompromising attitude contributed to an erosion of support for its resolution, which was passed in the Fourth Committee by 73-7-54, compared to 88-8-43 in last year's UNGA Plenary. (A Moroccan resolution had earlier been withdrawn). Australia, together with Austria, Sweden and Finland, all of whom last year voted for the Algerian resolution on the basis of their support for the principle of self-determination, this year joined other Western countries in abstaining. A number of moderate African countries including Kenya (the Chairman of the OAU Implementation Committee) and Nigeria also abstained. Subsequently, Fourth Committee also adopted, by consensus, a "supplementary" decision proposed by Kenya as OAU Chairman requiring the Secretary-General to assist the OAU Implementation Committee in discharging its mandate on the question of Western Sahara.

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U N C L A S S I F I E D

UNGA 36 : WESTERN SAHARA

WE WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE A CABLED REPORT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE VOTE ON THIS ITEM.

ACTION: FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
DEP DEFENCE

FOREIGN MINISTER  
DEP P M AND CABINET

MIN DEFENCE  
JIO

ACTION: IO  
AME

SEC	DEPSEC-A	DEPSEC-B	DEPSEC-C	LA
EX	MCO	PA	FAS(EANZ)	CN
FAS(DN)	DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)	FAS(ECO)
FAS(LT)	IL	FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

OUT

93572872

F. UN 836/2

Fourth Committee (AM)

Press Release GA/T/2364  
9 November 1981

ANNEX I

Vote on Draft Resolution on Western Sahara

The Fourth Committee (Decolonization) this morning adopted the revised draft resolution on Western Sahara (document A/C.4/36/L.3/Rev.1) by a recorded vote of 73 in favour to 7 against, with 54 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussia, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Iran, Jamaica, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, USSR, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Morocco, Senegal, United States, Zaire.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Bolivia, Burma, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Gambia, Federal Republic of Germany, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United Republic of Cameroon, Uruguay.

Abstain: China, Democratic Kampuchea, Djibouti, Dominica, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Kuwait, Liberia, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, Romania, Saint Vincent, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Upper Volta, Yemen.

(END OF ANNEX I)

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*+RR Algiers, Paris, Lnd,  
Nairobi.*

RESTRICTED

UNGA 36 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : WESTERN SAHARA

THE ALGERIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED BY THE FOURTH COMMITTEE TODAY, 9 NOVEMBER, BY 73 - 7 - 54 (AUSTRALIA). THIS COMPARED TO A VOTE IN PLENARY LAST YEAR OF 88 - 8 - 43. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ASPECT OF THE VOTING WAS THE NUMBER OF AFRICAN STATES WHICH ABSTAINED : CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, GAMBIA, GUINEA, KENYA, MALAWI, NIGER, NIGERIA, SOMALIA, SUDAN, CAMEROON. THE NEGATIVE VOTES WERE FROM MOROCCO, UNITED STATES, ZAIRE, SENEGAL, GABON, EQUATORIAL GUINEA AND EL SALVADOR.

2. THE COMMITTEE ALSO ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS A DECISION PROPOSED BY KENYA WHICH REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO GIVE ASSISTANCE TO THE OAU IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE IN THE DISCHARGE OF ITS MANDATE REGARDING THE QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA. KENYA PROPOSED THIS DECISION AS CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE OAU BUT NOT ON BEHALF OF THE IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE. IT WAS AGREED BY ALGERIA THAT THE DECISION COULD BE ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS PROVIDED THAT IN INTRODUCING IT THE KENYAN WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IT WAS SUPPLEMENTARY TO RATHER THAN IN ANY WAY CONTRADICTORY WITH THE ALGERIAN DRAFT.

3. THE RESULT IS NOT A PARTICULARLY GOOD ONE FOR ALGERIA. NO WESTERN COUNTRIES SUPPORTED THEIR DRAFT AND IT WAS GENERALLY AGREED THAT THEIR STUBBORNNESS IN PURSUING A DRAFT WHICH WENT BEYOND THE IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE RESOLUTION HAD ALIENATED SUPPORT.

ACTION: FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DNA

PRIME MINISTER  
DEP DEFENCE

FOREIGN MINISTER  
DEP P M AND CABINET

MIN DEFENCE  
JIO

.../2

RESTRICTED

ASSEMBLY : SAHARA

UNITED NATIONS, Nov 9, AAP-AP - OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF MOROCCO AND THE UNITED STATES, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S COMMITTEE ON DECOLONIZATION TODAY APPROVED A RESOLUTION ENDORSING THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF THE FORMER SPANISH SAHARA TO INDEPENDENCE. THE RESOLUTION SPONSORED IN PART BY SUCH RADICAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES AS ALGERIA, ANGOLA AND LIBYA, WON APPROVAL BY A 73-7 VOTE, WITH 54 ABSTENTIONS. THE RESOLUTION NOW GOES TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOR ACTION.

THOSE VOTING AGAINST THE RESOLUTION INCLUDED FOUR AFRICAN STATES BESIDE MOROCCO - EQUATORIAL GUINEA, GABON, SENEGAL AND ZAIRE. THE TWO OTHER DISSENTERS WERE THE UNITED STATES AND EL SALVADOR. THE SPLIT IN AFRICAN RANKS WAS FURTHER EVIDENT IN THAT 14 AFRICAN COUNTRIES ABSTAINED, INCLUDING SUCH MODERATES AS NIGERIA, TUNISIA AND KENYA, CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE 51-NATION ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU).

MOROCCO, WHICH IS DEFENDING ITS CLAIM TO THE WESTERN SAHARA AGAINST THE INSURGENT POLISARIO INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT, HAS AGREED TO AN OAU COMPROMISE PLAN FOR A CEASEFIRE AND A REFERENDUM ON THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF THE TERRITORY. THE POLISARIO GUERRILLAS ARE SUPPORTED BY LIBYA AND ALGERIA.

THE ALGERIAN-ENGINEERED RESOLUTION APPROVED TODAY WELCOMES THE OAU INITIATIVE, BUT MOROCCAN AMBASSADOR MEHDI MRANI ZENTAR AND US ENVOY WILLIAM SHERMAN OBJECTED THAT THE RESOLUTION PREJUDGED THE ISSUE.

AAP-AP

EXR0136  
AFP-17

ORAN-VOTE 1.

UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK, NOV. 9 (AFP) - THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S DECOLONISATION COMMITTEE TODAY ADOPTED TWO DRAFTS ON THE WESTERN SAHARA DEALING WITH U.N. HELP FOR MOVES BY THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) TO STAGE A REFERENDUM IN THE EX-SPANISH TERRITORY BEING FOUGHT OVER BY MOROCCO AND THE POLISARIO LIBERATION FRONT.

THE FIRST RESOLUTION, SUBMITTED BY POLISARIO'S CHIEF BACKER ALGERIA AND 38 OTHER COUNTRIES, REAFFIRMED THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE.

IT APPEALED TO MOROCCO AND THE FRONT TO OBSERVE A CEASEFIRE, KEEPING WITH OAU DECISIONS, ASKING THEM TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO GET AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND A PEACE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ENABLE A REFERENDUM TO BE HELD.

THE MOTION WON 73 VOTES, SEVEN COUNTRIES, INCLUDING MOROCCO, VOTED AGAINST, AND 54 COUNTRIES ABSTAINED.

THE TEXT STRESSED U.N. DETERMINATION TO WORK WITH THE OAU IN ORGANISING AND STAGING THE REFERENDUM, AND ASKED THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO TAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES.

MORE JAW/HL

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935/2872

EXR0137  
AFP-18

SAHARAN-VOTE 2 LAST (UNITED NATIONS).

FOUR AFRICAN COUNTRIES VOTED WITH MOROCCO AGAINST THE RESOLUTION -- ZAIRE, SENEGAL, GABON AND EQUATORIAL GUINEA. THE OTHER TWO OPPONENTS WERE THE UNITED STATES AND EL SALVADOR. MAURITANIA, WHICH ORIGINALLY WAS INVOLVED IN THE DESERT WAR AGAINST POLISARIO BUT HAS SINCE RELINQUISHED CLAIMS TO PART OF THE TERRITORY, VOTED IN FAVOUR.

AMONG THE DOZEN AFRICAN COUNTRIES ABSTAINING WAS KENYA, CURRENT OAU CHAIRMAN AND SPONSOR OF THE SECOND TEXT, WHICH WAS ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS. NOTING THE JUNE OAU SUMMIT'S DECISION TO ORGANISE A REFERENDUM, THE TEXT ASKED THE U.N. TO SUPPLY ASSISTANCE, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE OAU, TO THE SPECIAL IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE FORMED BY THE PAN-AFRICAN BODY TO GET THE SUMMIT RESOLUTIONS CARRIED OUT.

IT ASKED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT AS APPROPRIATE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

THE OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES ABSTAINING WERE CAMEROON, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, EGYPT, GAMBIA, GUINEA, MALAWI, NIGER, NIGERIA, SOMALIA, SUDAN AND TUNISIA. OTHER ABSTAINERS INCLUDED THE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET.

IN RABAT, SEMI-OFFICIAL MOROCCAN SOURCES EXPRESSED DEEP SATISFACTION AND HAILED THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE KENYAN TEXT BY CONSENSUS AS A VICTORY TO THE EXTENT THAT IT MEANT IT WAS BEING LEFT TO AFRICA TO SOLVE THE WESTERN SAHARAN ISSUE.

MOROCCAN RADIO SAID IT WAS ALSO A VICTORY AGAINST "THE SOWERS OF DIVISION IN AFRICA AND THE ENEMIES OF MOROCCO'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY".

JAW/HL

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U N C L A S S I F I E D

UNGA 36 : FOURTH COMMITTEE ON WESTERH SAHARA

WE ARE CONCERNED BY TENOR OF REFTELS BUT IN THE ABSENCE OF COPIES OF RELATED NEW YORK TELEGRAMS (OTHER THAN UN22015), OR OF THE RELEVANT TEXTS, WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO OFFER ANY COMMENT. IN THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD REPEAT RELEVANT TELEGRAMS TO US.

*Mr. Penny*  
ACTION: FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

*we didn't ask them.*

PRIME MINISTER  
DEP DEFENCE

FOREIGN MINISTER  
DEP P M AND CABINET

MIN DEFENCE  
JIO

ACTION: IO

OGBAAF

SEC	DEPSEC-A	DEPSEC-B	DEPSEC-C	LA
EX	MCO	PA	FAS(EANZ)	EUR
FAS(DN)	DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)	CN
FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	IL	FAREP-M	AME
FAREP-S				FAREP-P

*R James*

FIRST

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FIRST

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UNGA 36 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : WESTERN SAHARA

WE AGREE THAT YOU SHOULD ABSTAIN ON THE ALGERIAN DRAFT IN COMPANY WITH THE NORDICS AND AUSTRIA. ALTHOUGH WE WOULD PREFER YOU NOT TO MAKE AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE ON THIS OCCASION, YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO DO SO, DRAWING ON THE BRIEF, IF YOU CONSIDER THAT THIS WOULD BE USEFUL IN EXPLAINING OUR POSITION. WE WOULD HAVE HOPED, IN PARTICULAR THAT AN AGREED OAU DRAFT COULD HAVE BEEN TABLED WHICH WOULD HAVE DRAWN WIDESPREAD SUPPORT.

ACTION: FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
DEP DEFENCE

FOREIGN MINISTER  
DEP PM AND CABINET

MIN DEFENCE  
JIO

ACTION: IO  
AME

SEC	DEPSEC-A	DEPSEC-B	DEPSEC-C	LA
EX	MCO	PA	FAS(EANZ)	CN
FAS(DN)	DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)	FAS(ECO)
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*[Signature]*

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93.72812

ACTION: IO  
COPY NO. 3

**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

O.PA94401 JAMC  
TOR 06.40 07.11.81

O. PA94401 1800 6.11.81 CLA

TO.  
PP CANBERRA/9539

RP.  
PP UN NEW YORK/1200 ALGIERS/710

EM. PARIS EMB / FILE 226/7 REF 0.UN22193

RESTRICTED

UNGA 36 : FOURTH COMMITTEE - WESTERN SAHARA

WE FULLY CONCUR WITH UN NEW YORKS RECOMMENDATION THAT AUSTRALIA ABSTAIN ON THIS YEAR'S ALGERIAN TEXT. THE CASE FOR ABSTAINING IS STRENGTHENED CONSIDERABLY BY SIMILAR INTENTIONS ON THE PART OF LEADING MEMBERS OF THE OAU IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE.

2. SUCH A VOTE WOULD SEEM CONSISTENT WITH OUR GENERAL PRINCIPLES ON SUCH DISPUTES, NOTABLY IN THIS CASE THE PREFERENCES OF THE DAU, AND WOULD ALSO PROVIDE A USEFUL GESTURE IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MOROCCO.

ACTION: FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DNA

PRIME MINISTER FOREIGN MINISTER MIN DEFENCE  
DEP DEFENCE DEP P M AND CABINET JIO

**ACTION:** IO OGBAAFA  
AME

SEC	DEPSEC-A	DEPSEC-B	DEPSEC-C	LA	
EX	MCO	PA	FAS(EANZ)	EUR	CN
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R. James

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ACTION: IO  
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INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.UN22193 JCNI  
TOR 11.39 06.11.81

O.UN22193 1900 5.11.81 CLA FIRST

TO.  
PP CANBERRA/1220

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RR PARIS EMB/1133

LRR Algiers

FM. UN NEW YORK / FILE 412/1 103/3/4

R E S T R I C T E D

UNGA 36: FOURTH COMMITTEE: WESTERN SAHARA

MOROCCO HAS NOW WITHDRAWN ITS DRAFT RESOLUTION. KENYA HAS SO FAR FAILED TO CONVINCE ALGERIA TO WITHDRAW ITS DRAFT AND ALTHOUGH THE OAU IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE IS PERSISTING IN ITS EFFORTS TO DRAFT A COMPROMISE, THE GENERAL EXPECTATION IS THAT, IN THE FACE OF ALGERIAN INTERANSIGENCE, IT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DO SO.

2. IN THAT SITUATION THE FOURTH COMMITTEE WOULD ONLY HAVE THE ALGERIAN DRAFT ON WHICH TO VOTE. LIKE LAST YEAR, MOST WEOS WILL ABSTAIN. ONLY AUSTRIA, SWEDEN, FINLAND AND AUSTRALIA VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE ALGERIAN DRAFT LAST YEAR. THE OTHER THREE ARE RECOMMENDING AN ABSTENTION THIS YEAR AND WE NOW DO LIKEWISE. INDEED, OUR PREFERRED POSITION WOULD BE TO ABSTAIN IN ANY EVENT. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT SOME MEMBERS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE (INCLUDING TANZANIA AND NIGERIA) ARE PLANNING TO ABSTAIN.

3. AUSTRIA AND SWEDEN HAVE SOUGHT TO CONVINCE THE ALGERIANS THAT THEIR PRESENT DRAFT ONLY SERVES TO ALIENATE ALGERIA'S FEW WESTERN SUPPORTERS FROM LAST YEAR BUT THESE ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN TREATED DISMISSIVELY BY BEDJAOUTI. WHEREAS LAST YEAR BEDJAOUTI ASIDUOUSLY COURTED WESTERN SUPPORT, THIS YEAR HE HAS BEEN TOTALLY INFLEXIBLE.

4. MOROCCO HAS INDICATED TO US THAT THEY HOPE WE WILL MOVE TO AN ABSTENTION.

5. ALGERIA IS PUSHING FOR A VOTE AS EARLY AS TOMORROW 6 NOVEMBER. WE THINK THIS UNLIKELY BUT WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS BY THEN JUST IN CASE.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

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ACTION: IO  
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INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PA94331 MJWO  
TOR 05.24 05.11.81

O.PA94331 1830 4.11.81 CLA

TO.  
PP CANBERRA/9477 UN NEW YORK/1196

RP.  
PP ALGIERS/707 CAIRO/468

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 226/3/7 REF O.PA93993

C O N F I D E N T I A L

UNGA 36 - FOURTH COMMITTEE, ITEM 19 - WESTERN SAHARA

SUMMARY: FRANCE WOULD CERTAINLY VOTE FOR AN OAU-SPONSORED RESOLUTION CLOSELY CONSISTENT WITH THE NAIROBI TEXT, AND WOULD PROBABLY VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE CURRENT MOROCCAN DRAFT, IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT IT CAME TO A VOTE. IT WOULD ABSTAIN ON THE CURRENT ALGERIAN DRAFT, AND ON PROBABLE ALGERIAN AMENDMENTS TO THE MOROCCAN DRAFT, BECAUSE THEY SINGLE OUT MOROCCO AND POLISARIO WITHOUT MENTIONING OTHER PARTIES TO THE WESTERN SAHARAN DISPUTE. THIS IS MUCH THE SAME VOTING PATTERN AS FRANCE HAS ADOPTED IN PREVIOUS YEARS: SEVERAL OTHER WEOGS ARE LIKELY, AS IN THE PAST, TO VOTE FOR THE ALGERIAN TEXT.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

IN CONVERSATION ON 4 NOVEMBER POLETTI, MOROCCO/WESTERN SAHARA DESK OFFICER IN THE FRENCH EXTERNAL RELATIONS MINISTRY, SAID THAT AT THIS STAGE - WITH THE FOURTH COMMITTEE DEBATE ON WESTERN SAHARA LIKELY TO BE RESUMED ON 5 OR 6 NOVEMBER - THE ORIGINAL SHORT OAU DRAFT, PHRASED IN TERMS TO WHICH NO ONE COULD TAKE EXCEPTION AND CLOSELY CONSISTENT WITH OAU'S NAIROBI RESOLUTION ON A WESTERN SAHARA SETTLEMENT, HAD DISAPPEARED, BUT THAT A SIMILAR TEXT HAD BEEN CIRCULATED BY KENYA (AS CHAIRMAN OF THE OAU IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE) IN VERY SIMILAR TERMS. THIS TEXT HAS NOT FORMALLY BEEN PRESENTED AND IT WAS NOT CERTAIN THAT IT WOULD BE. IF IT WERE, FRANCE WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY IN VOTING FOR IT, AND INDEED IT WAS UNLIKELY TO MEET OPPOSITION FROM ANY QUARTER.

2. MOROCCO'S TEXT (O.UN22015) WAS STILL ON THE TABLE. IT HAD BEEN CLEVERLY DRAFTED, WAS CLOSELY CONSISTENT WITH THE OAU DECISION, MADE REFERENCES TO HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS SUCH AS UNGA RESOLUTION 15/41 ON SELF-DETERMINATION WHICH HELPED SUPPORT MOROCCO'S POSITION, AND EMPHASISED THE OAU PRINCIPLES FOR A SETTLEMENT. FRANCE COULD ONLY VOTE IN FAVOUR OF SUCH A RESOLUTION, AND POLETTI SUPPOSED THAT OTHER WEOGS WOULD REACT SIMILARLY.

3. HOWEVER THE LIKELIHOOD WAS THAT THE MOROCCAN DRAFT WOULD BE

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WITHDRAWN, EITHER FOLLOWING THE TABLING OF AN OAU IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE TEXT (O.UN22015, PARA 4) OR BECAUSE OF THE RISK THAT ALGERIA WOULD SUCCEED IN HAVING THE MOROCCAN TEXT AMENDED BEFORE IT WAS PUT TO THE VOTE, BUT THE INSERTION OF REFERENCES (WHICH IT HAS ALREADY CIRCULATED) TO HEARINGS BY THE FOURTH COMMITTEE OF BOTH MOROCCO AND POLISARIO. WHILE THIS DID NOT GO AS FAR AS NAMING MOROCCO AND POLISARIO AS PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE, IT IMPLIED MUCH THE SAME THING. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES FRANCE WOULD ABSTAIN IN ANY VOTE ON THE ALGERIAN AMENDMENTS. HOWEVER THE LIKELIHOOD WAS THAT MOROCCO, TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE NEAR-CERTAIN ADOPTION OF THE ALGERIAN AMENDMENTS, WOULD WITHDRAW ITS TEXT IN ADVANCE.

4. AS FOR THE ALGERIAN DRAFT, THIS SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED POLISARIO (AND MOROCCO) AS PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT. IT WAS THEREFORE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO MOROCCO, AND - IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FRENCH POLICY ON WESTERN SAHARA RESOLUTIONS OF VOTING IN FAVOUR ONLY OF THOSE WHICH WERE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL OF THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED - FRANCE WOULD ABSTAIN. POLETTI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT, AS IN PREVIOUS YEARS, IT WAS PROBABLE THAT SOME OTHER WEOS, SUCH AS THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, GREECE AND POSSIBLY HOLLAND, WOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE ALGERIAN TEXT.

5. IN DISCUSSING THE AUSTRALIAN VOTE, WE NOTED THAT OUR VOTES IN FAVOUR OF ALGERIAN TEXTS IN PREVIOUS YEARS APPEARED NOT IN THE EVENT TO HAVE CAUSED FRICTION IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH MOROCCO. POLETTI COMMENTED THAT MOROCCO'S REACTION TO AN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY'S VOTES TENDED TO DEPEND ON THE DEGREE OF CLOSENESS OF THE VOTE. THUS LAST YEAR, WHEN THE MOROCCAN TEXT MISSED OUT BY ONLY ONE VOTE, MOROCCO WAS VOLUBLE IN ITS CRITICISM OF GREECE FOR HAVING VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE ALGERIAN TEXT WHILE ABSTAINING ON THE MOROCCAN.

- COMMENT -

6. FROM THE ACCOUNT ABOVE IT SEEMS TO US THAT OUR VOTE WILL NEED TO BE DECIDED NOT ONLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE TEXT THEMSELVES BUT OF INDICATIONS OF ANY LIKELY MOROCCAN REACTION TO AUSTRALIAN VOTES, AND OF THE LIKELY CLOSENESS OF THE VOTE. POLETTI COMMENTED THAT, WHILE TIME WAS NOW SHORT, MANY DEVELOPMENTS COULD STILL OCCUR. HE WELCOMED THE PROSPECT OF CLOSE CONSULTATION BETWEEN OUR DELEGATION AND THE FRENCH IN NEW YORK: FRANCE HAD CLOSE RELATIONS WITH BOTH MOROCCO AND ALGERIA, WITH SENSITIVE ASPECTS IN BOTH CASES, AND THE FRENCH DELEGATION IN NEW YORK WOULD BE WELL INFORMED ON DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING THE WESTERN SAHARA DEBATE.

7. ON REFLECTION, THE COMMENT IN PARA 3 OF OUR REFTEL THAT A VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE ALGERIAN DRAFT WOULD CAUSE US FEWER DIFFICULTIES IF MOROCCO WERE TO WITHDRAW ITS TEXT SEEMS MISTAKEN: IT MIGHT IN FACT BE HELPFUL IF WE WERE ABLE TO VOTE FOR BOTH A MOROCCAN (OR ALTERNATIVELY AN OAU IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE) TEXT AND AN ALGERIAN ONE. IF

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**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

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THERE IS ONLY AN ALGERIAN TEXT, MOROCCO IS ALL THE MORE LIKELY TO EXAMINE THE VOTING PATTERN CRITICALLY. ACCORDING TO POLETTI, THE LATEST INFORMATION FROM NEW YORK WAS THAT THE OAU DID NOT INTEND TO PRESENT ITS DRAFT UNLESS BOTH MOROCCO AND ALGERIA AGREED TO WITHDRAW THEIRS: THIS ALGERIA WAS UNLIKELY TO DO. MOROCCO ON THE OTHER HAND WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY WITHDRAW ITS TEXT, LEAVING ONLY THE ALGERIAN TEXT, WHICH UNLIKE THE MOROCCAN HAD AN IMPRESSIVE NUMBER OF CO-SPONSORS.

8. WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT MOROCCO IS SHOWING ITSELF AT NEW YORK TO BE MORE SENSITIVE AND ACCOMMODATING TO INTERNATIONAL OPINION THAN AT FIRST SEEMED THE CASE. SINCE SENDING REFTEL WE HAVE SEEN A REPORT OF STATEMENTS BY OAU SECRETARY GENERAL KODJO THAT HASSAN HAD INDICATED TO HIM IN DISCUSSIONS ON 27 OCTOBER THAT MOROCCO WOULD DO ALL IT COULD TO AVOID FURTHER IMPEDIMENTS TO THE PEACE PROCESS, AND HAD EMPHASISED HIS COMMITMENT TO THE AOU SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS. POLETTI CONFIRMED PRESS REPORTS THAT HASSAN HAD TOLD FRENCH EXTERNAL RELATIONS MINISTER CHEYSSON DURING HIS VISIT LAST WEEK TO MOROCCO THAT HE WOULD WELCOME A REFERENDUM "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE". (POLETTI COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS HARDLY SURPRISING, AS THE OAU CHAIRMANSHIP, AND THUS THE SUPERVISION OF A REFERENDUM, WOULD PASS FROM KENYA TO LIBYA AT THE END OF THE YEAR). POLETTI OBSERVED THAT MOROCCAN DOMESTIC CRITICISM OF HASSAN FOR COMPROMISING AT NAIROBI ON THE WESTERN SAHARA WAR EFFORT HAD, PARADOXICALLY, HELPED HASSAN INTERNATIONALLY BY ENABLING HIM TO PRESENT HIMSELF AS A MODERATING INFLUENCE ON MOROCCAN OPINION.

**ACTION: FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA**

PRIME MINISTER  
DEP DEFENCE

FOREIGN MINISTER  
DEP P M AND CABINET

MIN DEFENCE  
JIO

**ACTION: IO**

OGBAAF

SEC	DEPSEC-A	DEPSEC-B	DEPSEC-C	LA
EX	MCO	PA	FAS(EANZ)	EUR
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FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	IL	FAREP-M	AME
FAREP-S				FAREP-P

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

935/2812

## FACSIMILE MESSAGE

Precedence: PP

F.UN 760

Date / Time of Lodgement:

1800 29.10.81

CSN UNCH 790

UNCLASSIFIED

TO CANBERRA

FM UNNY

For Information:

FM FILE 103/3/4

TO FILE

REF.

NO. OF PAGES

2

Subject Heading or Summary of Text:

UNGA 36 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 19 - WESTERN SAHARA

THE ALGERIANS HAVE SUBMITTED A REVISED DRAFT  
(L3/REV.1) ON WESTERN SAHARA IN WHICH THE ONLY CHANGE  
IS TO COMBINE AND AMEND PARAS 8 AND 9 OF THE TEXT CONTAINED  
IN F.UN 731 AS FOLLOWS :

NEW PARAGRAPH 3 : "REQUESTS, TO THAT END, THE  
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO  
TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO ENSURE THAT THE  
UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATES IN THE ORGANISATION  
AND CONDUCT OF THE REFERENDUM, AND TO REPORT  
ON THIS SUBJECT, AND ON THE MEASURES REQUIRING  
A DECISION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, TO THE  
GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL;"

2. IN ADDITION THE ALGERIANS HAVE TABLED  
AMENDMENTS TO THE MOROCCAN DRAFT AS FOLLOWS

Sender

CHAN 29/10/81 F/N

Signature & Date

Dept/Section

Phone No.

No. of copies to be  
returned to sender .....



## General Assembly

Distr.  
LIMITEDA/C.4/36/L.3/Rev.1  
28 October 1981  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

Thirty-sixth session  
FOURTH COMMITTEE  
Agenda item 19

**IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE  
TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES**

**QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA**

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Burundi,  
Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen,  
Ethiopia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Lao People's Democratic Republic,  
Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mexico, Mozambique,  
Nicaragua, Panama, Rwanda, St. Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles,  
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia,  
Zambia and Zimbabwe: revised draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Having considered in depth the question of Western Sahara,

Recalling the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling its resolution 35/19 of 11 November 1980 on the question of Western Sahara,

Having considered the relevant chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1/

1/ A/36/23 (Part V), chap. IX.

ESTADO  
SOLITARIO



Having heard the statements made on the question of Western Sahara, in particular the statement of the representative of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro,

Recalling its resolution 35/117 of 10 December 1980 on co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,

Taking note of the decision adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its eighteenth ordinary session, held at Nairobi from 24 to 27 June 1981, to organize throughout the territory of Western Sahara general and free self-determination referendum of the people of Western Sahara, 2/

Taking note of the decision adopted by the Implementation Committee of the Organization of African Unity at the meeting held at Nairobi from 24 to 26 August 1981 concerning the establishment of appropriate machinery to enable the people of Western Sahara to express themselves freely and democratically on their future, 3/

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Organization of African Unity;

2. Welcomes the efforts made by the Organization of African Unity and its Implementation Committee with a view to promoting a just and definitive solution to the question of Western Sahara;

3. Takes note of the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity to organize throughout the territory of Western Sahara a general and free self-determination referendum of the people of Western Sahara;

4. Welcomes the steps taken by the Implementation Committee of the Organization of African Unity with a view to organizing and conducting the referendum;

5. Appeals to the two parties to the conflict, Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, to observe a cease-fire in accordance with the decisions of the Organization of African Unity and its Implementation Committee;

6. Urges, to that end, Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro to enter into negotiations with a view to

2/ See A/36/534, annex II, resolution AHG/Res.103 (XVIII).

3/ A/36/512-S/14692, annex.

/...

establishing an immediate cease-fire and concluding a peace agreement permitting the fair conduct of a general and free regular self-determination referendum in Western Sahara;

7. Reaffirms the determination of the United Nations to co-operate fully with the Organization of African Unity in the fair and impartial organization of the referendum;

8. Requests, to that end, the Secretary-General of the United Nations to take the necessary steps to ensure that the United Nations participates in the organization and conduct of the referendum, and to report on this subject, and on the measures requiring a decision by the Security Council, to the General Assembly and the Security Council;

9. Requests the Secretary-General of the United Nations to co-operate closely with the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity with a view to the implementation of the decisions of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity and of the Implementation Committee, and of this resolution;

10. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to continue to consider the situation in Western Sahara as a matter of priority and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

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The General Assembly

Having considered:

Recalling the  
Declaration on the  
Granting of Independence to  
Colonial Countries and Peoples,  
and the Declaration on  
the Elimination of Colonialism  
in All its Forms;

Recalling also the  
General Assembly's resolution  
of 14 December 1960, concerning  
the situation in Western Sahara;

Recalling further the  
General Assembly's resolution  
of 14 December 1960, concerning  
the situation in Western Sahara;

F. UN 76/1



UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
LIMITED  
  
A/C.4/36/L.6  
27 October 1981  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

Thirty-sixth session  
FOURTH COMMITTEE  
Agenda item 19

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE  
TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Madagascar, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe and Seychelles: amendments to draft resolution  
A/C.4/36/L.2

1. Sixth preambular paragraph

Replace the statements made to the General Assembly by the statements made on the question of Western Sahara, in particular the statements of Morocco and of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro,

2. Insert the following text as operative paragraph 1 and renumber the remaining paragraphs accordingly:

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

3. New paragraph 2 (former paragraph 1)

Replace of a self-determination referendum in Western Sahara by a general and free self-determination referendum of the people of Western Sahara;

4. New paragraph 5 (former paragraph 4)

Replace the present text by:

5. Requests the Secretary-General to co-operate fully with the Organization of African Unity in carrying out the decisions of its Implementation Committee;

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A/C. 30.2.6  
English  
Page 2

5. Add the following text as paragraph 7:

7. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to continue to consider the situation in Western Sahara as a matter of priority and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

ENDS

DA. DEPT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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TOR 19.42 24.10.81

O.PA93993 0930 24.10.81 CLA

TO.  
PP CANBERRA/9166 UN NEW YORK/1187

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PP ALGIERS/702 CAIRO/462

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 226/3/7 REF O.UN22015

R E S T R I C T E D

UNGA 36 : FOURTH COMMITTEE, ITEM 19 : WESTERN SAHARA

AS BACKGROUND TO CONSIDERATION OF THIS YEAR'S WESTERN SAHARA RESOLUTIONS, YOU MIGHT FIND IT USEFUL TO KNOW THAT THE WESTERN SAHARA WARFARE HAS RECEIVED INCREASED ATTENTION IN THE FRENCH PRESS DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS. SEEN FROM HERE, THIS SEEMS TO REFLECT BOTH AN INTENSIFICATION IN THE FIGHTING AND A DESIRE BY BOTH SIDES TO STEP UP THE PROPAGANDA WAR TO COINCIDE WITH THE U.N. DEBATE. FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN THE MORE SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS REPORTED:

- MOROCCAN AIRCRAFT HAVE OVERFLOWN MAURITANIA IN EXERCISE OF A CLAIMED RIGHT TO ''HOT PURSUIT'': THIS HAS CAUSED, NOT SURPRISINGLY, A SHARP MAURITANIAN REACTION. MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTER BOUCETTA IS QUOTED AS CLAIMING THAT ''TENS OF THOUSANDS OF MAURITANIAN TROOPS'' HAVE BEEN AMONGST THOSE WOUNDED.

- KING HASSAN HAS CLAIMED THAT POLISARIO GUERRILLAS ARE USING MOROCCAN TERRITORY AS A BASE FOR STEPPED-UP ATTACKS ON MOROCCAN FORCES. THE MAURITANIAN EMBASSY IN PARIS ISSUED A PRESS RELEASE ON 21 OCTOBER REJECTING HASSAN'S ACCUSATIONS AND ADDING THAT MAURITANIA HAD CONTINUED TO SEEK GOOD RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO BUT THAT THE KING'S STATEMENT CONSTITUTED A NEW ATTACK ON MAURITANIA AND CALLED INTO QUESTION THE AGREEMENTS REACHED AT THE NAIROBI OAU SUMMIT.

- BOTH THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT AND POLISARIO HAVE ISSUED STATEMENTS CLAIMING A VICTORY DURING CLASHES ON 13-19 OCTOBER AT GUELTA-ZEMMOUR: ON BALANCE, OUR READING OF THESE REPORTS SUGGESTS THAT POLISARIO WAS SUCCESSFUL IN TAKING GUELTA-ZEMMOUR BUT SUBSEQUENTLY CHOSE TO EVACUATE IT, HAVING DEMONSTRATED THEIR CAPACITY FOR SIGNIFICANT VICTORIES OVER MOROCCAN-MANNED GARRISONS. A TOTAL OF SOME TWO THOUSAND TROOPS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING, WITH CONSIDERABLE ARMAMENTS. TWO MOROCCAN MIRAGES HAD EARLIER BEEN

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SHOT DOWN BY POLISARIO IN THE VICINITY.

- SOON AFTER THIS FIGHTING, HASSAN CLAIMED THAT IT HAD RESULTED FROM AN UNPROVOKED ATTACK BY POLISARIO, AND THAT IT ABSOLVED MOROCCO OF ANY OBLIGATION TO CONTINUE TO RESPECT THE NAIROBI AGREEMENTS, IN PARTICULAR IN FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE MODALITIES OF A REFERENDUM. IN THEIR STATEMENTS, MOROCCAN SPOKESMEN ACCUSED LIBYA AS WELL AS ALGERIA OF BACKING THE NEW POLISARIO ATTACKS. WE HAVE SEEN REPORTS OF POLISARIO DENIALS OF THIS BACKING. MOROCCO HAS ALSO CLAIMED THAT SOVIET-BACKED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PERSONNEL WERE INVOLVED IN THE GUELTA-ZEMMOUR FIGHTING.

- THE POLISARIO ATTACK HAD BEEN PRECEDED BY INTENSIFIED PRESSURE FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATION WITH MOROCCO ON A CEASE-FIRE AND THE CONDUCT OF A REFERENDUM. PRESS COMMENT HERE NOTED THAT POLISARIO CURRENTLY FINDS ITSELF IN A STRONG POSITION IF SUCH A REFERENDUM WERE TO BE HELD, IN VIEW OF ITS RECENT MILITARY SUCCESSES.

COMMENT

2. THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT HAS UNDOUBTEDLY HARDENED ITS POSITION OVER RECENT WEEKS. IT IS RELEVANT THAT THE ONLY RECENT DOMESTIC UNREST HAS BEEN THE RESULT OF CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR NOT PURSUING THE WESTERN SAHARAN WAR SUFFICIENTLY VIGOROUSLY (O.PA92752 OF 15 SEPTEMBER). AS ALGIERS HAS REPORTED IN ITS BB SUMMARY OF 9 SEPTEMBER, MOROCCO HAS RECENTLY BEEN UNRESPONSIVE TO CONTINUING EFFORTS BY THE OAU COMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN SAHARA TO DEVELOP THE REFERENDUM PROPOSAL.

3. AS TO THE DRAFT UNGA RESOLUTIONS (WITHOUT HAVING SEEN TEXTS), WHILE WE HAVE POSSIBLY IN THE PAST OFFENDED THE +MAURITANIAN+ BY VOTING IN FAVOUR OF ALGERIAN DRAFTS, IT LOOKS TO US AS IF THIS YEAR'S ALGERIAN DRAFT NEED CAUSE US NO DIFFICULTIES, ALL THE MORE OF COURSE IF MOROCCO WERE TO WITHDRAW ITS TEXT.

4. IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR THE FINAL TEXT TO BE CLOSELY CONSISTENT WITH THE OAU'S NAIROBI DECISION, WHICH AS NOTED IN REFTEL PARA 3, WOULD MEAN A FURTHER MODIFICATION OF THE REFERENCE TO POLISARIO'S STATUS IN ANY EVENTUAL NEGOTIATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE ALGERIANS' SUSPICIONS OF MOROCCO'S COMMITMENT TO A CEASEFIRE AND A REFERENDUM IS PROBABLY WELL FOUNDED: MOROCCO'S PRIMARY FOCUS IS ON THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIMENSION, AND IT IS PROBABLY HOPING THAT ITS INTERNATIONAL STANDING WILL BE HELPED BY REGIONAL CONCERN AT ANY DESTABILISING ACTIVITY, ESPECIALLY IF PROMOTED BY LIBYA, FOLLOWING SADAT'S ASSASSINATION.

+CORRECTION+ PARA 3.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

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SFA (UNC MEA)

UNGA 36 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 19 : WESTERN SAHARA

1. HOPES THAT THERE WOULD BE A CONSENSUS RESOLUTION ON THE WESTERN SAHARA THIS ASSEMBLY, IN THE LIGHT OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE OAU AT ITS 18TH ORDINARY SESSION (24-27 JUNE, NAIROBI) AND THE DECISION ADOPTED BY THE OAU IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE (24-26 AUGUST, A/36/512), ARE RECEDING.
2. BOTH ALGERIA AND MOROCCO HAVE NOW TABLED SEPARATE RESOLUTIONS SET OUT IN OUR 931. TH ALGERIAN TMTTTT

SET OUT IN OUR 931. THE ALGERIAN TEXT WHILE REFRAINING FROM ANY CRITICISM OF MOROCCO GOES BEYOND THE OAU DECISION IN URGING THE "TWO PARTIES(U/L2) (OUR UNDERLINING) TO THE CONFLICT, MOROCCO AND THE FRENTE POPULAR PARA LA LIBERACION DE SAGUA EL-HAMRA Y DE RIO DE ORO, TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH A VIEW TO ESTABLISHING AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND CONCLUDING A PEACE AGREEMENT PERMITTING THE FAIR CONDUCT OF A GENERAL AND FREE REGULAR SELF-DETERMINATION REFERENDUM IN WESTERN SAHARA". THIS FORMULATION, THE MOROCCANS ARGUE, WAS CAREFULLY AVOIDED IN THE OAU DECISION AT NAIROBI AND REMAINS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE MOROCCANS AS IT WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO MOROCCO ACCORDING RECOGNITION TO THE POLISARIO.

3. THE MOROCCAN DRAFT SIMPLY NOTES THE OAU RESOLUTION AND AUTHORISES THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO GIVE ALL NECESSARY ASSISTANCE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE TO CARRY OUT ITS MANDATE.
4. MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE (INCLUDING THE CHAIRMAN, WHO IS NEGOTIATING HARD FOR A SINGLE TEXT), RECALLING THE DIFFICULTIES THAT AROSE LAST YEAR, ARE HOPING THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE OAU IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE MAY YET COSPONSOR THEIR OWN CONSENSUS RESOLUTION ON THE CONDITION THAT THE TWO OTHER TEXTS ARE WITHDRAWN. HOWEVER, IT DOESN'T SEEM VERY LIKELY THAT SUCH A RESOLUTION WILL EMERGE. THE ALGERIAN CAMPAIGN IN THE COMMITTEE IS WELL UNDERWAY - THEY HAVE ATTRACTED 34 COSPONSORS SO FAR - AND THEY WILL NOT WANT

TO WITHDRAW THEIR DRAFT IN FAVOUR OF AN IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE TEXT WHICH IN PRACTICE COULD SAY LITTLE MORE THAN THE MOROCCAN DRAFT. MOREOVER, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY TEXT WHICH DOES NOT CLEARLY MENTION THE POLISARIO AS A PARTY TO THE CONFLICT.

5. THE DEBATE PROPER ON THE WESTERN SAHARA IS LIKELY TO TAKE PLACE EARLY NEXT WEEK. IT WILL BE POSSIBLE THEN TO GAUGE MORE ACCURATELY AFRICAN THINKING ON THE QUESTION. WESTERN COUNTRIES AT THE MOMENT ARE DIVIDED BETWEEN THOSE WHO COULD CONTEMPLATE SUPPORTING BOTH RESOLUTIONS (NETHERLANDS, FRANCE, IRELAND, AUSTRALIA) AND THOSE WHO WOULD PREFER TO STAY OUT OF THE QUESTION BY ABSTAINING ON BOTH (REST OF THE EC 10, NORWAY, SWEDEN, FINLAND).

6. FOR OUR PART WE WOULD BE INCLINED TO RECOMMEND THAT, WE JOIN THE NORDICS AND MOST OF THE TEN IN AN ABSTENTION.

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**R E S T R I C T E D**

**UNGA 36 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 19 - WESTERN SAHARA**

THE TWO DRAFT RESOLUTIONS TABLED TODAY (COPIES TO CANBERRA ONLY BY FAX) BY ALGERIA AND MOROCCO RESPECTIVELY INDICATE THAT THE QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA WILL CONTINUE TO BE A CONTROVERSIAL ITEM THIS YEAR IN THE FOURTH COMMITTEE.

2. THE MOROCCAN DELEGATION HAD EMPHASISTED TO US THAT IT WAS HOPING THAT THIS YEAR ANY RESOLUTION ON WESTERN SAHARA WOULD TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF DECISIONS REACHED IN NAIROBI BY THE ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE OAU IN JUNE AND BY THE IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE ON WESTERN SAHARA OF THE OAU IN AUGUST. ACCORDINGLY, MOROCCO'S EXPECTATION WAS THAT THIS YEAR THERE WOULD BE A GENERAL RESOLUTION WHICH SUPPORTED THE EFFORTS OF THE OAU AND WHICH COULD BE ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS.

3. MOROCCO'S MOVE IN TABLING A DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH ESSENTIAL LOOKS TO WHAT THE OAU HAS DECIDED IS A COUNTER TO THE ALGERIAN DRAFT WHICH MENTIONS (AT OPERATIVE PARAS 5 AND 6) POLISARIO AS A PARTY TO THE CONFLICT IN WESTERN SAHARA. THIS IS A POINT WHICH MOROCCO COMPLETELY REJECTS AND WHICH, AS IT HAS POINTED OUT TO US, WAS NOT MENTIONED IN THE DECISIONS OF THE OAU ON WESTERN SAHARA.

4. MOROCCO HAS SAID THAT IT CAN SEE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO VOTE AGAINST THE ALGERIAN DRAFT UNLESS IT CAN BE, ESPECIALLY BY DELETING THE REFERENCES TO POLISARIO. IN THE MEANTIME, IT HAS BEEN CONSULTING WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE OAU IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE TO SEE IF THE COMMITTEE MIGHT BE ABLE TO PRODUCE A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON WESTERN SAHARA WHICH CAN BE ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS. IF THIS EVENTUATES MOROCCO HAS SAID IT IS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW ITS TEXT.

5. THE ALGERIANS, FROM THEIR PERSPECTIVE, HAVE ACTUALLY PREPARED A DRAFT WHICH IS MORE MODERATE THAN THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED LAST YEAR. WHILE POLISARIO IS CERTAINLY MENTIONED THERE IS NO REFERENCE TO ITS ''SOLE AND AUTHENTIC STATUS'' AS THERE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY. THE

.../2

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ALGERIANS HAVE SAID THAT THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO COUNTENANCE ANY AMENDMENTS WHICH WOULD MODERATE THEIR DRAFT AND THAT THEY REMAIN SUSPICIOUS ABOUT THE GENUINE COMMITMENT OF MOROCCO TO A CEASEFIRE AND A REFERENDUM.

6. AT THIS STAGE WESTERN AND LIKEMINDED COUNTRIES TO WHOM WE HAVE SPOKEN HAVE NOT DECIDED HOW THEY MIGHT VOTE ON THESE TWO TEXTS.

ACTION: FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
DEP DEFENCE

FOREIGN MINISTER  
DEP P M AND CABINET

MIN DEFENCE  
JIO

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

ACTION: IO OGBAAFA

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## DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## FACSIMILE MESSAGE

Precedence: RR

F.UN731

Date / Time of Lodgement: 22.10.81 1840

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TO CANBERRA

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For Information:

FM FILE 103/3/4

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NO. OF PAGES

5

Subject Heading or Summary of Text: UNGA 36 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 19 - WESTERN  
SAHARA

THE FOLLOWING ARE DRAFT RESOLUTIONS TABLED BY ALGERIA AND MOROCCO RESPECTIVELY IN THE FOURTH COMMITTEE TODAY. YOU WILL SEE THAT THE ALGERIAN TEXT WHICH HAS ALREADY GATHERED A LARGE NUMBER OF CO-SPONSORS FOLLOWS THE DRAFT SENT TO YOU IN F.UN711.

2. SEPARATE COMMENTS ON THE TEXT BY CABLE.

BEGINS:

DEPARTMENT: FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ACTION : 10  
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Sender	CHAN	Signature & Date	22.10.81	Dept/Section	Phone No.	No. of copies to be returned to sender .....
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UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



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A/C.4/36/L.2  
21 October 1981  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

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Thirty-sixth session  
FOURTH COMMITTEE  
Agenda item 19

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING  
OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

*Withdrawn*

Morocco, Senegal and Zaire: draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of Western Sahara,

Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and its resolution 1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960,

Recalling also its resolutions relating to the question of Western Sahara,

Taking account of the resolution on the question of Western Sahara adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its eighteenth ordinary session, held at Nairobi from 24 to 27 June 1981, 1/

Also taking account of the decision adopted by the Implementation Committee on Western Sahara of the Organization of African Unity during its meeting at Nairobi from 24 to 26 August 1981, 2/

Considering the statements made to the General Assembly giving very broad support to the decisions of the Organization of African Unity and to the Implementation Committee in fulfilling its mandate,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the question of Western Sahara, 3/

---

1/ A/36/534, annex II, resolution AHG/Res.103 (XVIII).

2/ A/36/512-S/14692, annex.

3/ A/36/602.

Recalling its resolution 35/117 of 10 December 1980 on co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity;

1. Takes note of and welcomes the resolution on the question of Western Sahara adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its eighteenth ordinary session concerning the organization of a self-determination referendum in Western Sahara;
  2. Also takes note of the decision of the Implementation Committee established by the Organization of African Unity determining the conditions of the cease-fire and the modalities for organizing and conducting the referendum;
  3. Welcomes the readiness of all parties to co-operate fully with the Implementation Committee;
  4. Authorizes the Secretary-General to give all necessary assistance to the Implementation Committee in carrying out its mandate;
  5. Invites the Secretary-General to report on this question to the General Assembly and the Security Council.
-

F.44731/1



UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL  
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A/C.4/36/L.2  
21 October 1981  
ENGLISH  
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Thirty-sixth session  
FOURTH COMMITTEE  
Agenda item 19

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING  
OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Morocco, Senegal and Zaire: draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of Western Sahara,

Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and its resolution 1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960,

Recalling also its resolutions relating to the question of Western Sahara,

Taking account of the resolution on the question of Western Sahara adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its eighteenth ordinary session, held at Nairobi from 24 to 27 June 1981, 1/

Also taking account of the decision adopted by the Implementation Committee on Western Sahara of the Organization of African Unity during its meeting at Nairobi from 24 to 26 August 1981, 2/

Considering the statements made to the General Assembly giving very broad support to the decisions of the Organization of African Unity and to the Implementation Committee in fulfilling its mandate,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the question of Western Sahara, 3/

1/ A/36/534, annex II, resolution AHC/Res.103 (XVIII).

2/ A/36/512 S/14602, annex.

3/ A/36/602.

F.40731/2

A/C.4/36/L.2

English

Page 2

Recalling its resolution 35/117 of 10 December 1980 on co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity;

1. Takes note of and welcomes the resolution on the question of Western Sahara adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its eighteenth ordinary session concerning the organization of a self-determination referendum in Western Sahara;

2. Also takes note of the decision of the Implementation Committee established by the Organization of African Unity determining the conditions of the cease-fire and the modalities for organizing and conducting the referendum;

3. Welcomes the readiness of all parties to co-operate fully with the Implementation Committee;

4. Authorizes the Secretary-General to give all necessary assistance to the Implementation Committee in carrying out its mandate;

5. Invites the Secretary-General to report on this question to the General Assembly and the Security Council.

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General Assembly

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A/C.4/36/L.3  
21 October 1981  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

Thirty-sixth session  
PC JRTB COMMITTEE  
Agenda item 19

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE  
TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mexico, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, St. Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Uganda, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, Zambia and Zimbabwe;

draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Having considered in depth the question of Western Sahara,

Recalling the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling its resolution 35/19 of 11 November 1980 on the question of Western Sahara,

Having considered the relevant chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1/

Having heard the statements made on the question of Western Sahara, in particular the statement of the representative of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro,

1/ A/36/23 (Part V), chap. IX.

Recalling its resolution 35/117 of 10 December 1980 on co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,

Taking note of the decision adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its eighteenth ordinary session, held at Nairobi from 24 to 27 June 1981, to organize throughout the territory of Western Sahara general and free self-determination referendum of the people of Western Sahara,<sup>2/</sup>

Taking note of the decision adopted by the Implementation Committee of the Organization of African Unity at the meeting held at Nairobi from 24 to 26 August 1981 concerning the establishment of appropriate machinery to enable the people of Western Sahara to express themselves freely and democratically on their future,<sup>3/</sup>

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Organization of African Unity;

2. Welcomes the efforts made by the Organization of African Unity and its Implementation Committee with a view to promoting a just and definitive solution to the question of Western Sahara;

3. Takes note of the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity to organize throughout the territory of Western Sahara a general and free self-determination referendum of the people of Western Sahara;

4. Welcomes the steps taken by the Implementation Committee of the Organization of African Unity with a view to organizing and conducting the referendum;

5. Appeals to the two parties to the conflict, Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, to observe a cease-fire in accordance with the decisions of the Organization of African Unity and its Implementation Committee;

6. Urges, to that end, Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro to enter into negotiations with a view to establishing an immediate cease-fire and concluding a peace agreement permitting the fair conduct of a general and free regular self-determination referendum in Western Sahara;

7. Reaffirms the determination of the United Nations to co-operate fully

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2/ See A/36/514, annex 1T, resolution A/HG/Res.103 (XVIII).

3/ A/36/512-S/14692, annex.

/...

with the Organization of African Unity in the fair and impartial organization of the referendum;

8. Requests, to that end, the Secretary-General of the United Nations to take the necessary steps to ensure that the United Nations participates in the organization and conduct of the referendum;

9. Also requests the Secretary-General to report on this subject to the General Assembly and the Security Council;

10. Requests the Secretary-General of the United Nations to co-operate closely with the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity with a view to the implementation of the decisions of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity and of the Implementation Committee, and of this resolution;

11. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to continue to consider the situation in Western Sahara as a matter of priority and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

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ENDS.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

**FACSIMILE MESSAGE**

Precedence: PP

F. UN 711

Date / Time of Lodgement: 19.10.81 1830

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Subject Heading or Summary of Text: UNGA 36: FOURTH COMMITTEE: ITEM 19 -

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WESTERN SAHARA

FOLLOWING IS A DRAFT TEXT WHICH ALGERIA AND THE 25 OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHICH RECOGNISE POLISARIO, HAVE PREPARED. THE TEXT IS BASED UPON THE DECISION OF THE OAU IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE WHICH MET IN NAIROBI IN LATE AUGUST THIS YEAR.

1. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEPT OF DEFENCE.

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FAS(DAME)  
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2. YOU WILL NOTE THAT THE TEXT IN ITS PRESENT FORM IS MODERATE IN TONE ALTHOUGH IT DOES REFER IN OPERATIVE PARAS 5 AND 6 TO POLISARIO AS A PARTY TO THE CONFLICT IN WESTERN SAHARA (MOROCCO OF COURSE DOES NOT ACCEPT THE STANDING OF POLISARIO AS BEING ONE OF THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE).

3. THE NIGERIANS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE TEXT MAY BE TABLED TOWARDS THE END OF THIS WEEK. IN THE MEANTIME WE SHALL ENDEAVOUR TO GET A READING OF MOROCCO AND WEOS (PARTICULARLY THOSE WHO IN RECENT YEARS HAVE VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION) AS TO HOW THEY WILL VOTE ON THIS TEXT.

Sender	Signature & Date	Dept/Section	Phone No.	No. of copies to be
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F.U.N 711/1

The General Assembly,

"Having examined in depth the question of Western Sahara,

Recalling the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence, in conformity with the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and in General Assembly 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on Granting Independence to colonial Peoples and Countries,

~~RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 35/117 OF 10 DECEMBER 1980 CONCERNING~~  
the question of Western Sahara,

Having examined the relevant Chapter of the report of the Special Committee entrusted with the task of following the situation on the implementation of the Declaration on Granting Independence to colonial Peoples and Countries,

Having heard the statements on the question of Western Sahara, particularly the statement by the representative of Polisario,

Recalling its resolution 35/117 of 10 December 1980 concerning cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,

FUND 7/11/2

Taking note of the decision of the 18th Conference of Heads of States and Governments held in Nairobi (Kenya) from 24 to 27 June 1981, to organize on the totality of the territory of Western Sahara a general and free referendum on self-determination of the people of Western Sahara,

Taking note of the decision taken by the Organization of African Unity Implementation Committee at its meeting held in Nairobi from 24 to 26 August 1981, regarding the setting-up of appropriate machinery in order to enable the people of Western Sahara to freely and democratically determine their future.

- 1) Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self determination and independence in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), as well as with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and Organization of African Unity.
- 2) Welcomes the efforts made by the Organization of the African Unity and its Implementation Committee, aimed at promoting a just and definitive solution to the Western Sahara question.
- 3) Takes note of the decision of the 18th Conference of Heads of States and Governments of the Organization of African Unity to organize on the totality of the territory of Western Sahara a general and free referendum on self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.

FUN 711/3

- 4)- Welcomes the measures decided by the Organization of African Unity Implementation Committee with a view to organizing and conducting the said referendum.
- 5)- Appeals the two parties to the conflict, Morocco and the Polisario to observe a cease-fire in conformity with the decisions of the Organization of African Unity and its Implementation Committee.
- 6)- Calls upon Morocco and the Polisario Front to this end to enter into negotiations with a view to establish an immediate cease-fire and to conclude a peace agreement which would enable the organization of a general, regular and free referendum on self-determination in Western Sahara.
- 7)- Reaffirms the determination of the United Nations to fully cooperate with the Organization of African Unity in the just and impartial organization of the said referendum.
- 8)- Authorizes to this end the Secretary of the United Nations to take all the necessary measures to ensure the participation of the United Nations in the organization of the said referendum.
- 9)- Requests the Secretary General of the United Nations to report on the matter to the General Assembly and the Security Council.

F.40711/4

- 10)- Requests the Secretary General of the United Nations to cooperate closely with the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity for the implementation of the decisions of the 18th Conference of Heads of States and Governments of the Organization of African Unity, those of the Implementation Committee, as well as the present resolution.
- 11)- Requests the Special Committee on the Implementation of the Declaration on granting independence to colonial Peoples and Countries to examine the question of Western Sahara as a priority item and to report to the General Assembly as its 37th session."

ENDS.

93-72812

A



## General Assembly

Distr.

GENERAL

A/36/602

16 October 1981

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Thirty-sixth session  
Agenda item 19

### IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

#### Question of Western Sahara

#### Report of the Secretary-General

- At its thirty-fifth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 35/19 of 11 November 1980 concerning the question of Western Sahara. Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the resolution read as follows:

#### "The General Assembly,

"12. Requests the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to keep the Secretary-General of the United Nations informed of the progress achieved in implementing the decisions of the Organization of African Unity on the question of the Western Sahara;

"13. Invites the Secretary-General to follow closely the situation in Western Sahara with a view to the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session".

- On 14 September 1981, the Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations, on behalf of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of decision No. AHG/IMP.C/WS/Dec.1 (see annex I) adopted by the OAU Implementation Committee on Western Sahara at its first ordinary session, held at Nairobi from 24 to 26 August 1981 (A/36/512-S/14692).

3. On 23 September 1981, the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity addressed the following letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

"... I wish to inform you that since the adoption of resolution 35/19 this matter has been discussed by the OAU Ad Hoc Committee [of Heads of State on Western Sahara] on two occasions at Freetown, and subsequently at the OAU Summit Conference in Nairobi in June 1981. At the Summit meeting agreement was reached on the holding of a referendum in the Western Sahara. 1/

"An Implementation Committee, established by the Summit Conference, met at Nairobi from 24 to 26 August to consider the implementation of the decision of the Summit Conference.

...

"It is very much hoped that the recent constructive discussions which have taken place between the OAU secretariat and the United Nations Secretariat on the modalities of holding a referendum can be continued.

"I am confident that the co-operation and assistance envisaged in the decision of the OAU Implementation Committee will be forthcoming from the United Nations."

4. At its thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly will have before it the working paper on the item prepared by the Secretariat (A/AC.109/667), which the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples decided to transmit to the Assembly in order to facilitate the consideration of the item by the Fourth Committee.

5. During the year, the Secretary-General has continued to follow closely the situation with regard to Western Sahara. This has involved consultations with the current Chairman of OAU, the Secretary-General of OAU and the parties concerned. Contacts have also been maintained between the OAU secretariat and the United Nations secretariat on this matter.

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1/ The text of decision AHG/Res.103 (XVIII), adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU at its eighteenth ordinary session is contained in annex II to the present report.

/...

**ANNEX I**

**Decision of the OAU Implementation Committee on Western Sahara**

The OAU Implementation Committee on Western Sahara, meeting in its first session in Nairobi from 24 to 26 August 1981, pursuant to resolution AHG/Res.103 (XVIII), a/

Having heard the concerned and interested parties,

Having taken into consideration the results of the consultations held by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the countries, members of the Implementation Committee,

Taking note of the views expressed by the various delegations of the Implementation Committee,

Expressing satisfaction at the positive participation of the parties to the conflict,

Conscious of the need for all parties concerned to co-operate for the successful implementation of resolution AHG/Res.103 (XVIII), of the eighteenth ordinary session of the Assembly of OAU Heads of State and Government, held in Nairobi, so as to attain the objectives laid down in the resolution and make the parties concerned agree on the steps to be taken in the context of that resolution,

Taking into consideration the need for the United Nations to participate in the referendum and cease-fire by virtue of resolution AHG/Res.103 (XVIII), adopted by the eighteenth ordinary session of the Assembly of OAU Heads of State and Government, held in Nairobi, in June 1981:

Decides to organize and conduct a general and free referendum in the Western Sahara, establish and maintain the cease-fire, as follows:

(a) Referendum

I. The referendum shall be one of self-determination which will enable the people of Western Sahara to express themselves freely and democratically on the future of their territory.

II. The referendum shall be held in the Western Sahara (ex-Spanish Sahara) the maps of which were deposited with the United Nations.

a/ See annex II to the present report.

/...

III. All Saharawis listed in the census conducted in 1974 by the Spanish authorities who have attained the age of 18 or above, shall be eligible to vote in the referendum. In determining the Saharawi refugee population in the neighbouring countries, reference should be made to the records of UNHCR. In establishing the population of the Western Sahara, account shall be taken of the internationally-recognized rate of population growth.

IV. The voting shall be by secret ballot on the basis of one person one vote.

V. The people of the Western Sahara shall be given the following choice:

(a) Independence; or

(b) Integration with Morocco.

(b) Structural requirements

I. The referendum shall be organized and conducted by the Implementation Committee in collaboration with the United Nations.

II. For a fair and impartial organization of the referendum, an impartial Interim Administration supported by civilian, military and police components shall be set up.

III. The Interim Administration shall work in collaboration with existing administrative structures in the area.

IV. The Interim Administration shall also be assisted by an adequate number of OAU and/or United Nations peace-keeping forces.

(c) Cease-fire

I. The Committee urges the parties in conflict to agree on a cease-fire through negotiations under the auspices of the Implementation Committee.

II. All the parties concerned shall undertake to respect the cease-fire and maintain it after the proclamation of the date fixed by the Implementation Committee.

III. For the fair conduct of the referendum and the strict observance of the cease-fire, troops of the parties to the conflict should be effectively confined to their bases in conformity with the recommendations of the fifth session of the Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State on Western Sahara held in Freetown, Sierra Leone, from 9 to 11 September 1980.

IV. The peace-keeping force shall be stationed in the area so as to guarantee the cease-fire.

(d) Financing of the implementation of the decision

The current OAU Chairman shall consult the United Nations in order to determine the United Nations involvement in the implementation of this decision, including its financing.

(e) General principles

- I. All the parties undertake to respect the results of the referendum.
- II. Neighbouring countries undertake to respect the results of the referendum and to abstain from interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.
- III. The Implementation Committee shall announce the results of the referendum.

/...

ANNEX II

Decision AHG/Res.103 (XVIII), adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its eighteenth ordinary session

Question of Western Sahara

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting at its eighteenth ordinary session in Nairobi, Kenya, from 24 to 27 June 1981,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General on Western Sahara (document AHG/103 (XVIII) A) and the reports of the fifth and sixth sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State on Western Sahara (documents AHG/103 (XVIII) B) and AHG/103 (XVIII) C), respectively,

Having heard the statements made by His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco, the heads of State of Mauritania and Algeria as well as those made by various heads of State and Government and leaders of delegations,

Noting with appreciation the solemn commitment made by His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco to accept the holding of a referendum in Western Sahara to enable the people of that Territory to exercise their right to self-determination,

Noting further with appreciation His Majesty King Hassan's acceptance of the recommendation of the sixth session of the Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State on Western Sahara contained in documents AHG/103 (XVIII) B), annex I, as well as his pledge to co-operate with the Ad Hoc Committee in the search for a just, peaceful and lasting solution,

Recalling its previous resolutions and decisions on the question of Western Sahara,

1. Adopts the reports of the Secretary-General on Western Sahara and those of the fifth and sixth sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State on Western Sahara and endorses the recommendations contained therein (documents AHG/Res.103 (XVIII)) and congratulates the Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State on Western Sahara for the commendable work done in finding a peaceful solution to the problem of Western Sahara;

2. Welcomes the solemn commitment made by His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco for accepting the organization of a referendum in the territory of Western Sahara;

/...

3. Decides to set up an Implementation Committee composed of Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Tanzania to ensure, with the co-operation of the concerned parties and with full power, the implementation of the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee;

4. Urges the parties to the conflict to observe an immediate cease-fire and calls on the Implementation Committee to ensure the observance of the cease-fire without delay;

5. Directs the Implementation Committee to meet before the end of August 1981 and, in collaboration with the parties in conflict, to work out the modalities and all other details relevant to the implementation of the cease-fire and the conduct and administration of the referendum;

6. Requests the United Nations, in conjunction with OAU, to provide a peace-keeping force to be stationed in Western Sahara to ensure peace and security during the organization and conduct of the referendum and subsequent elections;

7. Mandates the Implementation Committee, with the participation of the United Nations, to take all necessary measures to guarantee the exercise by the people of Western Sahara of self-determination through a general and free referendum;

8. Requests the Implementation Committee in the discharge of its mandate to take into account the proceedings of the eighteenth ordinary session on the question of Western Sahara and to this end invites the OAU Secretary-General to make available the full records of the said proceedings to the Committee.

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**R E S T R I C T E D**

**MOROCCO : FRENCH COMMENTS ON PROPOSED WESTERN SAHARA REFERENDUM**

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN MOROCCO, NOTABLY THE SHARP CRACK-DOWN ON THE MOROCCAN SOCIALIST PARTY (USFP), HAVE BEEN CLOSELY FOLLOWED OVER THE PAST TEN DAYS IN THE FRENCH PRESS. CRITICISM BY FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY LEADERS OF THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS, INCLUDING A DEMAND FOR THE IMMEDIATE FREEING OF ARRESTED SOCIALIST LEADER ABDELLAH BOUABID, LED THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT TO ISSUE A STATEMENT ON 9 SEPTEMBER CRITICISING THE "UNREALISTIC AND TOTALLY IGNORANT" ATTITUDES OF THE FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY. THE STATEMENT ALSO SAID THAT THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT WAS "PERPLEXED, TO SAY THE LEAST" AT THE SOCIALIST PARTY'S "BLIND AND ILLOGICAL DEFENCE OF THE USFP'S OPPOSITION TO THE CONDUCT OF A REFERENDUM IN WESTERN SAHARA". IN THE INTEREST OF FRENCH-MOROCCAN RELATIONS, THE STATEMENT CALLED ON THE FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY TO CEASE ITS "INTEMPERATE" INTERVENTIONS.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

2. SOCIALIST PARTY SPOKESMEN RESPONDED BY DEFENDING THEIR RIGHT TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS BECAUSE OF THEIR LONG STANDING LINKS WITH THEIR MOROCCAN COUNTERPARTS, BUT ON 14 SEPTEMBER THE FRENCH EXTERNAL RELATIONS MINISTRY ISSUED A STATEMENT WHICH HAS HELPED COOL THE ATMOSPHERE. IT EXPRESSES "CONCERN" AT THE CRITICISMS BEING MADE IN MOROCCO OF THE PROPOSED WESTERN SAHARA REFERENDUM, ADDING "WE CONSIDER THAT THE PUTTING INTO EFFECT OF THE SELF-DETERMINATION REFERENDUM IS THE BASIC REQUIREMENT OF ANY SETTLEMENT OF THIS PROBLEM". AT THE SAME TIME, THE STATEMENT CONTINUES "WE ARE HOWEVER CONCERNED THAT THESE EXPRESSIONS OF OPPOSITION SHOULD HAVE LED TO ARRESTS, INCLUDING THAT OF M. BOUABID WHO IS PERSONALLY VERY WELL KNOWN AND VERY WELL REGARDED IN FRANCE".

3. ACCORDING TO "LE MONDE" OF 16 SEPTEMBER, THIS STATEMENT HAS BEEN WELCOMED BY THE MOROCCAN AUTHORITIES. PALACE SOURCES HAVE REMINDED THE PRESS OF MITTERAND'S LETTER SHORTLY AFTER HIS ELECTION ENCOURAGING HASSAN TO ACCEPT A REFERENDUM, AND OF CHEYSSON'S WARM ENDORSEMENT OF THE OAU DECISION. HOWEVER, A USFP SPOKESMAN HAS

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COMMENTED THAT THE FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY "SHOULD REMEMBER THAT WE ARE NO LONGER A FRENCH PROTECTORATE".

COMMENT

4. OBVIOUSLY ENOUGH, THE FRENCH SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT IS UNDER CONFLICTING PRESSURES ARISING FROM ITS SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF A WESTERN SAHARA REFERENDUM AND ITS LONG-STANDING SYMPATHIES WITH THE MOROCCAN SOCIALISTS, WHO ARE OPPOSING THE REFERENDUM. THE FACT THAT THE USFP JUDGES THIS TO BE A POPULAR CAUSE ON WHICH TO CHALLENGE KING HASSAN SUGGESTS THAT THE REFERENDUM, ON WHICH THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY GIVEN EVERY SIGN OF HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS, MAY NEVER AMOUNT TO MUCH.

ACTION: FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
DEP DEFENCE

FOREIGN MINISTER  
DEP P M AND CABINET

MIN DEFENCE  
JIO

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

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10 September 1981  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

Thirty-sixth session  
Agenda item 19\*

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING  
OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

Letter dated 9 September 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Madagascar  
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to the memorandum on Western Sahara, dated 25 July 1981, which was addressed to you on 7 August 1981 by the General Secretary of the POLISARIO Front, on the occasion of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly.

On instructions from my Government, I request you to have this memorandum circulated as an official General Assembly document under item 19 of the provisional agenda.

(Signed) Blaise RABETAFIKA  
Ambassador

\* A/36/150.

ANNEX

Memorandum dated 25 July 1981 from the General Secretary of the POLISARIO Front addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations

Since the early 1960s, the question of Western Sahara has been considered by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity as a decolonization problem.

The international community has judged the matter in this context and has adopted a number of resolutions affirming the right of the Saharaoui people to self-determination and independence.

Since the matter related to a colonial Territory whose people was being subjected to foreign domination, it was normal to recognize that people's right freely to choose its own destiny.

The United Nations has reiterated, in increasingly urgent terms, the need for total liberation of Western Sahara through the implementation of a regular decolonization process.

That process was put into operation by the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2229 (XXI) of 1966, which invited the administering Power to determine the procedures for the holding of a referendum under United Nations auspices with a view to enabling the Saharaoui people to exercise freely its right to self-determination and independence.

Resolution 2229 (XXI) served as a model for a number of provisions which were identical in their substance (see resolutions 2354 (XXII) of 19 December 1967, 2428 (XXIII) of 18 December 1968, 2591 (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, 2711 (XXV) of 14 December 1970, 2983 (XXVII) of 14 December 1972, and 3162 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973).

All of those resolutions and a number of others, insisting on the implementation of the strict right of peoples to self-determination, were adopted with the consent and support of Morocco, which is today committing aggression against our country.

It was the Moroccan delegate, Mr. Benhima, who, speaking in the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, during the debate in 1972 on the decolonization of Western Sahara, said that:

"Morocco was prepared to respect the free expression of the will of the inhabitants when independence was attained."

"Once that Territory became independent, its frontiers would indubitably be respected, like those of all independent countries. Morocco would be prepared to respect the free expression of the will of the inhabitants on that day." (United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Fourth Committee, 2005th meeting, pp. 239-240, paras. 97 and 110).

/...

Also in the context of its action to promote the decolonization of Western Sahara, the United Nations General Assembly sent an investigative mission which visited the Territory in May 1975.

Its report, adopted at the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, was and continues to be testimony of great importance because it enlightens the international community concerning the choice and the will of the Saharaoui people.

"Within the Territory", concluded the report, "the Mission noted that the population, or at least almost all of those persons encountered by the Mission, was categorically for independence and against the territorial claims of Morocco and Mauritania."

The report also concluded that the Saharaoui people had reaffirmed its support of its sole and legitimate representative, the POLISARIO Front.

"The Frente POLISARIO", states the report, "although considered a clandestine movement before the Mission's arrival, appeared as a dominant political force in the Territory."

"The Mission witnessed mass demonstrations in support of the movement in all parts of the Territory." (A/AC.109/L.1063/Add.1 and 2).

In its advisory opinion of 16 October 1975, the International Court of Justice, originally seized of the matter by Morocco, refuted that country's expansionist arguments.

The conclusion relating to the Moroccan claim of "immemorial rights of possession" in the Territory is completely unambiguous.

"... The Court concludes that the materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the Territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity."

"The Court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of resolution 1514 (XV) on the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory." (A/10300, para. 162)

In the face of this firm determination of the international community to bring the decolonization process in Western Sahara to its completion, Morocco scarcely hesitates to evade international law and resort to the most vulgar machinations and to force in order to gain its ends.

/...

The entire world remembers what happened after Morocco's deliberate refusal to comply with the resolutions of international authorities.

It was a war of rapine and genocide waged by the Moroccan forces of aggression against the Saharaoui people. It was colonial occupation, with all of its consequences: large-scale massacres, pillage, imprisonment, torture, and exile for those who were able to flee.

Facing the menace of destruction directed against it, the Saharaoui people has a duty to react in such a way as to preserve the homogeneity and unity of the process initially set in train by the United Nations. It became desirable, indeed imperative, for that people, on pain of disappearance, to proclaim its independence. The only choice open to the Saharaoui people was either to submit to recolonization or to complete the liberation of its country and continue its national liberation struggle, which had already been begun in 1973 against Spanish colonialism.

It is in this context that on 27 February 1976, our people proclaimed its independence and the foundation of its Republic.

Today the Democratic Saharaoui Arab Republic is recognized by more than 45 countries throughout the world.

In Africa, 26 States - that is, the majority - recognize the Democratic Saharaoui Arab Republic, a fact which gives it the right to be a full member of the Organization of African Unity in accordance with its charter.

As the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity said at the eighteenth summit conference of that organization held recently at Nairobi, this is "an administrative procedure with an automatic mechanism which leaves little room for interpretation".

Similarly, the Ad Hoc Committee, in the report of its sixth meeting submitted to the same summit conference, stated that the question of the admission of the Democratic Saharaoui Arab Republic to OAU was "not within its competence".

Since the restoration of a just and lasting peace is one of its primary objectives, the Democratic Saharaoui Arab Republic signed the peace agreement of 5 August 1979 with the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, thereby opening the way to a dynamics of peace, against which Morocco has remained frozen in its position of intransigence.

The deliberate blocking of the normal process of the decolonization of Western Sahara and the transformation of that process into annexationism has brought a firm reaction from international organizations which thus refuse to endorse the policy of the fait accompli.

The Security Council, through the voice of its President, called upon Morocco "to put an end forthwith to the declared march on Western Sahara" (official communiqué of the 1853rd meeting of the Security Council, Thursday, 6 November 1975).

/...

The special envoys of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the region, and in particular Ambassador Rydbeck, have refused to approve the Moroccan occupation. It was Ambassador Rydbeck, who, upon his return to New York in March 1976, declared:

"The conditions for the holding of a popular referendum in the Territory of Western Sahara have not been met, given the presence of foreign troops."

Thus, the Secretary-General of the United Nations did not consent to an endorsement of the electoral farce to which the Moroccan and Mauritanian Governments invited him in 1976 in order to lend credibility to their operation.

He replied to one of them, in substance, as follows:

"... It is not possible for me to consider taking any steps with regard to your message."

To the other he replied:

"... Even if time had permitted and if the necessary information had been furnished, my designation of a representative of the United Nations to attend this meeting and possibly take note of the decisions adopted would not constitute implementation of the aforementioned General Assembly resolutions."

Similarly, the General Assembly has constantly followed the developments in the situation, adopting on each occasion resolutions calling upon Morocco to return to international legality and emphasizing that the Saharaoui people must enjoy all of its national rights.

In its latest resolution, 35/19 of 11 November 1980, the General Assembly again indicates the way that must be followed for the decolonization of Western Sahara.

Reaffirming the legitimacy of the struggle waged by the Saharaoui people for the exercise of its rights, the General Assembly:

"Again declares that it is deeply concerned at the aggravation of the situation deriving from the continued occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and from the extension of that occupation to the part of Western Sahara which was the subject of the peace agreement concluded on 10 August 1979 between Mauritania and the Frente Popular para a la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro;

"Reaffirms that a solution to the question of Western Sahara lies in the exercise by the people of that Territory of their inalienable rights, including their right to self-determination and independence;

"Reiterates the appeal contained in its resolution 34/37 whereby it urged Morocco to join in the peace process and to terminate the occupation of the Territory of Western Sahara;

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"Urges, to that end, Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, representative of the people of Western Sahara, to enter into direct negotiations with a view to arriving at a definitive settlement of the question of Western Sahara."

As in the case of the non-aligned movement, the Organization of African Unity has, for its part, always shown its concern at the aggravation of the situation in Western Sahara. Over the years, the Organization of African Unity has reaffirmed the right of the Saharaoui people to self-determination.

Since the Khartoum summit (1978), all the steps taken and all the machinery set up by the Organization of African Unity have been deliberately blocked by Morocco.

Morocco, which sometimes refuses to attend meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee and sometimes resorts to blackmail, insults and stagecraft, has demonstrated that it intends to persist in its policy of intransigence and recalcitrance against the Organization of African Unity.

Before the Nairobi summit, the King of Morocco had been compelled by his diplomatic isolation and the military defeats of his army to join in the unanimous African acceptance of the Saharaoui people's right to self-determination and of the holding, to that effect, of a general and regular self-determination referendum. (See the decision taken at the eighteenth summit conference, third preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 7.)

Is this the expression of a real political will which the Moroccan Government had not had earlier or of a new manoeuvre designed to postpone a showdown?

The Government of the Democratic Saharaoui Arab Republic cannot help doubting the sincerity of the Moroccan monarchy, for a number of very simple reasons:

First of all, Hassan II has never ceased to pursue his policy of the fait accompli, of intransigence and of creating obstacles to thwart the decisions of international organizations aimed at the decolonization of Western Sahara. Furthermore, it is Morocco itself which, six years ago, resorted to armed aggression to block the process of decolonization of our country, thus rejecting the decisions taken and the provisions adopted by the United Nations with regard to the Saharaoui people's exercise of its national rights to self-determination, independence and territorial integrity.

The statements made by King Hassan II one week after the Nairobi summit confirmed the Saharaoui Government's doubts concerning the willingness of the Moroccan Government to return to reason and to envisage peacefully a just and lasting solution to the existing conflict between the Democratic Saharaoui Arab Republic and the Kingdom of Morocco.

/...

King Hassan II of Morocco is already speaking of an internal referendum in Morocco<sup>11</sup>, whereas the eighteenth summit of the Organization of African Unity decided upon "the holding of a general and regular self-determination referendum of the people of Western Sahara".

The texts are clear and unambiguous.

The step taken by the Organization of African Unity is similar to and identical with the one already envisaged by the United Nations, which was aborted by the Moroccan aggression against the Democratic Saharaoui Arab Republic in 1975.

For the United Nations, as for the Organization of African Unity, the situation is that of a people, the Saharaoui people, which has been recognized to have the right to self-determination and independence within its country, Western Sahara, a territory which is distinct from Moroccan territory.

The ambiguity and confusion which Morocco wants to introduce cannot be accepted, just as the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations will not come to Western Sahara to endorse and legitimatize the Moroccan occupation in keeping with the wishes of Hassan II.

Having condemned and rejected this occupation, the international organizations have as their essential task putting an end to the aggression against the Democratic Saharaoui Arab Republic, thereby enabling its people to enjoy its internationally recognized legitimate rights.

The elimination of the Moroccan occupation in all its forms - military, administrative and physical - is an imperative necessity for the creation of a climate of freedom and security without which the implementation of the principle of the right to self-determination of the Saharaoui people is impossible and impracticable.

The Saharaoui people, like all the peoples of the world, cannot be invited to express its wishes, to choose and to exercise its national rights under the bayonets of its aggressors and in the presence of their military, political and administrative arsenal.

Indeed, by envisaging such hypotheses, one week after the Nairobi summit, King Hassan II insulted Africa and its leaders and manifestly violated the letter and spirit of the decision taken at the eighteenth OAU summit.

The policy of expansionism and obstructionism pursued by Morocco does not change in the slightest the fundamental facts of the decolonization of Western Sahara and the responsibility of OAU and the United Nations with regard to the protection of the legitimate rights of the Saharaoui people and to the restoration of peace between the Democratic Saharaoui Arab Republic and Morocco, in keeping with the principle of the inviolability of frontiers inherited from colonization and of respect for the rights of all peoples to self-determination.

/...

Thus, the Moroccan aggression against our people after its liberation from Spanish colonization, through an armed struggle of national liberation during which our people made great sacrifices, cannot alter in any way the conditions in which the Saharaoui people should effectively and freely exercise its right to self-determination and independence.

Moreover, in 1975, Morocco specified the following conditions to the United Nations as its requirements for the holding of the self-determination referendum in Western Sahara:

- "A. Withdrawal of Spanish troops and administration;
- "B. Presence of United Nations "Blue Helmets" in the Territory;
- "C. United Nations administration in the Territory;
- "D. Transitional period of six months after departure of the Spanish troops and administration."

(United Nations General Assembly document A/AC.109/L.1063/Add.3)

Not only these conditions presented at the time by Morocco but also those presented by the POLISARIO Front, by Mauritania or by Algeria emphasize in particular the total withdrawal of foreign troops and administration, the establishment of a regular United Nations administration and the presence of United Nations peace-keeping forces in the Territory. (A/AC.109/L.1063/Add.3 and 4.)

Why then does Morocco reject today the conditions which it demanded in 1975, for an operation which remains the same, namely: the holding of a general and regular referendum for the Saharaoui people's exercise of its right to self-determination?

This is what clearly proves the lack of a political will for co-operation with OAU and the United Nations, which King Hassan demonstrated at the Nairobi summit.

The Government of the Democratic Saharaoui Arab Republic and the POLISARIO Front intend to co-operate, as in the past, with OAU and the United Nations for the restoration of peace and security in north-western Africa, a region gravely menaced by Moroccan aggression, and to do so on the basis of total and scrupulous respect for the legitimate rights of the Saharaoui people, recognized by all international organizations.

If one envisages today a political and peaceful solution of the conflict in Western Sahara after an on-the-scene setback of the policy of the fait accompli and aggression pursued by the Moroccan Government and its rejection and condemnation at the international level, it is necessary and urgent to enable the Saharaoui people to exercise its national rights freely, without any constraint

/...

or outside pressure and after the total annulment of all measures adopted and all actions taken by the occupiers.

The Moroccan occupation of some towns and villages of the Democratic Saharaoui Arab Republic constitutes the sole obstacle to the implementation of the decisions of international organizations and to the return of peace in the region.

Thus, the conditions for any general and regular self-determination referendum in Western Sahara, conditions endorsed by Morocco and the POLISARIO Front in 1975 at the United Nations, are still unchanged today and remain unchangeable.

These conditions are:

1. Direct negotiations between the two parties to the conflict - the POLISARIO Front and the Moroccan Government - to determine the practical measures for a cease-fire and for the withdrawal of Moroccan occupation troops and administration, so as to create appropriate conditions that will enable the people of Western Sahara to exercise its inalienable right to self-determination through a general, free and regular referendum, in keeping with the Charters of the United Nations and OAU.

2. Withdrawal of Moroccan forces from the entire territory of Western Sahara.

3. Total withdrawal of the Moroccan administration and the Moroccan presence in all its forms.

4. Removal of forces to a distance of 150 km inside the internationally recognized frontiers of Morocco as they were immediately after independence.

5. Return of the entire Saharaoui people to its towns and villages, far from any foreign presence or pressures.

6. Installation of a provisional international administration set up by the United Nations and OAU, with the collaboration of the national administration of the Democratic Saharaoui Arab Republic, in order to ensure the security and tranquility necessary for carrying out in a normal manner the operation of the self-determination referendum of the people of Western Sahara.

7. The provisional international administration shall devote itself, for at least three months, in co-ordination with the national administration of the Democratic Saharaoui Arab Republic, to creating the psychological and moral climate necessary for relieving the direct effects of the practices of extermination, persecution and terror resulting from the expansionist war waged by the Kingdom of Morocco, a climate which is indispensable to any free choice.

8. Release of all Saharaoui detainees (women, children, men) now in Moroccan gaols and concentration camps.

9. The peace-keeping forces of the United Nations shall be stationed especially along the Moroccan-Saharaoui frontiers until the operation of self-determination of the Saharaoui people has been completed.

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R E S T R I C T E D

POLISARIO FRONT : TUVALU POSITION

THE TUVALU HIGH COMMISSIONER IN SUVA (LATASI) HAS TOLD US THAT ALTHOUGH HIS PRIME MINISTER (LAUTI) SAW THE RASD DELEGATION IN VILA, NO COMMITMENT WAS GIVEN ON THE QUESTION OF RECOGNITION. INDEED, QUITE THE CONTRARY. LATASI SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD MALAININ THAT TUVALU DID NOT RPT NOT WISH TO BE INVOLVED IN A MATTER WHICH WAS SO REMOTE FROM ITS CONCERNS. LATASI SAID HE SPECIFICALLY DECLINED TO SIGN THE "PIECE OF PAPER" WHICH WAS PRESENTED TO HIM, WHICH IS PRESUMABLY THE "MESSAGE" REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF REFTEL.

ACTION: FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

A/PRIME MINISTER DEP DEFENCE JIO	FOREIGN MINISTER DEP P M AND CABINET	MIN DEFENCE SPEC. ADVISER TO P.M
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ACTION: PSP  
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				FAREP-M	

ACCRA APIA CAIRO LAGOS LONDON LUSAKA MADRID NOUMEA  
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U N C L A S S I F I E D

WESTERN SAHARA

(FOLLOWING IS REPETITION OF O.NA13915)

BEGINS:

U N C L A S S I F I E D

OAU : WESTERN SAHARA

THE OAU'S IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE ON WESTERN SAHARA MET IN NAIROBI ON 25-26 AUGUST. THE MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY ALL SEVEN MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE. KENYA, TANZANIA, GUINEA, NIGERIA AND SUDAN WERE REPRESENTED BY THEIR HEADS OF STATE (PRESIDENT MOI, OF COURSE, WAS IN THE CHAIR). SIERRA LEONE AND MALI WERE REPRESENTED BY THEIR FOREIGN MINISTERS. HEADS OF STATE OF ALGERIA, MAURITANIA AND MOROCCO ALSO ATTENDED.

2. THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS WHICH CAME OUT OF THE COMMITTEE'S AGREEMENT WERE:

(1) AGREEMENT ABOUT PARTICIPATION IN THE REFERENDUM WHICH WAS AGREED TO IN PRINCIPLE AT THE OAU SUMMIT. VOTING RIGHTS IN THE REFERENDUM WOULD BE BASED ON WESTERN SAHARA POPULATION LISTED IN THE 1974 CENSUS WITH ACCOUNT BEING TAKEN OF REFUGEES WHO HAVE FLED THE SOUTHERN SAHARA IN THE MEANTIME AND SETTLED IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. THE UNHCR WILL BE CONSULTED ON ESTABLISHING WHO AMONGST THE REFUGEES WOULD BE ELIGIBLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE REFERENDUM ON THE BASIS OF THE 1974 CENSUS. THE AGREEMENT ALSO SAID THAT ACCOUNT WILL BE TAKEN OF THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED RATE OF POPULATION GROWTH. THE CHOICE IN THE REFERENDUM WILL BE TO OPT EITHER FOR INDEPENDENCE OR INTEGRATION WITH MOROCCO.

(11) THE COMMITTEE DECIDED TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A CEASEFIRE BY BOTH SIDES DURING WHICH OPPOSING TROOPS WOULD BE EFFECTIVELY CONFINED TO THEIR BASES.

.../2

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

OUT

ACTION: IO  
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OUT

(111) THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD BE ASKED TO PROVIDE PEACEKEEPING TROOPS. THE OAU WOULD ALSO PROVIDE PEACEKEEPING TROOPS.

3. THE COMMITTEE CALLED FOR THE SETTING UP OF AN IMPARTIAL ADMINISTRATION SUPPORTED BY CIVILIAN, MILITARY AND POLICE IN ORDER FOR THE REFERENDUM TO BE FAIR. THE OAU AND/OR UN PEACEKEEPING FORCES WOULD ASSIST THE ADMINISTRATION WHICH WOULD WORK IN COLLABORATION WITH THE EXISTING ONE.

4. THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT AND POLISARIO ARE YET TO FORMALLY ACCEPT THE PLAN. SINCE THE PLAN HAS BEEN AGREED TO, HOWEVER, BY THE SO-CALLED "COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN" IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR EITHER OF THE CONFLICTING PARTIES TO REJECT IT. THERE HAVE ALREADY BEEN REPORTS THAT THE POLISARIO HAS INDICATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH MOROCCO IN ORDER TO TERMINATE THE CONFLICT. THE POLISARIO HAS NOT/NOT REJECTED IT. MOROCCO HAS ALREADY EXPRESSED SOME SATISFACTION WITH THE OAU PLAN.  
ENDS.

ACTION: FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ACTION: IO  
AME

JCAA

FAS(IOAME)

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

OUT

28 AUG 1981

Australian

2

93.7212

# OAU blueprint for Sahara peace

Australian UNITED PRESS: NAIROBI, THURSDAY

p1

THE Organisation of African Unity has produced a blueprint for peace in Western Sahara that drew guarded approval from Morocco and the Polisario Liberation Front, the two main parties to the five-year-old conflict.

The formula, completed yesterday after an all-night session of the OAU's implementation committee, recommended enforcing a ceasefire in the 265,000-square-kilometre territory by a peace-keeping force, possibly including United Nations troops.

It also called for a referendum to give Saharans the choice between independence and integration with Morocco, which took over the territory from Spain in 1976.

In Casablanca, the Moroccan Foreign Minister, Mr Mohammed Boucetta, said the recommendations "again take up those principles Morocco considers as fundamental" but said some points would have to be examined.

In Nairobi, the secretary-general of Polisario, Mr Mohammed Abdelaziz, said the proposals meant that "manoeuvres" by Morocco's King Hassan had been in vain.

"In fact, the committee has reaffirmed the Saharan people's right to self-determination and independence," he said in a statement.

But he reiterated a standing Polisario call for direct negotiations with Morocco, which King Hassan has always refused.

The proposal did not mention direct negotiations and did not recommend that Morocco withdraw from Western Sahara during the planned referendum, another of Polisario's main demands.

Mr Peter Onu of Nigeria, OAU's official spokesman, said the organisation would seek the comments of the parties concerned before deciding on the next step.

The other parties in the dispute are Algeria, which is Polisario's main ally, and Mauritania, a former co-administrator of Western Sahara with Morocco.

Sydney Morning Herald

Sydney Morning Herald

## African oil p2

LONDON, Thursday. — Pressure is mounting on Algeria and Libya to reduce their oil prices following Nigeria's announcement last night of a \$US4 dollar cut in its oil price of \$40 a barrel, oil market analysts said today.

The announcement said the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation would from now on offer all customers a \$4 discount, although the official price would remain at \$40 a barrel. The discount would remain until the end of the year, when it would be reviewed after a scheduled meeting of OPEC on December 10.

Nigeria's decision, which comes into effect immediately, makes it the first major OPEC producer to be forced into a major price cut by the present glut in the world market. It has been hardest hit by the glut, with sales currently down to just over 770,000 barrels a day from about two million at the beginning of this year. Estimates of lost revenue because of the slump in Nigerian sales range from \$1.2 billion to more than \$3.35 billion.

Libya and Algeria are in a particularly vulnerable position since they are still seeking to keep their oil prices high in defiance of the current oil surplus, analysts said.

The two countries produce crudes of similar quality to Nigeria's for around \$40 a barrel and they also have been facing a buyer revolt.

93.728/2  
INFO: IO  
COPY NO. 1

# INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.NA13915 MJDE  
TOR 23.08 27.08.81

O.NA13915 1600 27.8.81 UNC

TO.  
RR CANBERRA/2610

RP.  
RR PARIS EMB/254 ALGIERS/42 + UNNY Teddah

FM. NAIROBI / FILE 235/1

U N C L A S S I F I E D

OAU : WESTERN SAHARA

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(111) THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD BE ASKED TO PROVIDE PEACEKEEPING TROOPS. THE OAU WOULD ALSO PROVIDE PEACEKEEPING TROOPS.

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INFO: IO  
COPY NO. 1

**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

2-0.NA13915

4. THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT AND POLISARIO ARE YET TO FORMALLY ACCEPT THE PLAN. SINCE THE PLAN HAS BEEN AGREED TO, HOWEVER, BY THE SO-CALLED "COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN" IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR EITHER OF THE CONFLICTING PARTIES TO REJECT IT. THERE HAVE ALREADY BEEN REPORTS THAT THE POLISARIO HAS INDICATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH MOROCCO IN ORDER TO TERMINATE THE CONFLICT. THE POLISARIO HAS NOT/NOT REJECTED IT. MOROCCO HAS ALREADY EXPRESSED SOME SATISFACTION WITH THE OAU PLAN.

ACTION: FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DNA

A/PRIME MINISTER FOREIGN MINISTER MIN DEFENCE  
DEP DEFENCE DEP P M AND CABINET JIO

**ACTION:** AME **JCAA**

SEC	DEPSEC-A	DEPSEC-B	LA	EX	MCO
PA	FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(EANZ)	EUR	
FAS(DN)	NUC	NPD	NS	DEF	DPR
FAS(IOAME)	IO	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)		
FAS(MES)	FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S		

ACCRA CAIRO DAR ES SALAAM LAGOS LONDON LUSAKA MOSCOW PEKING  
PRETORIA SALISBURY UN NEW YORK WASHINGTON

INFO: IO  
COPY NO. 1*lun 28/8/81*

① 935/28/2

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.AL5082 BOMA  
TOR 15.38 24.08.81

O.AL5082 1330 23.8.81 UNC

TO.  
RR CANBERRA/3772RP.  
RR PORT MORESBY/07 NAURU/02 WELLINGTON/02  
RR SUVA/03 VILA/02 HONIARA/04  
RR PARIS EMB/879 NAIROBI/30

FM. ALGIERS / FILE 862/98/1 REF O.H05838 O.PM13112

UNCLASSIFIED

## POLISARIO FRONT : POSITION OF SOUTH PACIFIC COUNTRIES

FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE, REFERRED TO IN O.AL5060, AS RE-PRINTED IN "EL MOUDJAHID":

"RECALLING THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF THE WESTERN SAHARA TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CHARTERS AND DECISIONS OF THE UN AND OAU.

"WELCOMING THE DECISION OF THE 18TH SUMMIT OF THE OAU HELD IN NAIROBI FROM 24 TO 27 JUNE 1981, DURING WHICH THE OAU DECIDED ON THE HOLDING OF A GENERAL FREE AND REGULAR REFERENDUM ON SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE WESTERN SAHARA.

"APPEALS TO MOROCCO AND THE SAHARAN ARAB DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTING THE NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS OF THE SHARAN PEOPLE (LE GOUVERNEMENT LEGITIME REPRESENTANT LES ASPIRATIONS NATIONALES DU PEUPLE SAHRAOUI) TO UNDERTAKE NEGOTIATIONS TO DETERMINE THE PRACTICAL MEASURES FOR THE CEASE-FIRE AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE TROOPS AND OF THE MOROCCAN ADMINISTRATION FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE WESTERN SAHARA IN ORDER TO CREATE CONDITIONS ADEQUATE TO PERMIT THE SAHARAN PEOPLE TO EXERCISE THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHTS TO SELF-DETERMINATION THROUGH A GENERAL FREE AND REGULAR REFERENDUM UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE OAU AND THE UN."

2. ACCORDING TO THE SAME PRESS REPORT, THE MESSAGE WAS SENT ON 12 AUGUST TO MM EDEM KODJO, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE OAU AND BRAHIM HAKIM, SAHARAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SIGNED BY MM BARAK SOPE, PAULIAS MATANE, FRANCIS BUGOTO, ATANROI BAITKE AND L.D. KEKE RESPECTIVELY ON BEHALF OF VANUATU, PAPUA NEW GUINEA, SOLOMON ISLANDS, KIRI BATI AND NAURU AS WELL AS BY A DELEGATION FROM TUVALU.

.../2

INFO: IO  
COPY NO. 1

# INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-O.AL5082

ACTION: FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

A/PRIME MINISTER  
DEP DEFENCE  
JIO

FOREIGN MINISTER  
DEP P M AND CABINET

MIN DEFENCE  
SPEC. ADVISER TO P.M

ACTION: PSP  
AME

JBAN  
JBAE

SEC	DEPSEC-A	DEPSEC-B	DEPSEC-C	LA
EX	MCO	PA	FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)
FAS(EANZ)	ANZ	EUR	FAS(DN)	DEF
FAS(IOAME)	IO	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	DPR
FAREP-P	FAREP-S			FAREP-M

ACCR AAPI CAIRO LAGOS LONDON LUSAKA MADRID NOUMEA  
NUKU'ALOFA UN NEW YORK WASHINGTON

93.728/2

RESTRICTED

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.H05838 BOMA  
TOR 0854 21.08.81

O.H05838 0930 21.8.81 CLA

TO.  
RR CANBERRA/5307 ALGIERS/03RP.  
RR WELLINGTON/247 NAURU/192 PARIS EMB/40  
RR SUVA/400 VILA/251 PORT MORESBY/789

FM. HONIARA / FILE 800/1 REF O.PM13112

R E S T R I C T E D

POLISARIO FRONT : SOLOMON ISLANDS POSITION

BUGOTU, SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ADVISES THAT SOLOMON ISLAND POSITION IS SIMILAR TO PAPUA NEW GUINEA'S I.E. SHORT OF FORMAL RECOGNITION.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONAPRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN DEFENCE  
DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
SPEC. ADVISER TO P.M  
JIO

ACTION:	PSP	JBAN		
	AME	JBAE		
SEC	DEPSEC-A	DEPSEC-B	DEPSEC-C	LA
EX	MCO	PA	FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)
FAS(EANZ)	ANZ	EUR	FAS(DN)	DEF
FAS(IOAME)	IO	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	DPR
FAREP-P	FAREP-S			FAREP-M

ACCRÀ APIA CAIRO LAGOS LONDON LUSAKA MADRID NOUMEA  
NUKU'ALOFA UN NEW YORK WASHINGTON

RESTRICTED

*Mr B. Dwyer*  
935/28/2

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PM13112 BOMA  
TOR 1515 20.08.81

O.PM13112 1507 20.8.81 CLA

TO.  
RR CANBERRA/075 ALGIERS/003RP.  
RR WELLINGTON/747 SUVA/921 HONIARA/920  
RR NAURU/346 VILA/556 PARIS EMB/434

FM. PORT MORESBY / FILE 800/93 REF O.AL5060

R E S T R I C T E D

POLISARIO FRONT: PNG POSITION

ABISINITO (ASSISTANT SECRETARY, EUROPE AND AFRICA, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE) WAS SURPRISED TO HEAR OF THE REPORT THAT PNG WAS AMONG FIVE PACIFIC COUNTRIES WHO HAD RECOGNISED THE SAHARA ARAB DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (RASD). HE THOUGHT THERE HAD BEEN A "MISUNDERSTANDING" IN VILA, WHERE A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE RASD (MALAININ) HAD BEEN VISITING DURING THE FORUM MEETING.

2. ABISINITO SAID THAT CONSISTENT WITH THE POSITION ADOPTED DURING MALAININ'S VISIT TO PNG LAST YEAR, PNG WOULD GIVE POLISARIO MORAL SUPPORT, BUT THIS DID NOT EXTEND TO RECOGNITION OF THE RASD.

3. WE ASSUME THEREFORE THAT RASD REPRESENTATIVE IN VILA HAS OVERSTATED AT LEAST PNG'S POSITION.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONAPRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN DEFENCE  
DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
SPEC. ADVISER TO P.M  
JIO

RESTRICTED

27ED

935728/2

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

0.AL5060 GAFR  
TOR 0038 16.08.81

0.AL5060 1430 15.8.81 UNC

TO.  
RR CANBERRA/3753RP.  
RR PORT MORESBY/06 NAURU/01 WELLINGTON/01  
RR SUVA/02 VILA/01 HONIARA/03  
RR PARIS EMB/877

FM. ALGIERS / FILE 862/98/1

U N C L A S S I F I E D

## POLISARIO FRONT - RECOGNITION BY FIVE SOUTH PACIFIC COUNTRIES

ON 14 AUGUST ''EL MOUDJAHID'' PROMINENTLY REPORTED THAT, IN A MESSAGE SENT FROM VILA ON 12 AUGUST TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE OAU AND TO THE RASD MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS FOLLOWING THE CONCLUSION OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM, FIVE SOUTH PACIFIC COUNTRIES HAD RECOGNISED THE SAHARAN ARAB DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (RASD). RECALLING THAT VANUATU HAD RECOGNISED THE RASD IN NOVEMBER 1980, THE REPORT NOTED THAT THE RECOGNITION BY PAPUA-NEW GUINEA, THE SOLOMON ISLANDS, KIRIBATI, NAURU AND TUVALU BROUGHT TO FIFTY THE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES RECOGNISING THE RASD.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONAPRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN DEFENCE  
DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
SPEC. ADVISER TO P.M  
JIO

*① MENG B. Matthews Jr.*

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



② 935/28/2  
(UNP)



Distr.  
GENERAL

A/AC.109/667  
3 August 1981

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION  
WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION  
OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING  
OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES  
AND PEOPLES

WESTERN SAHARA

Working paper prepared by the Secretariat

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## WESTERN SAHARA

### 1. GENERAL

1. Western Sahara is situated on the Atlantic coast of north-west Africa opposite the Canary Islands, bounded on the north and north-east by Morocco and Algeria and on the south and east by Mauritania. It has a total area of about 266,000 square kilometres and its seaboard measures 1,062 kilometres. Its land frontiers extend for a total length of 2,045 kilometres, the frontier with Mauritania being 1,570 kilometres long and that with Morocco and Algeria 475 kilometres. The Territory consists of two regions, Saguia el Hamra and Río de Oro, which form an integral part of the great Saharan Desert.

2. The climate of Western Sahara is very dry with enormous differences between nocturnal and diurnal temperatures. There is very little cultivation, except in some low-lying areas in the south which are watered by occasional rainfall.

3. The physical characteristics of this desert region have determined the traditional way of life of the indigenous inhabitants, who are for the most part nomadic and pastoral, moving continuously over extensive areas which transcend international frontiers. Since 1968, however, following the drought which affected the whole Saharan region, a substantial part of the population has settled in and around urban and trading centres.

4. The principal tribes in the Territory are the Erguibat, Ait Lahsen and Ulad Delim, who are to be found also in Mauritania, Morocco and Algeria.

### 2. BACKGROUND

5. It will be recalled that on 14 November 1975, the Governments of Spain, Morocco and Mauritania agreed upon a Declaration of Principles, also known as the Madrid Agreement, 1/ with respect to the Territory of Western Sahara. In accordance with the Declaration, Spain transferred its powers to a temporary administration, comprising the Spanish Governor-General at that time and two Deputy Governors, one nominated by Morocco and the other by Mauritania. Also in accordance with the terms of the agreement, Spain terminated its presence in the Territory on 26 February 1976. With the withdrawal of the Spanish troops, Moroccan forces moved into the northern and eastern areas of the Territory and Mauritanian forces into parts of the southern area. The forces met with armed confrontation by the forces of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el Hamra y Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), which had announced that it intended to continue the guerrilla war which had begun under the Spanish administration.

6. On 14 April 1976, Morocco and Mauritania signed an agreement whereby the frontier between Mauritania and Morocco was defined by the straight line linking the point of intersection of the 24th parallel north and the 13th meridian west. With the frontier thus defined, the northern part of Western Sahara was integrated into Moroccan territory and the southern part into Mauritanian territory. The

1/ Official Records of the Security Council, Thirtieth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1975, document S/11880, annex III.

Algerian Government, which had opposed the Madrid Declaration, accused the Spanish Government of repudiating its obligations with respect to the decolonization of the Territory and of handing over the Territory to Morocco and Mauritania.

7. The Frente POLISARIO declared that the Saharan people considered "the agreement concluded between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania as null and void and as an act of aggression and banditry" and reaffirmed the inalienable right of the Saharan people to self-determination and independence.

8. On 27 February 1976, representatives of the Frente POLISARIO declared the creation of the "Saharan Arab Democratic Republic". By 1 January 1981, the "Republic" had reportedly been recognized by 44 countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Cuba, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Yemen, Dominica, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Iran, Jamaica, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Panama, Republic of Vanuatu, Rwanda, St. Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

9. On 10 August 1979, following a change of government in Mauritania and various attempts to find a solution to the question of Western Sahara, the Mauritanian Government signed a peace agreement 2/ at Algiers with representatives of the Frente POLISARIO, by which Mauritania renounced all territorial and other claims on Western Sahara and stated that it was withdrawing definitively from the Western Sahara war.

10. On 12 August 1979, Moroccan troops which had been stationed at Dakhla (formerly Villa Cisneros) since 1976 took over the administration of the city as the rest of the Mauritanian sector of Western Sahara. Morocco subsequently moved to consolidate its position in the Territory. Among other measures, the Moroccan Parliament unanimously approved special legislation establishing three seats in Parliament for representatives of what was termed Morocco's thirty-seventh province.

11. In a declaration on 14 August 1979, 3/ Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed Khouna Ould Haidala, the Prime Minister of Mauritania, protested the "occupation by force of Dakhla", stating that that action represented an act of aggression against Mauritania's provisional administration, and requested Morocco to "withdraw its troops immediately from Mauritanian territory". The Prime Minister further stated that his Government had decided to withdraw from Tiris El Gharbia as from 15 August 1979, appealed to the international community to help Mauritania defend its independence and territorial integrity, and called on the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to assume their responsibilities.

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2/ A/34/427-S/13503, annex I. For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fourth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1979.

3/ Ibid., annex II.

12. The reaction of the Frente POLISARIO to the Moroccan action was expressed in a statement by Mr. Hakim Ibrahim, "Foreign Minister" of the "Saharan Arab Democratic Republic". Mr. Ibrahim reportedly said that the Frente POLISARIO would "push its attacks inside Morocco as far and as hard as possible" and proclaimed his movement's determination to fight for "complete sovereignty and territorial integrity".

13. Algeria's position was expressed in a letter dated 16 August 1979 from Mr. Mohamed Seddik Benyahia, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, addressed to the Secretary-General (A/34/420, annex). Mr. Benyahia drew attention to the "serious repercussions" which would arise from Morocco's action. He urged the international community to condemn Morocco's policy and to call for respect for the will of peoples to live in freedom and peace. Algeria appealed to the United Nations to "assume its full responsibility in this matter" and to "demand the immediate and complete withdrawal of all Moroccan occupation forces from the entire territory of Western Sahara".

### 3. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

#### A. Recognition by Spain of the Frente POLISARIO

14. In December 1980 it was reported that Spain had for the first time given official recognition to the Frente POLISARIO and had made a strong declaration in support of self-determination for the people of Western Sahara, in which it had stressed the need for a just and global political solution for the entire Territory. This recognition, which reportedly did not include recognition of the "Saharan Arab Democratic Republic", came in the form of a document signed at Algiers on 17 December by Mr. Jose Cuenca, Director of the Cabinet at the Spanish Ministry of External Affairs and Mr. Emilio Casiniello Aubán, then Spain's Ambassador to Angola, and Mr. Ahmedou Souilem of the Frente POLISARIO.

15. In exchange for this recognition, Spain obtained the release of 36 Spanish fishermen who had been captured by the Frente POLISARIO off the coast of Western Sahara during the preceding six months (see para. 33 below). Reports indicate that, in confirming signature of the agreement, Mr. Joaquín Ortega, Under-Secretary of State at the Spanish Ministry of External Affairs, stated that the Frente POLISARIO had "implicitly" agreed to carry out no further attacks on Spanish fishing vessels off the coast of Western Sahara.

#### B. Statements regarding the situation in Western Sahara

16. In his speech from the throne on 3 March 1981, King Hassan II of Morocco reportedly said that the issue of Western Sahara was "closed", that the Territory belonged to Morocco and that his country was not prepared to relinquish it. Morocco favoured putting an end to the conflict in the Territory but would never accept a solution which would be to the "detriment of an integral part of national territory". The King emphasized that Morocco continued to extend a hand of

/...

friendship to Algeria in order to re-establish peace in the area. The King also paid homage to the Moroccan armed forces stationed in Western Sahara for their "courage in preserving the territorial integrity" of the country.

17. Previously, at a press conference held on 29 January 1981, Mr. Bachir Moustafa Sayed, Deputy Secretary-General of the Frente POLISARIO, reportedly stated that his organization was ready to help Morocco resolve the problem of Western Sahara by favourably receiving any initiative from the United States of America or Europe aimed at finding a solution to the question. Mr. Sayed reiterated that the Frente POLISARIO was ready to negotiate at "any time and any place" and called on Morocco's "friends" to persuade the Moroccan Government to recognize the inalienable rights of the people of Western Sahara.

C. Letters addressed by Mauritania and Morocco to the Secretary-General

18. In a letter dated 17 March 1981, 4/ the Permanent Representative of Mauritania to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General that on 16 March Mauritania's armed forces had prevented an attempted coup d'état led by former officers of the Mauritanian army who had been convicted of desertion and treason. The officers had intended to assassinate leading Mauritanian public figures and then broadcast an appeal to Morocco requesting the intervention of the Moroccan army and air force. Confessions made by commando leaders indicated that the coup had been staged by "the most prominent Moroccan authorities". Mauritania's determination to maintain strict neutrality in the war between Morocco and the Saharan people's liberation forces was seen as the cause for Morocco's action. Mauritania had decided to sever diplomatic relations with Morocco and reserved the right to take future action at the United Nations level.

19. Morocco, for its part, reportedly rejected all accusations that it was involved in the coup attempt and broke diplomatic relations with Mauritania.

20. On 26 March 1981, the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations addressed a letter to the Secretary-General 5/ in which he made "clarifications" of the events of 16 March. He stated that the letter of 17 March from the Permanent Representative of Mauritania contained "a number of groundless and gratuitous accusations against the Kingdom of Morocco, in support of which the Mauritanian Government has not provided the slightest proof". He also stressed the "sincerity, depth and scope of the very friendly relations which Morocco and Mauritania enjoyed for many years" and described the events of 16 March as "purely Mauritanian".

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4/ A/36/133-S/14410. For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-sixth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1981.

5/ A/36/151-S/14419. For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-sixth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1981.

21. In June 1981 however, the official Saudi Arabian press agency announced that Saudi Arabia had succeeded in persuading Morocco and Mauritania to restore diplomatic relations after a meeting between King Khalid of Saudi Arabia, King Hassan II of Morocco and President Mohammed Khouna Ould Haidala of Mauritania at Taif, Saudi Arabia. Subsequently, the Moroccan press reported that Morocco and Mauritania had each agreed: (a) to refuse to allow any force which might be hostile to the other country to pass through or to stop on its territory; and (b) to forbid all hostile political or military action towards the other country and to refuse to give aid or shelter to any national of either country who might engage in such activities.

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4. CONSIDERATION BY THE ORGANIZATION  
OF AFRICAN UNITY

A. Meetings held during 1980

22. At its seventeenth ordinary session, held at Freetown from 1 to 4 July 1980, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU adopted decision AHG/Dec.118 (XVII) (A/35/529, annex), by which it took note of the report of the third session of the Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State on Western Sahara, held at Monrovia from 4 to 6 December 1979; agreed that the Ad Hoc Committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. Siaka Stevens, should continue its work with a view to reconciling the parties involved and seeking a solution to the conflict; welcomed Morocco's willingness to engage in discussions with all interested parties and to participate freely in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee; and decided that the Committee should convene within the next three months at Freetown.

23. The Ad Hoc Committee subsequently met from 9 to 12 September 1980. According to press reports, President Chadli Bendjedid of Algeria, President Haidala of Mauritania and Prime Minister Maati Bouabid of Morocco attended the meetings of the Committee. In addition, Mr. Mohammed Abdelaziz, Secretary-General of the Frente POLISARIO and representatives of 10 Western Saharan groups favouring integration with Morocco appeared before the Committee to present their views. The 10 groups were: Parti de l'Union nationale Sahraoui; Front de libération du Sahara; Front de libération et de l'unité; Mouvement de Résistance des Hommes Bleus (MOREHOB); Mouvement des originaires de la Sakiat el-Hamra et du Rio de Oro (AOSARIO); Association of Former Members of the Moroccan Liberation Army in the Saharan Provinces; "Parents and members of families sequestered in Tindouf", "Local and professional elected members", the Jema'a (Saharan Assembly) and deputies of the Saharan Provinces in the Chamber of Representatives, Rabat.

24. At the conclusion of the meetings, the Ad Hoc Committee is said to have unanimously adopted a six-point plan recommending application of the resolution on the question of Western Sahara adopted at the sixteenth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU, in which the Assembly had, inter alia, called for the preparation of a proper atmosphere for peace in the area through a general and immediate cease-fire (see A/AC.109/621, para. 30). According to press reports, 6/ the six-point plan contained the following recommendations: (a) that a fair and general referendum be held in Western Sahara; (b) that a cease-fire go into effect by December 1980; (c) that the parties involved be asked to leave their forces at their bases during the cease-fire; (d) that United Nations peace-keeping troops be entrusted with ensuring the effectiveness of the cease-fire; (e) that OAU, with the assistance of the United Nations, organize the referendum; and (f) that the Secretary-General of OAU inform the parties of the decisions taken by the Committee.

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6/ The official communiqué has not been received.

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B. Meetings held during 1981

25. During the eighteenth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU, held at Nairobi from 24 to 27 June 1981, King Hassan II reportedly announced that he was prepared to agree to a cease-fire in Western Sahara and to a referendum under international supervision. According to press reports the King stated that "we have decided to prepare a controlled referendum procedure, the terms of which will comply with the recommendations made by the OAU committee on Western Sahara and Morocco's conviction of its legitimate rights". The King is said to have declared that his decision had been influenced by appeals from leaders of 14 countries, including Spain.

26. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government subsequently adopted a resolution (AHG/Res.103 (XVIII)) by which it, inter alia, adopted the reports of the fifth and sixth sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State on Western Sahara and endorsed the recommendations contained therein; welcomed the solemn commitment made by King Hassan II to accept the organization of a referendum in Western Sahara; decided to set up an Implementation Committee composed of Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan and the United Republic of Tanzania to ensure, with the co-operation of the concerned parties, the implementation of the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee; urged the parties to the conflict to observe an immediate cease-fire and called on the Implementation Committee to ensure observance of the cease-fire without delay; directed the Implementation Committee to meet before the end of August 1981 and, in collaboration with the parties in conflict, to work out modalities relevant to the implementation of the cease-fire and the conduct and administration of the referendum; requested the United Nations, in conjunction with OAU, to provide peace-keeping forces to be stationed in Western Sahara to ensure peace and security during the organization and conduct of the referendum and subsequent elections; and mandated the Implementation Committee, with the participation of the United Nations, to take all necessary measures to guarantee the exercise by the people of Western Sahara of self-determination through a general and free referendum.

27. Reaction to King Hassan's announcement included a statement in which President Bendjedid of Algeria reportedly welcomed the announcement and said that the King had taken "the first step in the search for peace". At the same time President Bendjedid is said to have called for the immediate withdrawal of all Moroccan troops from the Territory.

28. Mr. Ibrahim, of the Frente POLISARIO, is reported to have said that this was "another pernicious attempt by Morocco to legitimize its military occupation of Western Sahara".

29. At a press conference in Rabat on 2 July 1981, King Hassan II reportedly stated that "Morocco would ask for the co-operation of the United Nations and OAU and the good-will of Algeria and Mauritania in the holding of a referendum" which would be conducted on the basis of a census carried out by Spain in 1974.

30. Regarding the participation of Saharans living outside the Territory, King Hassan is said to have stated that their identity would have to be confirmed

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against the records of the Spanish census. He added that in three or four months Morocco would be ready to hold the referendum and would reach agreement with United Nations and OAU observers regarding technical arrangements such as the number of voters, the number of polling booths, etc. King Hassan is said to have declared that the electoral campaign would be free but that no one would be allowed to advocate secession. Regarding the withdrawal of forces, the King reportedly said that Moroccan forces would not be withdrawn from Western Sahara during the referendum.

##### 5. CONSIDERATION BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

31. In its consideration of the item in October 1980, the Fourth Committee had before it two draft resolutions (A/C.4/35/L.2/Rev.1 and A/C.4/35/L.7). By a recorded vote of 88 to 6, with 44 abstentions, the Committee, at its 21st meeting on 30 October, recommended to the General Assembly adoption of the first draft resolution, sponsored by 42 countries including Algeria. At its 22nd meeting on 31 October, following a lengthy procedural discussion, the Committee rejected by a recorded vote of 41 to 40, with 58 abstentions, the second draft resolution, sponsored by Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Zaire.

32. On 11 November 1980, the General Assembly adopted resolution 35/19 on the question of Western Sahara. By this resolution the Assembly, inter alia, reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence; deeply deplored the fact that its resolution 34/37 of 21 November 1979 had not been implemented; again declared its deep concern at the aggravation of the situation deriving from the continued occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and from the extension of that occupation to the part of the Territory which had been the subject of a peace agreement between Mauritania and the Frente POLISARIO (see para. 9 above); reaffirmed that a solution to the question lay in the exercise by the people of the Territory of their inalienable rights; took note of the decision on the question adopted by the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government (see para. 22 above); also took note of the conclusions of the fourth session of the OAU Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State (see para. 24 above); welcomed the efforts made by OAU and its Ad Hoc Committee, as well as the availability of the parties concerned and interested, with a view to promoting a just and definitive solution to the question; reaffirmed the determination of the United Nations to co-operate fully with OAU with a view to enabling the people of Western Sahara to exercise their right to self-determination and independence; reiterated the appeal contained in its resolution 34/37 whereby it had urged Morocco to join the peace process and to terminate the occupation of the Territory; urged Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO to enter into direct negotiations; requested the Special Committee to consider the situation in the Territory as a matter of priority and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session; requested the Secretary-General of OAU to keep the Secretary-General of the United Nations informed of the progress made in the implementation of the relevant OAU decisions; and invited the Secretary-General to follow the situation closely and to submit a report on the question of Western Sahara to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

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## 6. MILITARY SITUATION

### A. Seizure of foreign fishing vessels

33. In early June 1980, the Frente POLISARIO reportedly indicated that it would take prisoner and punish all those who violated the "territorial waters of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic". At the same time, the Frente POLISARIO confirmed that it was holding 15 crew members of a Spanish fishing boat, the Garmo Mar, and that it had destroyed a Portuguese fishing boat, the Rio Vouga, and detained its crew members. Subsequently, in October, the Frente POLISARIO captured two more Spanish fishing vessels, the Costa de Terranova and the Sarita, as well as a Portuguese vessel, the Enebe, whose crew was briefly detained.

34. In order to free its nationals, the Portuguese Government undertook negotiations with the Frente POLISARIO in July 1980. These negotiations reportedly resulted in a joint communiqué signed on 24 July in Algiers by which Portugal expressed its "support for the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity under the leadership of the Frente POLISARIO". In return the Frente POLISARIO agreed to free the Portuguese fishermen. Both sides are reported to have urged Morocco to begin negotiations on a settlement in the disputed Territory.

35. The agreement reached with Spain is discussed in paragraphs 14-15 above.

### B. Armed clashes

36. On 17 September 1980 it was reported that King Hassan II had informed members of Morocco's National Security Council that the Moroccan army was in "complete control of the entire Saharan provinces" following "clean-up" operations in the area.

37. Subsequent reports indicated that, following an attack by forces of the Frente POLISARIO on the town of M'Hamid in southern Morocco in October 1980, King Hassan had decided to arm the civilian population of the three provinces bordering Algeria. Sources reported that King Hassan had distributed weapons to members of delegations from the provinces of Guelmim, Taza and Ouarzazate at a palace ceremony and had told the delegations to explain to the people in those frontier areas that the weapons were for self-defence.

38. At the opening session of Parliament, King Hassan II reportedly said that he believed that the attack on M'Hamid had been carried out as a result of a conspiracy against both Morocco and Algeria and suggested that outside forces were seeking to destabilize the area by provoking war between the two countries.

39. On 25 November 1980 it was reported that Morocco was concentrating its attention on defending a "strategic triangle" in Western Sahara by building a defensive line beginning at Ouarkziz in southern Morocco and ending 300 kilometres to the south on the Atlantic coast south of Boujdour. The area to be encompassed was said to include Smara, Bu Craa, El Ayoun and Boujdour. The line, which was

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begun [redacted] August 1980 and completed in the summer of 1981, consists of an earthen wall two or three metres high protected by barbed wire and mine fields.

40. Conflicting reports continue to emanate from the two sides regarding attacks, numbers of casualties and the damage inflicted by either side. During the period under review, the Frente POLISARIO claimed that its forces had attacked Moroccan positions in Western Sahara (Boujdour, Smara, Eguereyir, Daoura and Lemzeiriga) as well as within Morocco (Zaak, Abattih, Rous Lekhyelate, Ras el Khanfra, Bouquerba, Sidi-Amara and Tata).

C. Military aid

41. On 26 January 1981, the United States Government reported that it had decided to sell 108 M60 tanks to Morocco. The tanks had reportedly been requested in July 1980 for delivery in 1983. In addition, the United States is said to have delivered two of the six Rockwell OV-10A Bronco reconnaissance aircraft sold to Morocco in March 1980.

42. Subsequently, on 25 March, the United States Administration was said to have decided that it would no longer link arms sales to Morocco with progress by the Moroccans in achieving a negotiated settlement of the question of Western Sahara.

43. Testifying before two foreign affairs sub-committees of the House of Representatives, Mr. Morris Draple, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, said that arms sales to Morocco would be based on the same criteria as "for other friends" and that "America's allies and close associates should expect understanding and reliable support".

44. Mr. Draple also stated, however, that the United States would encourage Morocco to seek a peaceful negotiated settlement to the conflict over Western Sahara.

7. ECONOMIC SITUATION

45. On 19 December 1980 it was reported that the Moroccan Chamber of Representatives had adopted legislation creating an "exclusive economic zone" extending 200 nautical miles off its Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts, including the waters off Western Sahara. Previously, Morocco's territorial waters had extended 12 nautical miles with an "exclusive fishing zone" of 70 nautical miles. The new legislation gave Morocco exclusive rights to all mineral as well as fishing resources in the sea and on and beneath the sea-bed, and stipulated that the zone could not be explored or exploited economically without Morocco's authorization.

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*Mr. El Aoua up*

*Mr. Bishay*

UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



(P. 93,7292)

(UNP) Distr.  
GENERAL



A/AC.109/665  
31 July 1981  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH  
REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE  
DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF  
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES  
AND PEOPLES

LETTER DATED 15 JUNE 1981 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE  
OF MOROCCO TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN  
OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples has before it, among other questions, the so-called question of Western Sahara.

In that connexion, I wish to state on behalf of my Government that this question can no longer be included in the Committee's agenda, since it no longer embodies any colonial element and is consequently outside the essential sphere of competence of that body.

The question of the decolonization of Western Sahara was settled when the colonial Power finally withdrew from that Territory in 1976 and the local populations overwhelmingly and freely chose to rejoin Morocco, their mother country. The decolonization of Western Sahara, through which the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Morocco was achieved, was accomplished within the framework of international legality by virtue of an agreement concluded with Spain, the administering Power - the Madrid Agreement - of which the United Nations General Assembly took note in resolution 3458 B (XXX) of 10 December 1975.

It is especially important to stress that the provisions of the Madrid Agreement called for the exercise by the population of Western Sahara of their right to self-determination through the consultation of their representative assembly, the Jemâa.

This consultation took place on 26 February 1976, and the Jemâa unanimously opted for the return of Western Sahara and its population to Morocco.

Since then the population of our Saharan provinces has frequently demonstrated that it belongs to the Moroccan nation and to its political, economic and social life by participating in the parliamentary, communal and other elections held under

free and universal suffrage in the presence of foreign observers and the world press.

Our Saharan provinces are now open to anyone wishing to observe for himself the remarkable tranquillity and patriotic fervour prevailing there and the major economic and social development schemes now in progress.

It is consequently my view that consideration by your Committee of the so-called question of Western Sahara is not only unjustified, but also constitutes interference in Morocco's internal affairs. I am all the more opposed to consideration of this question by the Committee in that the discussion thus initiated provides an unexpected opportunity for the development of cheap propaganda dispensed by self-styled petitioners, who in fact are merely mercenaries without a reputable cause being manipulated by foreign interests which wish to injure my country.

I am particularly surprised by the dissemination by your Committee or with its consent of the unfounded rhetoric profferred by these self-styled petitioners in the Committee or one of its subsidiary bodies. The Committee should give no credence to the mendacious propaganda of these self-styled petitioners and should refrain from taking any action on their fanciful, provocative and insulting claims against a respectable State Member of the United Nations, part of whose contributions should not be used thus to fuel a campaign against its national interests.

(Signed) Mehdi Mrani ZENTAR  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative

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## OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

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R E S T R I C T E D

POLISARIO FRONT VISITOR - SADIK BACHIR MALAININ

FROM VIS IMMIGRATION CANBERRA

NO OBJECTION TO VISA ISSUE. GRATEFUL ADVICE VISA ISSUE AND TRAVEL DETAILS INCLUDING PERIOD OF STAY.

2. PLEASE ADVISE A/N THAT AS HE WILL BE AWARE FROM HIS LAST VISIT TO A/A, IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO HAVE CONTACTS WITH MINISTERS AS THE AUSTRALIAN GOVT DOES NOT RECOGNISE THE 'SAHRAWI ARAB DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC.' HOWEVER DEPT FOREIGN AFFAIRS COULD ARRANGE DISCUSSIONS WITH OFFICIALS AND, IF SO WISHED MR MALAININ SHOULD CONTACT AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST BRANCH, D.F.A. ON ARRIVAL.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DEP IMM ETH AFF  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
SPEC. ADVISER TO P.M  
JIO

Mr Edwards <sup>AT</sup> Yes.  
Mr Miller Mena }  
                  {

In view of U.N. involvement / interest in W. Sahara,  
could UNP be included in any talks with  
Malainin please?

John Lewis.

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

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R E S T R I C T E D

WESTERN SAHARA : AFTER THE OAU SUMMIT

Summary

The adoption of the OAU resolution on the Western Sahara has marked a new stage in the evolution of this issue and has provided some sort of a framework with which an internationally supervised solution can be negotiated. However, fundamental differences exist between the parties as to the modalities for conducting the ceasefire and referendum and about the ultimate desirable future for the territory. King Hassan's statement that he supports a referendum but not self-determination is interpreted here as being contrary to the letter and spirit of the OAU resolution. Polisario's nine point plan calls for withdrawal of all Moroccan forces and administration from the disputed territory and their replacement by international administrative and peacekeeping machinery as a prerequisite for the conduct of a referendum. The OAU Committee, which is fairly evenly divided between sympathisers of both sides, will thus have a difficult time in reconciling their positions. In the meantime the fighting will continue. But having now committed himself to a referendum under internationally agreed conditions, King Hassan will find himself under increasing pressure to follow through on that commitment and to permit a genuine and properly supervised act of self-determination.

1. The adoption of the OAU resolution on the Western Sahara has marked a new stage in the dispute over the future of that territory. The initial reactions of both Algeria and Polisario were cautious but, at least in the case of the former, combined with some relief that the King had finally taken the first step in committing Morocco to a referendum process with the involvement of the OAU and the United Nations. For Algeria, this advance, however qualified by references to a "controlled" referendum, at least meant an end to the Moroccan argument that the people of the territory had already expressed their intention to be part of Morocco. Similarly, the adoption of a framework resolution, the setting up of an enlarged OAU Committee to elaborate the modalities "in collaboration with the parties", the call for a UN peace-

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keeping force and the careful distinctions drawn between the references to "the parties to the conflict" and "the (other) parties concerned" all make it impossible for Morocco to continue to argue that the Western Sahara remains a purely bilateral dispute involving itself and Algeria.

2. From Polisario's point of view, Hassan's 2 July Rabat press conference only served to confirm their suspicions about the genuineness of the referendum that was being proposed. Hassan's widely reported remark that "in reality I have never refused a referendum but only self-determination which puts sovereignty in issue" led Polisario to reply that within a week of the Nairobi meeting the King had already violated the letter and spirit of the OAU resolution. Nor did Hassan's statement that "the referendum itself will only be confirmatory because the Moroccan people will not go back on their previous oaths of allegiance" reassure Polisario about Moroccan good faith. Accepting that the King has a very difficult line to tread in selling a referendum within Morocco, not least to the Moroccan Army, the King's press conference made it clear that there is a very wide gulf between the procedure he envisages and the "general and regular referendum of self-determination of the people of Western Sahara" referred to in the OAU resolution.

3. Algeria appears generally happy to play a fairly low key role at present and the Algerian press for the most part limits itself to reporting Polisario reactions and replays of foreign (mostly French) press reports on the domestic problems facing Morocco. However, a Foreign Ministry spokesman did make clear Algeria's view that Morocco could not unilaterally decide the issue to a referendum since consensus has been reached that the OAU Committee "which has full powers" should put in hand the conduct of the referendum. It was the Committee which was given the mandate to deal with the technical problems raised by the ceasefire, by the despatch of a peacekeeping force to supervise the ceasefire, by the putting in place of a neutral international administration, by the repatriation of Saharan refugees and by a census of the Saharan population. Algeria seems well pleased that at long last a procedure for resolution of the conflict under international auspices has been initiated. While not wishing to create undue difficulties for Morocco during what they recognise as a difficult period for the King, they will certainly not fail to remind Morocco of the commitments it assumed at Nairobi.

4. For its part, Polisario has put forward its own nine point plan which will no doubt form the basis of the position they will put to you during Malainine's forthcoming visit to Canberra:

(i) Direct negotiations between the two parties to the conflict, the Polisario Front and the Moroccan Government, for determining the practical measures for a ceasefire, withdrawal of occupation forces and of the Moroccan administration for the purpose of creating the appropriate conditions for the exercise of the Saharan peoples right of self-determination.

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- (ii) Total withdrawal of Moroccan forces from all the territory of Western Sahara.
- (iii) Total withdrawal of the Moroccan administration and of the Moroccan presence in all its forms.
- (iv) Removal of Moroccan forces to 150 kms on the other side of Morocco's internationally recognised frontiers.
- (v) Return of all the Saharan people to their towns and villages.
- (vi) Installation of an international provisional administration, constituted by the UN and the OAU, with the collaboration of the administration of the RASD (Polisario) to assure security and the normal conduct of the referendum.
- (vii) The international provisional administration to be attached for three months for coordination purposes with the national administration of the RASD as a means of creating the psychological climate to allay the effects <sup>of</sup> the Moroccan occupation, persecution, etc.
- (viii) Release of all detained Saharan people from Moroccan prisons and camps.
- (ix) United Nations peacekeeping forces to be stationed along the length of the Saharan-Moroccan frontier until the end of the self-determination process.

5. There is no prospect that these proposals would be acceptable to Morocco nor does there seem any reason why the Moroccans should be asked to agree to replace their own forces and administration by Polisario forces and administration before a referendum. On the other hand, it is also clear that what appears to be Hassan's concept of a referendum conducted by Morocco under guidelines drawn up by Morocco with no possibility for the other side either to conduct a political campaign or to be assured of an objective result is equally unacceptable to Polisario and its supporters. It is scarcely surprising that no agreement could be reached in Nairobi on the withdrawal of forces issue. However, the fact that agreement was reached on the concept of a UN peacekeeping force to be stationed in the Western Sahara while a referendum and "subsequent elections" were held, suggests that some procedures were envisaged "with a view to guaranteeing the exercise of a general and regular self-determination referendum". The Polisario plan at least identifies the issues that will need to be addressed.

6. The OAU resolution is vague on the relationship between the OAU and the United Nations both in relation to the provision of a peacekeeping force "in collaboration with the OAU" and in relation to the work of the OAU Committee which is to develop the necessary measures "with the participation of the United Nations". We understand that preliminary contacts have been

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made between the OAU and the UN concerning their projected roles. All the above suggests that the OAU Committee, which is to meet in Nairobi before the end of August, will have its work cut out. The fact that it seems to be reasonably evenly balanced between States which recognise the RASD (Mali, Sierra Leone and Tanzania) and those who might be less committed to any particular outcome (Guinea, Sudan, Nigeria and Kenya) should not lighten its task. A further complication will be Morocco's apparent unwillingness to accept that, in terms of the OAU resolution, the "parties to the conflict" are itself and Polisario while Algeria, Libya and Mauritania get their guernseys as "other parties concerned". Last week the Mali Foreign Minister was roundly criticised by Morocco for suggesting that Polisario, which is not mentioned in the OAU resolution, was a party to the conflict.

7. All of this suggests that the negotiations on modalities are likely to prove a long drawn out affair and that in the meantime the fighting will continue. A Polisario representative has told us that, in the absence of agreement, especially on what for them is the key issue of Moroccan troop withdrawals, the fighting will continue. But Polisario have drawn some heart from what they see as the serious internal social and economic problems which King Hassan is now beginning to face and profess confidence that time is on their side insofar as concerns their ability to maintain military pressure on Morocco. While the military situation seems to us likely to continue to be stalemated, we would expect to see Hassan come under increasing diplomatic pressure to achieve a settlement. It seems not unlikely that those same Western and Arab leaders who for various reasons encouraged Hassan to be more flexible at Nairobi will continue to urge him to seek a negotiated resolution of the conflict. Moreover, when the Western Sahara issue comes back to the United Nations this year, it will be discussed for the first time in a framework within which both sides will have recognised the principle of the right of self-determination of the Western Sahara and will have accepted a role for the United Nations in that process. As an Algerian spokesman recently commented, the OAU resolution was the beginning of an irreversible dynamic which sooner or later must lead to recognition of the rights of the Saharan people.

8. Australia has been one of the few Western countries to have consistently supported the application of the principle of self-determination to the Western Sahara. In the light of developments at the OAU Summit that would appear to have been the most appropriate position to have taken. While we should continue to avoid involvement in unnecessary polemics in relation to issues that must in the final analysis be resolved within an African and Arab context, it would seem that this same approach should inform our handling of this item at the next session of the General Assembly.

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## INWARD CABLEGRAM

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R E S T R I C T E D

POLISARIO FRONT : VISIT TO AUSTRALIA

FOLLOWING DETAILS OF DELEGATE FORWARDED FOR INFORMATION/  
ASSISTANCE RE VISA APPLICATION IN NEW DELHI.

SURNAME : MALAININE

GIVEN NAMES : SADIK BACHIR

DATE OF BIRTH : 16/1/50

PLACE OF BIRTH : SMARA, WESTERN SAHARA

PASSPORT NO : 2850 A 80

DATE/PLACE OF ISSUE : 20 AUG 1980 ALGIERS

EXPIRY DATE : 19 AUG 1983

A/N EXPECTS TO ARRIVE NEW DELHI BETWEEN 20 AND  
27 JULY. WILL APPROACH YOU EARLY IN STAY RE VISA ISSUE.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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FM. ALGIERS / FILE 862/98/1

R E S T R I C T E D

POLISARIO FRONT : VISIT TO AUSTRALIA

HABIBALLAH, DEPUTY SENIOR POLISARIO FRONT REPRESENTATIVE IN ALGIERS, CALLED ON 19 JULY TO INFORM US THAT MR SADIK MALAININ, MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF POLISARIO, PROPOSED TO VISIT AUSTRALIA AGAIN AT THE BEGINNING OF AUGUST IN THE COURSE OF VISIT TO A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES IN THE PACIFIC REGION. AS MALAININ IS LEAVING ALGIERS ON 20 JULY HABIBALLAH PROPOSED THAT HE MIGHT SEEK A VISA IN DELHI, WHICH WILL BE HIS FIRST PORT OF CALL. HE EXECTS TO BE THERE ABOUT A WEEK. WE SUGGESTED THAT MALAININ MIGHT INFORM DELHI OF DETAILS OF HIS TRAVEL TO AUSTRALIA, AS THESE ARRANGEMENTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN FINALISED. YOU WILL ALREADY HAVE A FULL PROFILE ON MALAININ BUT NO DOUBT WILL INFORM DELHI OF ANY FURTHER REQUIREMENTS YOU MAY HAVE.

2. HABIBALLAH EXPLAINED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT WOULD BE TO EXPLAIN THE POLISARIO POSITION ON THE WESTERN SAHARA IN THE LIGHT OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE OAU SUMMIT ON A CEASEFIRE AND REFERENDUM. WE WILL BE REPORTING FURTHER ON THAT SUBJECT IN ADVANCE OF MALAININ'S VISIT.

....AMBASSADOR

RESTRICTED

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.AL4991

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DEP IMM ETH AFF T/T  
ONA  
ASIO (M) T/T

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN DEFENCE  
DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
SPEC. ADVISER TO P.M  
ASIO (C)  
JIO

RESTRICTED

REFUGEE

ACTION: AME JBAAE  
RIA ICBB

SEC	DEPSEC-A	DEPSEC-B	DEPSEC-C	PPU
LA	EX	MCO	PA	FAS(NSA)
FAS(EANZ)	FAS(DN)	DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)
IO	FAS(CIC)	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)
FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S		

93728/2 CONFIDENTIAL

## International Message Form

AUSTRALIAN DIPLOMATIC NETWORK 4/4/81

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In precedence columns insert BB for BAG DESPATCH or RR for ROUTINE  
PP for PRIORITY, II for IMMEDIATE or EE for IMMEDIATE telegraphic transmission  
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13660/74/1

Taped
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Reference No. <b>O. NA13486</b>	Time/date of lodgement <b>1500 8.7.81</b>	XMC	CLA	
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TO.	ACTION POSTS (TO)				
BB CANBERRA	/ 299	CAIRO	/ 214	ALGIERS	/ 86
BB MADRID	/ 06	UN NEW YORK	/ 65	WELLINGTON	/ 10
BB SALISBURY	/ 08	LUSAKA	/ 13	PRETORIA	/ 118
BB DAR ES SALAAM	/ 281	ACCRA	/ 203	LAGOS	/ 11

RP.	INFORMATION POSTS (REPEATED TO)				
	/		/		/
	/		/		/

FM. Originating post	<b>NAIROBI</b>	/ FILE 235/1	REF O
Security classification	<b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>		
Subject heading	<b>OAU : WESTERN SAHARA</b>		

MOROCCO'S AGREEMENT TO A "CONTROLLED REFERENDUM" IN THE WESTERN SAHARA WAS WELL TIMED DIPLOMATIC MOVE TO DIVERT PRESSURE FOR THE RECOGNITION OF POLISARIO. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS HAVE BEEN LEFT TO A COMMITTEE OF HEADS OF STATE TO RESOLVE. MOST OBSERVERS REGARDED THE MOROCCAN ANNOUNCEMENT AS A CLEVER AND SUCCESSFUL EXERCISE IN BUYING TIME (CONFIDENTIAL : FOLLOWING CONTAINS SENSITIVE INFORMATION - PARA 6)

THE QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA WAS CONSIDERED ONLY BY THE SUMMIT ON THE GROUNDS THAT ONLY THE SUMMIT COULD DELIBERATE ON THE REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF HEADS OF STATE ON THE WESTERN SAHARA.

2. NOT UNEXPECTEDLY HOWEVER IN THE WEEK PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT BOTH THE MOROCCANS AND POLISARIO WERE LOBBYING STRONGLY FOR SUPPORT. THE MOROCCANS, WHO BROUGHT A VAST DELEGATION, SOME 200 OR SO,<sup>WHO</sup> WERE THINLY DESCRIBED AS "JOURNALISTS" FLOODED THE PRESS GALLERIES, WINING, DINING AND GENERALLY ATTEMPTING TO PERSUADE AMUSED MEMBERS OF THE LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS. THE THEME OF THEIR APPROACH WAS THAT KING HASSAN WOULD ANNOUNCE "SOMETHING VERY IMPORTANT" ALTHOUGH THEY ..2

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	Signature	Date	Dept/Bch/Sect
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DID NOT HAVE ANY DETAILS. THE POLISARIO, WHO OBVIOUSLY HAD A PRETTY CLEAR IDEA WHAT HASSAN WOULD ANNOUNCE EARLY ON ISSUED A PRESS STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT HASSAN WAS COMING WITH "AMBIGUOUS FORMULAS....<sup>DESIGNED</sup> TO GAIN TIME". THE PRESS STATEMENT WHICH WAS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF HASSAN PROMPTED A FIST FIGHT IN THE PRESS GALLERY BETWEEN MOROCCAN "PRESSMEN" DEFENDING THE HONOUR OF THE KING AND POLISARIO SUPPORTERS. ON THE STRENGTH OF THIS THE MOROCCANS WROTE OFFICIALLY TO THE OAU AND THE KENYANS DEMANDING THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE POLISARIO (SOME OF WHICH HAD BEEN GRANTED OBSERVER STATUS BY THE KENYANS, OTHERS OF WHOM WERE INCLUDED IN DELEGATIONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES NOTABLY BENIN AND ALGERIA) WERE NOT ENTITLED TO ANY FORM OF ACCESS TO THE MEETING AND SHOULD HAVE ANY FORM OF ACCREDITATION REMOVED. THE KENYANS, WHO DID NOT WANT TO UPSET MOROCCO BUT WHO WERE NEVER-THELESS SYMPATHETIC TO POLISARIO, SIMPLY IGNORED THE REQUEST AND THE MATTER LAPSED.

3. THE POLISARIO'S SUPPORTERS WERE MEANWHILE GATHERING STRENGTH FOR A SHOWDOWN. THE MOST DETERMINED OF THESE, PRINCIPALLY MADAGASCAR AND SEYCHELLES, WROTE TO THE 26 COUNTRIES WHO HAD RECOGNISED THE SADR INSISTING THAT THE MATTER MUST BE RESOLVED AT THE NAIROBI MEETING AND THAT THEY MAINTAIN A UNITED FRONT. SOME OF THE WIND WAS HOWEVER TAKEN OUT OF POLISARIO'S SAILS BY THE ANNOUNCEMENT DURING THE FIRST WEEK THAT LIBYA HAD OFFERED TO OPEN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO. AS IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE PRICE OF MOROCCAN ACCEPTANCE WOULD HAVE BEEN THE END OF LIBYAN MILITARY SUPPORT FOR POLISARIO, THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE CONCERN IN THE POLISARIO CAMP AT THE NEWS. THIS WAS NOT IMPROVED BY PRESS ROOM NEWS THAT ALGERIAN WAS PREPARING TO DEAL WITH MOROCCO OVER A DISPUTED BORDER WHEREBY ALGERIA WOULD DIMINISH (OR POSSIBLY WITHDRAW) ITS SUPPORT FOR POLISARIO BASES ON ITS TERRITORY IN RETURN FOR MOROCCAN CEDING <sup>THE DISPUTED</sup> ~~THE~~ TERRITORY TO ALGERIA.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

4. AT THE OPENING OF THE SUMMIT THE CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT STEVENS PAINTED A VERY GLOOMY PICTURE OF THE LACK OF PROGRESS ON THE WESTERN SAHARA AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE AREA. HE ADDED THAT "WE ARE STILL TODAY NOT WITHIN SIGHT OF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF THE WESTERN SAHARA".

5. THE SUMMIT CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION WAS BASED ON THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON WESTERN SAHARA AND THE REPORTS OF TWO SESSIONS OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF HEADS OF STATE ON THE WESTERN SAHARA. FOLLOWING THEIR DELIVERY, PRESIDENT SEKOU TOURE OF GUINEA MADE AN EMOTIONAL APPEAL TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE SUMMIT TO DEAL WITH THE MATTER IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO ENSURE THE UNITY OF THE OAU AS WELL AS ALL AFRICA. HE ~~WELCOMED~~ THE PRESENCE OF KING HASSAN BUT REMINDED THE SUMMIT THAT WHAT WAS MOST IMPORTANT WAS THE WILL OF THE SAHARA PEOPLE.

6. KING HASSAN THEN MADE HIS LONG AWAITED STATEMENT. WITH GREAT DRAMATIC FLOURISH HASSAN ANNOUNCED THAT "TO SAVE THE AFRICAN CONTINENT FROM BEING TORN APART AND TO PROTECT THE GOOD IMAGE OF THE OAU" HE HAD DECIDED "TO ENVISAGE A CONTROLLED REFERENDUM IN THE WESTERN SAHARA ON THE BASIS OF MODALITIES CORRESPONDING BOTH TO THE OBJECTIVES OF THE LATEST RECOMMENDATION OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN AND TO MOROCCO'S CONVICTION OF ITS LEGITIMATE RIGHTS". HE MENTIONED THAT A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES HAD URGED HIM TO TAKE THIS POSITION INCLUDING SENEGAL, IVORY COAST, GUINEA, GABON, CAMEROON, SAUDI ARABIA, UAE, JORDAN, IRAQ, BRITAIN, FRANCE, FRG, ITALY AND SPAIN AND THAT HE WAS RESPONDING TO THESE APPROACHES. (WE HAD BEEN TOLD BY A BRITISH COLLEAGUE THAT IN FACT THE MOROCCANS HAD APPROACHED THE LEADERS OF A NUMBER OF WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES INCLUDING MRS THATCHER, ASKING THAT THEY WRITE TO HASSAN URGING HIM TO COMPROMISE ON THE WESTERN SAHARA, LETTERS WHICH THE MOROCCANS <sup>HAD</sup> ARGUED, COULD BE USED BY HASSAN DOMESTICALLY TO JUSTIFY HIS STANCE).

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7. PRESIDENT HAIDALLA OF MAURITANIA THEN SPOKE, REFERRING IN THE FIRST INSTANCE TO "FLAGRANT INTERFERENCE BY MOROCCO IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF MAURITANIA" (THEY HAD IN FACT WRITTEN IN THE SAME TERMS TO THE OAU SECRETARY-GENERAL WHO HAD MENTIONED THIS IN HIS REPORT AT THE OPENING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS). THE KING INTERJECTED ON A POINT OF ORDER TO PROTEST AND WHEN MAURITANIA CONTINUED IN THIS VEIN HASSAN LEFT THE HALL. AFTER HIS DEPARTURE HOWEVER HAIDALLA THEN WELCOMED THE KING'S ANNOUNCEMENT AS "A GENEROUS CONTRIBUTION TO FINDING A SETTLEMENT". HE INSISTED HOWEVER THAT FOR LASTING PEACE TO BE ATTAINED 5 CONDITIONS WOULD FIRST NEED TO BE MET - ALGERIA, MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA WOULD ALL HAVE TO COLLABORATE IN THE EXERCISE OF A REFERENDUM IN THE WESTERN SAHARA; ALL THREE WOULD HAVE TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO THE RESULT OF THE REFERENDUM; A NEUTRAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE WESTERN SAHARA SHOULD BE SET UP BY THE OAU COMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN SAHARA; THERE SHOULD BE A CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES TO DEFINED AREAS OF THE TERRITORY AND A NEUTRAL FORCE SHOULD BE SENT TO THE TERRITORY.

8. ALL THE SPEAKERS WHO FOLLOWED INCLUDING SUDAN, MALI, MADAGASCAR, ALGERIA, GHANA, MOZAMBIQUE AND GAMBIA WELCOMED THE KING'S ANNOUNCEMENT. HOWEVER SOME (ESPECIALLY MADAGASCAR) APPEALED FOR THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE POLISARIO IN BRINGING MOROCCO TO THIS POINT NOT TO BE FORGOTTEN. ALL INSISTED THAT MOVES BE IMMEDIATELY UNDERTAKEN TO ENSURE THAT THE PROPOSALS WERE IMPLEMENTED. LIBYA DID NOT SPEAK AT ALL, PRESUMABLY SO AS NOT TO JEOPARDISE THE DISCUSSIONS WITH MOROCCO OVER RESUMING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

9. IN THE EVENT THE RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE SUMMIT WELCOMED THE KING'S COMMITMENT TO A REFERENDUM; ESTABLISHED AN "IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE" WITH FULL POWERS COMPOSED OF GUINEA, KENYA, MALI, NIGERIA, SIERRA LEONE, SUDAN AND TANZANIA, "TO ENSURE WITH THE COOPERATION OF THE CONCERNED PARTIES THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE"; URGED THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT "TO OBSERVE

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AN "IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE" AND CALLED ON THE IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE "TO ENSURE THE OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE WITHOUT DELAY"; DIRECTED THE IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE TO MEET BEFORE THE END OF AUGUST 1981 "IN COLLABORATION WITH THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO WORK OUT THE MODALITIES AND ALL OTHER DETAILS RELEVANT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASEFIRE AND THE CONDUCT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE REFERENDUM"; REQUESTED THE UN TO PROVIDE, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE OAU A PEACEKEEPING FORCE AND MANDATED THE IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE TO DISCUSS THIS QUESTION WITH THE UN.

10. ATTEMPTS BY ALGERIA, BENIN, MALI, MOZAMBIQUE, CONGO, AND ANGOLA TO INSERT AMENDMENTS RECONGISING POLISARIO AND CALLING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF MOROCCAN TROOPS FROM WESTERN SAHARA WERE DEFLECTED ON THE GROUNDS THAT TO IMPOSE SUCH PRECONDITIONS COULD FRUSTRATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MOROCCAN AGREEMENT.

11. THE RESULT OF THE WESTERN SAHARA DEBATE WAS A CLEAR VICTORY FOR HASSAN. THE MAJORITY OF OAU STATES, GRATEFUL THAT A VERY DIFFICULT AND DIVISIVE ISSUE (POLISARIO'S RECOGNITION) HAD BEEN DIFFUSED, DID NOT PURSUE AT THE SUMMIT THE DETAILS OF THE MOROCCAN PROPOSAL AND LEFT THIS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE COMMITTEES TASK WILL NOT BE AT ALL EASY AND THAT IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS COULD TAKE UNTIL NEXT SUMMIT (OR BEYOND) TO RESOLVE.

12. AT THE SAME TIME, THE QUESTION OF POLISARIO'S RECOGNITION HAS, AT LEAST CURRENTLY, DROPPED FROM SIGHT. INDEED THE USUALLY UBIQUITOUS POLISARIO FOREIGN MINISTER HAKKIM WAS NOTICEABLY ABSENT FROM OAU PREMISES FOLLOWING THE KING'S ANNOUNCEMENT AND THERE WAS NO MORE THAN A BRIEF POLISARIO RETORT TO THE MOROCCAN ANNOUNCEMENT, DENOUNCING THE KING'S "PERNIOUS FORMULA" WHICH WOULD "LEGITIMISE MOROCCAN MILITARY OCCUPATION OF WESTERN SAHARA".

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13. AS A POSTSCRIPT WE WERE TOLD TODAY (7 JULY) BY DR ONU ASSISTANT SECRETARY-GENERAL, THAT AFTER HAVING SEEN THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION, HASSAN HAD RUNG KODJO AND MAINTAINED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION THAT AN "ACT OF SELF DETERMINATION" WAS TO TAKE PLACE IN THE WESTERN SAHARA AND THAT HE COULD NOT AGREE TO THE UN OVERSEEING THE PROCESS AS THIS WOULD IMPLY THAT SUCH AN ACT WAS IN PROGRESS. DR ONU PREDICTED THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION TALKS, THE FIRST ROUND OF WHICH WILL BE HELD IN NAIROBI FROM 20 - 26 AUGUST UNDER PRESIDENT MOI'S CHAIRMANSHIP, WILL BE BOTH DIFFICULT AND IF THE MOROCCANS HOLD TO THEIR LINE AS DR ONU EXPECTS THEY WILL, INCONCLUSIVE.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

935/28/2

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

0.AL4854 GAFR  
TOR 0359 27.05.81

0.AL4854 1600 26.5.81 CLA

CONFIDENTIAL

TO.  
RR CANBERRA/3590RP.  
RR PARIS EMB/856 OTTAWA/11

FM. ALGIERS / FILE 862/98/1

C O N F I D E N T I A L

WESTERN SAHARA

AS BACKGROUND TO THE FORTHCOMING VISIT BY THE MOROCCAN PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION, YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT, DURING TALKS BETWEEN PRESIDENT CHADLI AND CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU, THE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT KING HASSAN RISKED BECOMING A VICTIM OF HIS OWN MILITARY VICTORIES. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, THIS IS THE FIRST ADMISSION MADE BY AN ALGERIAN LEADER THAT POLISARIO IS NOT HAVING ALL THE MILITARY SUCCESS IT (AND THE ALGERIAN MEDIA) CLAIMS.

2. PRESIDENT CHADLI ALSO SPECIFICALLY DENIED TO TRUDEAU THAT THERE WERE ANY SECRET NEGOTIATIONS GOING ON BETWEEN MOROCCO AND ALGERIA. HE REFERRED TO THE EXISTENCE OF "TECHNICAL OBSTACLES" IN THE WAY OF TALKS BETWEEN POLISARIO AND MOROCCO.

3. IN REPLY, TRUDEAU SAID THAT MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTER BOUCETTA HAD SAID (PRESUMABLY DURING HIS VISIT TO OTTAWA EARLIER THIS MONTH) THAT MOROCCO WAS PREPARED TO ABIDE BY THE DECISION OF THE OAU COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN. PRESIDENT CHADLI WAS SCEPTICAL ABOUT THIS AND SAID THAT IF THAT WAS THE MOROCCAN POSITION IT SHOULD BE PUBLICLY STATED.

4. FURTHER DETAILS ON TRUDEAU VISIT BY BAG.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN+DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
SPEC. ADVISER TO P.M  
JIO

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

935/28/2

O.AL4855 BOMA  
TOR 0150 27.05.81

O.AL4855 0900 26.5.81 UNC

TO.  
RR CANBERRA/3591

RP.  
RR PARIS EMB/857

FM. ALGIERS / FILE 862/98

U N C L A S S I F I E D

VISIT BY MOROCCAN DELEGATION

ALGERIAN REACTION TO THE MOROCCAN DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE, OF WHICH THE FORTHCOMING VISIT TO AUSTRALIA IS A PART, HAS BEEN LOW-KEY BUT PREDICTABLY CRITICAL. THE ALGERIAN MEDIA HAS LABELLED IT A ''CAMPAIGN OF DIPLOMATIC ROWDINESS'' AIMED AT ''ATTEMPTING TO JUSTIFY (MOROCCO'S) EXPANSIONIST INTRIGUES IN THE WESTERN SAHARA'' BEFORE THE NAIROBI SUMMIT OF THE OAU. THE MEDIA HAS ALSO LINKED SUCH CAMPAIGNS TO THE DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY DEFEATS SUFFERED BY MOROCCO IN THE PAST AT THE HANDS OF THE POLISARIO FRONT, AND THE NEED FOR MOROCCO TO CLEAN ITS ''TARNISHED ESCUTCHEON'' FOLLOWING THE ABORTIVE COUP D'ETAT IN MAURITANIA IN MARCH.

2. APART FROM THE ABOVE, THE ALGERIAN PRESS HAS CONTENTED ITSELF WITH PUBLISHING ARTICLES TAKEN FROM OTHER AFRICAN NEWSPAPERS ALSO CRITICAL OF MOROCCO AND THE CURRENT DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN+DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
JIO

935/28/2

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.AL4462 JAMC  
TOR 2351 05.01.81

O.AL4462 1200 4.5.81 CLA

TO.  
RR PARIS EMB/820RP.  
RR CANBERRA/3284

FM. ALGIERS / FILE 862/98 REF O.PA84513 O.CH935640

R E S T R I C T E D

POLISARIO FRONT

GLAD IF YOU COULD LET US KNOW DATES FOR LINCOLN'S PLANNED VISIT TO MOROCCO.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONAPRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN+DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
JIO

ACTION: AME JAE

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)	
NUC	DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)		IO	
FAS(ECO)		FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)		FAREP-M	
FAREP-P		FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB	FAS(BP)		PAAP
SEAP		FAS(PTO)				

ACCRA CAIRO JEDDAH LAGOS LUSAKA MADRID

RESTRICTED

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RESTRICTED

93.728/2

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PA87353 JCNI  
TOR 0747 28.03.81

O.PA87353 1629 27.3.81 CLA

TO.  
RR CANBERRA/3219RP.  
RR ALGIERS/645 UN NEW YORK/1090

FM. PARIS EMB /

RESTRICTED

MOROCCO/MAURITANIA - FRENCH ANALYSIS

SUMMARY: THE FRENCH THINK IT IMPROBABLE THAT MOROCCO PROMOTED THE RECENT COUP ATTEMPT IN MAURITANIA (AND DENY ANY FRENCH INVOLVEMENT), BUT FEAR THAT MOROCCO'S STANDING HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY DAMAGED BY THE AFFAIR. THIS REDUCES ANY PROSPECT FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE WESTERN SAHARA DISPUTE. (RESTRICTED)

ORIGINS OF THE COUP ATTEMPT (UNDERLINED)

ON 24 MARCH WE CALLED ON MOLINARI, HEAD OF THE MOROCCO/WESTERN SAHARA SECTION IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, TO FOLLOW UP ON THE ISSUES DISCUSSED IN THE AMBASSADOR'S DESPATCH 3/81 ON HIS FEBRUARY AND MARCH VISITS TO MOROCCO. MOLINARI SAID THAT FRANCE HAD VERY LITTLE HARD INFORMATION ON THE ORIGINS OF THE UNSUCCESSFUL COUP ATTEMPT IN MAURITANIA. MOROCCO WAS INEVITABLY BEING BLAMED. FOR THE TWO WEEKS PRIOR TO THE COUP ATTEMPT, IT HAD BEEN CONDUCTING A VIGOROUS ANTI-MAURITANIA PRESS CAMPAIGN, BECAUSE OF THE ALLEGED SUPPORT BEING GIVEN IN NORTHERN MAURITANIA TO POLISARIO GUERILLA UNITS. IT HAS RENEWED THESE COMPLAINTS SINCE THE COUP ATTEMPT, FOLLOWING MAJOR POLISARIO ATTACKS IN THE SOUTH OF WESTERN SAHARA ON 23 AND 25 MARCH.

2. MOLINARI THOUGHT, ON BALANCE, THAT THE MOROCCANS WERE UNLIKELY TO HAVE BEEN BEHIND SUCH A MALADROIT COUP ATTEMPT. HOWEVER THE MAURITANIAN COLONELS WHO HAD ATTEMPTED THE COUP MUST HAVE HAD UNOFFICIAL SUPPORT FROM SOME MOROCCAN QUARTERS IN THEIR PREPARATIONS, AND HAD PROBABLY CALCULATED THAT MOROCCO WOULD COME TO THEIR AID IF THEIR COUP SUCCEEDED. MOLINARI COMPARED THIS TO THE UNOFFICIAL ASSISTANCE GIVEN BY INDIVIDUAL ALGERIAN OFFICIALS TO THE TUNISIAN COMMANDOS IN THEIR 1980 ATTACK ON GAFSA.

FRENCH INVOLVEMENT (UNDERLINED)

3. MOLINARI SAID THAT IT WAS OF COURSE UNTRUE, DESPITE SOME PRESS SPECULATION TO THE CONTRARY, THAT FRANCE HAD IN ANY WAY BEEN INVOLVED IN THE MAURITANIA COUP, OR INDEED EVEN HAD SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE OF IT.

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## DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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IT WAS PROBABLE THAT THE COLONELS HAD TRANSITED PARIS IN THEIR TRAVELS BETWEEN MOROCCO, SENEGAL AND MAURITANIA, BUT THIS WOULD BE MERELY THE RESULT OF THE ODDITIES OF AIRLINE ROUTINGS BETWEEN AFRICAN COUNTRIES. MOLINARI REITERATED THAT THE VISIT MADE BY KING HASSAN AND MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTER BOUCETTA TO PARIS IN EARLY MARCH, DURING WHICH THEY HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT GISCARD, WAS PURELY ROUTINE.

4. ON FRANCE'S POSITION ON THE WESTERN SAHARA DISPUTE GENERALLY, WE ASKED WHETHER A STATEMENT FOLLOWING THE HASSAN VISIT BY FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCOIS-PONCET, TO THE EFFECT THAT FRANCE WOULD LIKE TO SEE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN MOROCCO AND ALGERIA, CONSTITUTED A SLIGHT LEAN IN MOROCCO'S FAVOUR ON THE PART OF THE FRENCH. MOLINARI SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT SO. THE USUAL FORMULA FRANCE ADOPTED WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE NEGOTIATIONS "AMONG THE INTERESTED PARTIES". IN PRACTICE THIS MEANT ALGERIA AND MAURITANIA : NO WESTERN COUNTRY HAD YET SPECIFICALLY PROPOSED POLISARIO AS A SEPARATE PARTNER IN NEGOTIATIONS. (COMMENT: FRANCOIS-PONCET'S REMARK WAS MADE IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION AT A DIPLOMATIC PRESS CLUB LUNCHEON. IT SOUNDED PRO-MOROCCAN BECAUSE OF ITS SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ALGERIA: ALGERIA INSISTS THAT MOROCCO SHOULD NEGOTIATE WITH POLISARIO).

*WESTERN*OUTLOOK FOR THE / SAHARA SITUATION (UNDERLINED)**RESTRICTED**

5. MOLINARI FOUND IT VERY UNLIKELY THAT MOROCCO WOULD HAVE SO ILL-JUDGED ITS OWN INTERESTS AS TO HAVE HELPED IN THE MAURITANIAN COUP ATTEMPT. BUT THE INCIDENT HAD PROVIDED AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR ALGERIA AND MAURITANIA TO COORDINATE ANEW THEIR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO ISOLATE MOROCCO IN AFRICAN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORUMS ON WESTERN SAHARA ISSUE. ALGERIA HAD LOST NO TIME IN EMPHASITICALLY REASSURING MAURITANIA OF FULL SUPPORT FOR ITS INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY, AND IN BACKING THIS UP WITH A MAJOR AIRLIFT OF ARMAMENTS. (PRESS REPORTS REFER TO CONTINUING ALGERIAN ARMAMENTS BEING AIRFREIGHTED TO NOUAKSHOTT AND TO THE MAURITANIA-WESTERN SAHARA BORDER AREA). MOROCCO, WHICH HAD A HISTORY OF POOR DIPLOMACY ESPECIALLY REGARDING MAURITANIA, WOULD NOW HAVE TO FACE THE PROSPECT OF ITS LOSS OF STANDING OVER THE MAURITANIA COUP BEING REFLECTED IN A GREATER READINESS ON THE PART OF AFRICAN AND OTHER THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES TO MOVE TO SUPPORT OF POLISARIO. ITS MILITARY SITUATION IN THE SAHARA MIGHT ALSO BECOME MORE DIFFICULT IF MAURITANIA INCREASINGLY SUPPORTED ALGERIA AND THE POLISARIO.

6. MOLINARI NOTED THAT THE RECENT UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION RESOLUTION ON WESTERN SAHARA HAD INTRODUCED SOMETHING OF A NEW ELEMENT IN THE UN CONTEXT BY REFERRING TO MOROCCO'S "OCCUPATION" OF WESTERN SAHARA : THIS FORMULATION HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN CONFINED TO OAU RESOLUTIONS.

## DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

3-O.PA87353

**RESTRICTED**

7. MOLINARI WAS NOT INCLINED TO PUT MUCH STORE BY SUGGESTIONS THAT THERE HAD BEEN RECENT SUBSTANTIVE CONTACTS BETWEEN MOROCCAN AND ALGERIAN REPRESENTATIVES ON A POSSIBLE WESTERN SAHARA COMPROMISE. THIS HAD BEEN A LINE PUT ABOUT BY THE MOROCCANS, WITH LITTLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT. IN ANY CASE, ANY SUCH PROSPECTS HAD NOW BEEN SET BACK, ALTHOUGH IT WAS TRUE THAT WORKING-LEVEL CONTACTS BETWEEN ALGERIA AND MOROCCO CONTINUED TO BE QUITE CLOSE. IT WAS PART OF MOROCCO'S CLUMSINESS WITH THE WIDER WORLD TO EXAGGERATE BOTH THE POSSIBILITY THAT ALGERIA UNDER CHADLI MIGHT BE MORE FLEXIBLE ON WESTERN SAHARA, AND TO OVERDO THE BOGEY-MAN INTERPRETATION OF LIBYA'S INVOLVEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE POLISARIO, IN A CRUDELY OBVIOUS ATTEMPT TO COURT WESTERN SUPPORT. MOLINARI THOUGHT THAT LIBYAN FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR POLISARIO WAS CONTINUING MUCH AS BEFORE - HE HAD SEEN NO EVIDENCE OF ANY SIGNIFICANT INCREASE.

8. ON THE QUESTION OF MOROCCAN INTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE WAR EFFORT, MOLINARI SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH THE GENERAL ASSESSMENT THAT THIS REMAINED TOTAL. WHILE THIS WAS USEFUL TO THE KING, IT WAS ALSO SOMETHING OF A TRAP : THE POSSIBILITIES OPEN TO HIM FOR COMPROMISE WERE GREATLY LIMITED. IT WAS TRUE THAT THE WAR WAS A CONTINUING DRAIN ON THE MOROCCAN ECONOMY, BUT HASSAN KNEW THAT MOROCCO'S WESTERN FRIENDS, NOTABLY THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE, VALUED ITS ROLE AS A CONSERVATIVE NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRY, AND WOULD CONTINUE TO COME TO ITS RESCUE ECONOMICALLY. (COMMENT: WE HAVE REPORTED SEPARATELY ON SAUDI ARABIA'S SIMILARLY-MOTIVATED FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR MOROCCO).

9. "LE MONDE" OF 27 MARCH REPORTS THAT THE UNITED STATES, WHICH AGREED LATE IN JANUARY TO SELL MOROCCO 108 M-60 TANKS, 20 F-5 FIGHTERS AND 6 OV-10 RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, INTENDS TO PROCEED WITH FURTHER SIGNIFICANT ARMS SALES TO MOROCCO. ASSISTANT UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE MORRIS DRAPER IS QUOTED AS STATING THAT MOROCCO, AS A LONG-STANDING FRIEND OF THE UNITED STATES, HAD NEED OF INCREASED AMERICAN SUPPORT. HE REFERRED TO AN "IMBALANCE" BETWEEN MOROCCAN AND ALGERIAN ARMoured VEHICLE NUMBERS.

**RESTRICTED**

10. MOLINARI FELT THAT THE BEST THAT COULD BE EXPECTED WAS THAT THE WESTERN SAHARA WARFARE WOULD CONTINUE MUCH AS AT PRESENT FOR SOME YEARS. THERE WAS ALWAYS THE WORRYING POSSIBILITY THAT SOME INCIDENT, SUCH AS THE MAURITANIAN COUP ATTEMPT, COULD PROVOKE AN OUTBREAK OF MUCH MORE SERIOUS HOSTILITIES.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

4-0.PA87353

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN+DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
SPEC. ADVISER TO P.M  
JIO

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

## DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

5-0.PAB7353

ACTION: EUR JBAL  
AME JBAE

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS (SEP)	FAS (NSA)		FAS (EANZ)		FAS (DN)	
NUC	DEF	DPR	FAS (IOAME)		IO	
FAS (ECO)		FAS (LT)	FAS (MFS)		FAREP-M	
FAREP-P		FAREP-S				

ACCRA ANKARA ATHENS BERNE BONN BRUSSELS CAIRO COPENHAGEN  
DUBLIN GENEVA LAGOS LISBON LONDON LUSAKA MADRID MALTA  
MOSCOW NICOSIA ROME STOCKHOLM THE HAGUE VIENNA WASHINGTON

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

## INWARD BB MESSAGE

93-728/2

O.NA12677 JAMC  
TOR D216 31.03.81

O.NA12677 1500 12.3.81 CLA

TO.  
BB CANBERRA/271RP.  
BB LONDON/211 WASHINGTON/151 CAIRO/212  
BB ALGIERS/85 LAGOS/208 SALISBURY/06  
BB DAR ES SALAAM/276 ACCRA/200 PRETORIA/115

FM. NAIROBI / FILE 235/1

CONFIDENTIAL

DAU: POLISARIO

(TAKE IN O.NA12677)

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONARIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN+DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
J10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: AME JCAA  
JAF

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS (SEP)	FAS (NSA)		FAS (EANZ)		ANZ	EUR
FAS (DN)	NUC	NPD	NS	DEF	DPR	
FAS (IOAME)	IO		FAS (ECO)	FAS (LT)		
FAS (MFS)	FAREP-M		FAREP-P		FAREP-S	
DIR-ADAB						

**CONFIDENTIAL****INWARD BB MESSAGE**

O.NA12677/ACT

O.NA12677 1500 12.3.81 CLA

TO.  
BB CANBERRA/271RP.  
BB LONDON/211 WASHINGTON/151 CAIRO/212  
BB ALGIERS/85 LAGOS/208 SALISBURY/06  
BB DAR ES SALAAM/276 ACCRA/200 PRETORIA/115

FM. NAIROBI / FILE 235/1

C O N F I D E N T I A L

OAU : POLISARIO

DESPITE INTENSE LOBBYING BY THE POLISARIO AND ITS SUPPORTERS PRIOR TO AND DURING THE OAU MEETING, THE ISSUE OF THE ADMISSION OF THE SADR AS A MEMBER STATE WAS DEFERRED TO THE NAIROBI SUMMIT. (RESTRICTED)

A POLISARIO DELEGATION LED BY "FOREIGN MINISTER" HAKKIM WERE PRESENT IN ADDIS ABABA DURING THE OAU MEETING LOBBYING INTENSIVELY FOR SADR'S ADMISSION AS A MEMBER. AT THE START OF THE MEETING, POLISARIO ARGUED PRIVATELY THAT AS IT COULD NOW COUNT ON THE SUPPORT OF 28 MEMBERS (WHILE THE ADDITIONAL TWO WERE NOT NAMED, WE UNDERSTAND THAT MALAWI WAS EXPECTED TO RECOGNISE BUT IN THE EVENT DID NOT SHOW ITS HAND DURING THE CONFERENCE), THERE WAS NO REASON WHY, AS IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF EVENTS, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD NOT WRITE TO MEMBER STATES NOTIFYING ITS ADMISSION.

2. IN HIS OPENING ADDRESS, SECRETARY-GENERAL KODJO NOTED THAT IN NOVEMBER 1980 THE FOURTH COMMITTEE OF THE UN HAD ADOPTED A RESOLUTION CALLING ON MOROCCO TO BEGIN TALKS WITH THE POLISARIO FRONT TO PEACEFULLY RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES, THAT UNGA HAD ENDORSED THE RESOLUTION BY AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY AND THAT THE NAM HAD "STRENGTHENED

**CONFIDENTIAL**

.../2

## INWARD BB MESSAGE

O.NA12677-2

THE POSITIONS ADOPTED BY THE OAU AND UN". KODJO HOWEVER ADMITTED THAT THE FACT THAT THE WAR CONTINUED IN THE WESTERN SAHARA DEMONSTRATED THE FAILURE OF THE OAU TO PREVAIL ON BOTH PARTIES TO FIND A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. HE ADDED THAT, SO FAR AS THE TWO ISSUES OF ADMISSION OF THE SADR TO THE OAU AND THE RELATED LEGAL OBJECTION SUBMITTED BY MOROCCO WERE CONCERNED THESE AND ANY ACTION BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN RELATION TO THEM WOULD HAVE TO AWAIT THE REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN SAHARA TO THE NAIROBI SUMMIT.

3. ON THE FIRST EVENING OF THE MEETING POLISARIO'S SUPPORTERS MET TO DISCUSS WAYS IN WHICH THEY MIGHT SEEK TO HAVE THE MATTER OF SADR'S ADMISSION DISCUSSED. DURING THE DAY MEMBERS OF THE OAU HAD LOBBIED POLISARIO'S SUPPORTERS TO DEFER THE ISSUE TO NAIROBI ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY MUST BE TO STOP THE WAR AND THAT DISCUSSION OF POLISARIO'S ADMISSION IN OAU COUNSELS WOULD AT THIS STAGE BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. THE SECRETARIAT ALSO ARGUED THAT AN ISSUE OF SUCH IMPORTANCE FOR THE OAU AND ONE WHICH WOULD EFFECTIVELY CREATE A PRECEDENT BOTH HAD, LEGALLY, TO AWAIT THE AD HOC COMMITTEE'S REPORT AND IN PRACTICAL TERMS, TO HAVE THE FULL FORCE OF OAU BEHIND IT, AND WOULD REQUIRE THE IMPRIMATEUR OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. TO THIS SOME OF POLISARIO'S SUPPORTERS RETORTED THAT THE ADMISSION OF GUINEA BISSAU AS A FULL MEMBER BEFORE IT EFFECTIVELY BECAME INDEPENDENT WAS A PRECEDENT FOR THE SADR, AND THAT THIS ADMISSION OF ITSELF BROUGHT AN EARLY END TO THE FIGHTING IN THAT COUNTRY. IN THE EVENT IT APPEARS THAT THE SECRETARIAT ARGUMENTS PERSUADED POLISARIO'S SUPPORTERS NOT TO FORMALLY RAISE THE MATTER IN DISCUSSION ON THE AGENDA.

4. HOWEVER, THERE REMAINED THE ISSUE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S ROLE AND AT A MEETING ON 24 FEBRUARY, POLISARIO'S SUPPORTERS PUT TO KODJO THAT IN NOT FOLLOWING NORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES, HE WAS IN EFFECT DEMONSTRATING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**CONFIDENTIAL****INWARD BB MESSAGE**

O.NA12677-3

BIAS IN FAVOUR OF THE NON-SADR CAMP. KODJO ARGUED THAT THE MATTER WAS NOT A PURELY ADMINISTRATIVE ONE, AND AS SUCH WAS BEYOND THE LIMITED COMPETENCE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. ON 26 FEBRUARY, THE HEADS OF THE DELEGATION OF SAO TOME, BURUNDI, MADAGASCAR, MOZAMBIQUE AND SEYCHELLES, ON BEHALF OF THOSE 26 COUNTRIES WHO HAD NOTIFIED THEIR RECOGNITION, WROTE TO KODJO QUESTIONING HIS INTERPRETATION OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE MATTER AND ASKING THAT HE GIVE REASONS WHY HE WOULD NOT PROCEED TO NOTIFY SADR'S ADMISSION IN THE NORMAL FASHION. KODJO FORMALLY REPLIED ON 27 FEBRUARY WITH A REAFFIRMATION OF HIS ALREADY EXPRESSED POSITION SUPPORTED BY A TELEGRAM FROM PRESIDENT SIAKA STEVENS (CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE OAU) THAT "ACCORDING TO SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS AT THE FREETOWN SUMMIT, THE ISSUE OF THE SADR WAS SUSPENDED UNTIL THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN SAHARA HAS CONCLUDED ITS WORK", WHICH EFFECTIVELY CLOSED THE ISSUE SO FAR AS THE COUNCIL MEETING WAS CONCERNED. (COPIES OF THIS CORRESPONDENCE SENT BY BAG UNDER SEPARATE COVER.)

5. WE UNDERSTAND FROM A MEMBER OF THE ALGERIAN DELEGATION THAT, IN FACT, THE POLISARIO HAD NOT EXPECTED THAT THEY WOULD SUCCEED IN HAVING THE MATTER RAISED AT THE ADDIS MEETING AND HAD BEEN RESIGNED TO DISCUSSION BEING DEFERRED UNTIL NAIROBI. HOWEVER, THEY WERE ALSO DETERMINED NOT TO LET MOROCCO APPEAR TO HAVE GAINED GROUND BY THE FACT THAT THE MATTER HAD BEEN DEFERRED, AND IN PARTICULAR TO ENSURE THAT THEY RECEIVED WHATEVER PUBLICITY THEY COULD IN SUPPORT OF THEIR CASE FROM THE LARGE BODY OF INTERNATIONAL PRESS ON HAND DURING THE MEETING.

6. WE WERE TOLD BY A MEMBER OF THE EGYPTIAN DELEGATION THAT EGYPT HAD WARNED MOROCCO THAT IF IT CONTINUED TO BE INTRANSIGENT IT COULD EXPECT SADR TO GAIN ADMISSION AT THE NEXT SUMMIT. ON THE OTHER HAND EGYPT HAD ADVISED MOROCCO

**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## INWARD BB MESSAGE

O.NAI2677-4

THAT IT COULD DELAY RECOGNITION AT NAIROBI IF IT WERE PREPARED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS AND AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE AND TO HOLDING OF ELECTIONS. EGYPT HAD TOLD MOROCCO THAT IF IT AGREED TO THE BROAD PRINCIPLES ON BOTH COUNTS, IT COULD THEN "ARGUE FOR YEARS" ABOUT THE DETAIL - I.E. WHAT WERE THE CONDITIONS FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS? HOW COULD FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS BE HELD IN THE WESTERN SAHARAN ENVIRONMENT?

7. THE STRONG FEELING IN THE SECRETARIAT IS THAT SO LONG AS MOROCCO REMAINS INTRANSIGENT THE SADR'S WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE ADMITTED AS A MEMBER IN NAIROBI. IT WILL HOWEVER BE INTERESTING TO SEE WHETHER IN THE INTERIM THE MOROCCANS ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT EGYPTIAN ADVICE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

935/28/2

**RESTRICTED**

**BY BAG**

O.AL4663 1600 10.3.81 CLA

TO.  
BB CANBERRA/216

RP.  
BB PARIS EMB/188 WASHINGTON/26

FM. ALGIERS / FILES 841/1 862/98/1

R E S T R I C T E D

MONTHLY POLITICAL REPORT : TUNISIA, MAURITANIA,  
WESTERN SAHARA : FEBRUARY 1981

Tunisia

para 7-9.

Following a visit by Tunisian Prime Minister M'Zali to Algiers in September 1980, his Algerian opposite number, Mohamed Abdelghani, paid a three day visit to Tunis from 8-10 February. The visit coincided with the 23rd anniversary of the French bombardment of the Tunisian border town of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef, suspected of harbouring elements of the Algerian National Liberation Army. The symbolic value of the visit was thus enhanced. The principal result of talks between the two heads of government was an agreement to create a mixed bank, with a capital of US\$40 million, which would finance common projects, but with the possibility also of underwriting joint enterprises carried out in third countries, principally in Africa. Abdelghani's visit was followed by those of a number of other Algerian Ministers and senior officials, which are seen as confirming the normalisation of relations which have come under some stress in past years.

2. Prime Minister M'Zali visited France from 18-20 February, and had discussions with French Prime Minister Barre which pertained chiefly to submarine gas exploitation, fisheries, agriculture, communications and cars. An agreement was also signed for the creation of a joint French-Tunisian-Arab investment bank (with 30% of the capital provided by France, 40% by Tunisia and 30% by Iraq). M'Zali also said that he approved France's "logical" attitude to the Chad question, and further, that Tunisia's attitude to any merger between Libya and Chad was that it should only take place with the approval of the people of Chad.

3. On 28 February, a meeting of eleven political parties from nine countries decided to create an Interafrican Socialist. Twenty-two countries had been invited to send

**BY BAG**

**RESTRICTED**

.2.

representatives. The Honorary Chairman of the Socialist is Tunisia's President Bourguiba, but the moving force and now Director of the Socialist's governing body was former Senegalese President Senghor who sees the Socialist as forming a political front for more moderate states in Africa. Algeria's National Liberation Front did not attend, and its official magazine had earlier criticised the idea of such an organisation as creating further splits between revolutionary and other countries, rather than bringing about rapprochement.

4. Internally, the month saw renewed agitation on the university campuses, after more than a year's calm. Violent incidents occurred, and a number of bomb threats were made against major tourist centres. The situation was further complicated by a number of strikes in the transport sector, thus tending to jeopardise Prime Minister M'Zali's efforts at conciliation and liberalisation. The image of these efforts was not aided by the Government's decision on 8 February to suspend the popular weekly, Tunis Hebdo, for three months for defaming Moroccan King Hassan's private life.

5. The Ambassador presented his credentials to President Bourguiba on 13 February.

#### Mauritania

6. The Mauritanian Minister for Mines visited Algiers on 3 February and obtained Algeria's commitment to reopening the oil refinery at Nouadhibou which has been out of use for a number of years. During the month, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development made an interest-free loan of US\$15.3 million to Mauritania for road development, repayable over 25 years. Iraq loaned a further \$32 million for irrigation, hospitals and schools, repayable over 20 years. However, the details of repayment have not been made known.

#### Western Sahara

7. February saw considerable movement on the question of the Western Sahara, without, however, any indication that peace is closer. In conformity with established practice, the Polisario Front stepped up its military activities in the period leading up to the (fifth) anniversary of the founding of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic on 27 February. The usual uncertainty surrounded conflicting Polisario and Moroccan claims as to the results of these actions. On the diplomatic front, Polisario gained further expressions of support from the Non-Aligned Ministerial meeting in Delhi and from the 36th ordinary session of the OAU in Addis Ababa for the principle of self-determination for the Saharan people. The latter meeting also proved embarrassing for OAU Secretary-General Edem Kodjo who received a strong letter from the 26 countries which, at the Freetown Summit, had supported the admission of the S.A.D.R. into the OAU. The

BY BAG

RESTRICTED

.3.

letter required an explanation as to why the Secretary-General had not followed the regulations of the Organisation in circulating a letter to all members advising that a majority existed for the admission of the SADR. We are not aware of such an explanation having been given as yet, apart from Kodjo's statement that he was awaiting further advice from the OAU ad hoc "Committee of Wise Men" on the matter.

8. From the Moroccan point of view, the United States symbolically reaffirmed its support for King Hassan in the form of a visit by three of its warships - (one of which ironically was called "El Paso") - to Casablanca and Agadir early in the month. On 18 February, Belgium announced that it was lifting its embargo on the sale of arms to Morocco. Morocco also hosted a visit by eleven editors of influential American Jewish newspapers who reassured their hosts that there was considerable support in the United States for Morocco's "authentic borders".

9. On 1 February, Iran announced that it was breaking off diplomatic relations with Morocco and Jordan. It will be recalled that Morocco decided in July last year to suspend sale of its phosphates to Iran because of the latter's support for the Polisario Front. Subsequently, Morocco's Ulemas have strongly criticised the ideas of Imam Khomeiny and Morocco has sided with Baghdad in its war with Iran.

BY BAG

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

O.CH946487 DRHA

O.CH946487 1736 2.3.81 CLA

TO.  
II GENEVA/6540

RP.  
PP UN NEW YORK/4177 ALGIERS/7509 PARIS EMB/1065

FM. CANBERRA / FILE 929/34/9 REF O.GE49710 O.UN20381

R E S T R I C T E D

CHR 37 : ITEM 9 - WESTERN SAHARA

OUR POSITION REMAINS THAT UNLESS THE DRAFT CAN BE AMENDED ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED IN O.CH945910 WE CANNOT SUPPORT IT. MOREOVER, OP. PARA. 2 CONSTITUTES A CENTRAL PART OF THE RESOLUTION AND WE THEREFORE COULD NOT COVER OUR CONCERNS BY ABSTAINING IN A PARAGRAPH VOTE WHILE VOTING FOR THE RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE. YOU SHOULD AGAIN PRESS THE ALGERIANS FOR AN AMENDMENT WHICH WOULD ALLOW US TO SUPPORT THEIR DRAFT. IF NONE IS FORTHCOMING YOU SHOULD ABSTAIN. IF A SEPARATE VOTE IS TAKEN ON OP. PARA. 2 YOU SHOULD ABSTAIN ON THE PARAGRAPH AND SUBSEQUENTLY ON THE RESOLUTION.

2. WHILE WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE DESIRABILITY OF MAINTAINING A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH ALGIERA, MOROCCO ALSO HAS SOME CLAIM ON OUR SYMPATHY AS NEW YORK HAS REITERATED. IN RELATION TO THE OTHER SITUATIONS COVERED UNDER THIS ITEM, IN OUR VIEW THERE IS BOTH A QUALITATIVE AND A QUANTITATIVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MOROCCO'S ACTIVITIES IN THE WESTERN SAHARA ON ONE HAND AND THE MASSIVE INVASION OF AN ESTABLISHED SOVEREIGN STATE SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN OR KAMPUCHEA ON THE OTHER. OUR VOTING ON THESE VARIOUS ISSUES NEED NOT THEREFORE BE SEEN AS INCONSISTENT.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
DEP ATTORNEY GENERAL  
DEP P M AND CABINET

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

2-O.CH946487

ACTION: IO OGAC  
AME

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)	
DPR	FAS(IOAME)	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	GLT	
IL	FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB	
FAS(BP)	FAS(PTO)	PDC	IOL		

RESTRICTED

PL-27-374

*Mr. Bitterman*

93-7281

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

0.GE49730 BOMA  
TOR 0656 03.03.81

0.GE49730 2105 2.3.81 CLA FIRST

TO.  
PP CANBERRA/4824RP.  
RR ALGIERS/103 UN NEW YORK/2898 PARIS EMB/1884

FM. GENEVA / REF 0.CH946487

R E S T R I C T E D

CHR 37: ITEM 9 - WESTERN SAHARA

HANIA SEMICHI (ALGERIA) SPOKE TO US TODAY IN MUCH THE SAME TERMS AS THOSE REPORTED IN 0.AL4635. IT SEEMS THAT THE ALGERIANS HERE WOULD WISH TO USE LANGUAGE EITHER EXPRESSING "PROFOUND INDIGNATION" OR "STRONGLY DEPLORING". EITHER WOULD REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL DIMINUTION IN TONE FROM THE PRESENT "CONDEMNS", BUT WE WOULD OURSELVES PREFER TO OBTAIN THE "INDIGNATION" FORMULA.

2. A CHANGE TO THE PARAGRAPH ALONG THESE LINES WOULD ONLY BE MADE TO ACCOMMODATE AN AUSTRALIAN POSITIVE VOTE. WE ASSUME THAT EITHER OF THE ABOVE WOULD MEET YOUR CONCERNS, BUT WOULD BE GLAD OF YOUR CONFIRMATION ON 3 MARCH.

3. VOTING IS EXPECTED FIRST THING ON 4 MARCH.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
DEP ATTORNEY GENERAL  
DEP P M AND CABINET

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.6E49730

ACTION: IO OGAC  
AME

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)	
DPR	FAS(IOAME)	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	GLT	
IL	FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB	
FAS(BP)	FAS(PTO)	PDC	IOL		

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.AL4635 JAMC  
TOR 0135 03.03.81

O.AL4635 1730 1.3.81 CLA FIRST

TO.  
PP CANBERRA/3414

RP.  
PP GENEVA/141 PARIS EMB/839 UN NEW YORK/173

FM. ALGIERS / REF O.GE49710 O.CH945910 O.UN20389

R E S T R I C T E D

CHR 37 - ITEM 9 - WESTERN SAHARA

ON 1 MARCH WE SPOKE TO ACHACHE (SUB-DIRECTOR FOR UN AFFAIRS IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY) ALONG LINES OF O.CH945910 REINFORCING REPRESENTATIONS MADE IN GENEVA. WE SAID THAT AUSTRALIA WAS PREPARED TO SUPPORT LANGUAGE WHICH DID NOT GO FURTHER IN CRITICISING MOROCCO THAN WE HAD SUPPORTED IN THE PAST BUT THAT THE WORD "CONDEMNS" WAS A STICKING POINT.

2. ACHACHE SAID THAT THE MINISTRY WAS AWARE OF OUR PROBLEMS AND INSTRUCTIONS WERE BEING SENT TO THE DELEGATION THAT THEY SHOULD SUBSTITUTE "DEPLORES" FOR "CONDEMNS" IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH TWO. WE SAID THAT WE THOUGHT THAT AN IMPROVEMENT BUT LESS OF AN IMPROVEMENT THAN THE LANGUAGE "EXPRESSING ITS PROFOUND CONCERN" THAT YOU HAD SUGGESTED. ACHACHE ARGUED THAT THE SUBSTITUTION OF "DEPLORES" WOULD MEAN THAT THE EFFECT OF THE PARAGRAPH WAS WEAKER THAN THE REFERENCE TO TERMINATING THE MOROCCAN OCCUPATION IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH SEVEN OF THE GENEVA ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION. WE SAID THAT WE WERE SURE THAT YOU WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY IN REVERTING TO LANGUAGE TAKEN DIRECTLY FROM THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION.

3. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IS PREPARED TO SHOW A MEASURE OF FLEXIBILITY IN AN EFFORT TO MEET OUR CONCERNS. NO DOUBT YOU WILL BE COMMUNICATING TO GENEVA YOUR REACTION TO THE "DEPLORES" FORMULATION WHICH SEEMS TO US TO BE A GOOD COMPROMISE.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DEP IMM ETH AFF T/T

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN IMM ETH AFF  
ATTORNEY GENERAL+DEP  
DEP P M AND CABINET

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.AL4635

ACTION: IO OGAC  
AME

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)	
DPR	FAS(IOAME)	FAS(CIC)	CIP	FAS(ECO)	
FAS(LT)	GLT	IL	FAREP-M	FAREP-P	
FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB	FAS(BP)	FAS(PTO)	PDC	
IOL					

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

93572872

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.UN20389 NASH  
TOR 1030 28.02.81

O.UN20389 1820 27.2.81 CLA

TO.  
PP CANBERRA/9510 GENEVA/2954RP.  
RR PARIS EMB/986 ALGIERS/109

FM. UN NEW YORK / REF O.GE49710

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CHR 37: ITEM 9- WESTERN SAHARA

AUSTRALIA AND ALGERIA WORK WELL TOGETHER OVER A RANGE OF ISSUES BOTH HERE AND IN GENEVA. WE SHOULD TRY TO PRESERVE THIS WORKING RELATIONSHIP. ALGERIA HAS BEEN USEFUL TO US IN THE PAST (E.G. IN HAVING OUR NAME REMOVED FROM THE LIST OF OFFENDING COUNTRIES IN THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES ITEM IN 1979). WE HAVE RECIPROCATED, OUR SUPPORT FOR SOME OF THEIR PROPOSALS BEING USEFUL IN ALLOWING THEM TO DEMONSTRATE A BROADER BASE OF SUPPORT.

2. THERE ARE LIMITS, HOWEVER, TO WHICH THIS ARRANGEMENT OF MUTUAL CONVENIENCE SHOULD EXTEND. WE SHARE CANBERRA'S BELIEF THAT "CONDEMNATION" IN OP 2 OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IS TOO TOUGH AND WOULD TAKE AUSTRALIA TOO FAR INTO THE ALGERIAN CAMP. WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN PRESERVING A RELATIONSHIP WITH MOROCCO, WHICH IT WILL BE NOTED GENERALLY SUPPORTS WESTERN POSITIONS ON ISSUES SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN AND KAMPUCHEA, WHEREAS ALGERIA ABSTAINS. WE DOUBT WHETHER A VOTE FOR A RESOLUTION CONTAINING THE PRESENT FORMULATION, EVEN IF WE WERE TO ABSTAIN ON A SEPARATE PARAGRAPH VOTE, IS APPROPRIATE. IN OUR VIEW AUSTRALIA SHOULD RESIST SUCH "SALAMI TACTICS".

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
ATTORNEY GENERAL+DEP  
MIN+DEP IMM ETH AFF  
DEP P M AND CABINET

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.UN20389

ACTION: IO OGAC  
AME

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)	
DPR	FAS(IOAME)	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	GLT	
IL	FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB	
FAS(BP)	FAS(PTO)	PDC	IOL		

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*lun bittmeyer*  
935/2812

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

0.GE49710 AEWA  
TOR 0643 28.02.81

0.GE49710 2045 27.2.81 CLA

TO.  
PP CANBERRA/4808RP.  
RR PARIS EMB/1883 UN NEW YORK/2889 ALGIERS/102  
FM. GENEVA / FILE 250/2/6/1 REF 0.CH945910

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CHR 37 : ITEM 9 - WESTERN SAHARA

THANKS REFTEL. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO ALGERIA ABOUT THE NEED FOR AMENDMENT TO OP.2 OF THE DRAFT TO REPLACE "CONDEMNATION" WITH CONCERN OR INDIGNATION AND THEY HAVE REFERRED OUR REQUEST TO ALGIERS FOR DECISION.

2. IN COMMENTING ON OUR REQUEST THEY MADE THE POINT THAT THEIR DRAFTS ON ISSUES SUCH AS THAT INVOLVED IN PARA 2 COME TO THEM FROM ALGIERS AND ARE DECIDED UPON AT "VERY HIGH LEVELS." THEY ARE THEREFORE NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT ALGIERS WILL AGREE TO THE CHANGE REQUESTED. THEY COMMENTED THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN TO ALGIERS THE IMPORTANCE THAT THE ALGERIAN DELEGATIONS HERE AND IN NEW YORK ATTACH TO OBTAINING AUSTRALIAN SUPPORT FOR DRAFTS ON WESTERN SAHARA.

3. IN LIGHT OF THIS FEELING, AND RECOGNIZING THE EMOTIONAL DIFFICULTIES WHICH THE FORMULATION "CONDEMNS" CAUSES US, HANIA SEMICHI (ALGERIA) ASKED WHAT WE WOULD DO IF THE SUGGESTED ALTERATION COULD NOT BE MADE. SHE WONDERED WHETHER WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE DRAFT IF IT STANDS AFTER REGISTERING OUR POSITION ON THE PARAGRAPH IN QUESTION IN A SEPARATE VOTE. WE, NOT WISHING TO UNDERMINE THE BASIS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, GAVE NO ENCOURAGEMENT TO HER, BUT WE DO OFFER THE THOUGHT TO YOU FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.

4. WE CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT AN AUSTRALIAN VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THIS DRAFT WOULD BE THE PREFERABLE COURSE TO TAKE (EVEN IF IT IS NOT AMENDED) AND WOULD BE GLAD OF YOUR INSTRUCTIONS AS TO THE ACTION WE SHOULD TAKE IN THE LIKELY EVENT THAT OP.2 IS PUT TO A SEPARATE VOTE. OUR RECOMMENDATION WOULD BE FOR AN ABSTENTION ON THE PARAGRAPH FOLLOWED BY A VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE DRAFT AND A STRONG EXPLANATION ON VOTE AIMED AT OP.2.

5. AS FURTHER COMMENT WE WOULD ADD THE FOLLOWING MARGINALIA. WE THINK THAT AN AUSTRALIAN ABSTENTION ON THIS DRAFT WOULD NOT SIT EASILY IN THE COMMISSION ALONGSIDE OUR STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE TWO OTHER MAIN RESOLUTION TO BE ADOPTED ON THE SAME DAY (ON AFGHANISTAN

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AND KAMPUCHEA - SITUATIONS WITH SOMEWHAT SIMILAR CHARACTERISTICS). WE ALSO THINK IT NOTEWORTHY (FOR WHAT IT MAY BE WORTH) THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION THIS YEAR HAS SOME SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE IN ALGERIAN EYES IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT 27 FEBRUARY IS THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SADR.

6. GLAD ADVICE ON THE FOREGOING RECOMMENDATIONS BY 0900 2 MARCH IN CASE VOTING IS BROUGHT ON SUDDENLY.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
DEP ATTORNEY GENERAL  
DEP P M AND CABINET

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ACTION: IO OGAC  
AME

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)	
DPR	FAS(IOAME)	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)		GLT
IL	FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB	
FAS(BP)	FAS(PTO)	PDC	IOL		

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PA86236 AEWA  
TOR 0548 25.02.81

O.PA86236 1835 24.2.81 CLA

TO.  
PP CANBERRA/2269 GENEVA/1942

RP.  
PP UN NEW YORK/1081 ALGIERS/633

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 226/3/7 REF O.GE49524

R E S T R I C T E D

CHR 37 : ITEM 9 - WESTERN SAHARA

IN VIEW OF THE AMBASSADOR'S VISIT TO MOROCCO NEXT WEEK FOR THE NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOU COULD CONTINUE TO INFORM US OF DEVELOPMENTS. IN THAT CONNEXION, LESS CONDEMNATORY WORDING AND ALSO RESPECTABLE VOTING COMPANY WOULD OF COURSE BE HELPFUL.

2. THOUGH THE PHRASE "SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE" FIGURES IN UNGA RESOLUTION ADOPTED LAST YEAR, HAS IT ALWAYS BEEN ACCEPTED THAT SEPARATION FROM MOROCCO (THROUGH INDEPENDENCE) IS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE OF SELF-DETERMINATION?

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
DEP ATTORNEY GENERAL  
DEP P M AND CABINET

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-O.PA86236

ACTION: IO OGAC  
AME

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)	
DPR	FAS(IOAME)	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	GLT	
IL	FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB	
FAS(BP)	FAS(PTO)	PDC	IOL		

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

## DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

935728/2

0.CH944886 BOMA

0.CH944886 1036 23.2.81 CLA FIRST

TO.  
PP GENEVA/6389

FM. CANBERRA / FILE 929/34/9 REF 0.GE49524

R E S T R I C T E D

CHR 37 : ITEM 9 - WESTERN SAHARA

TO ASSIST ON CONSIDERATION OF THIS QUESTION PLEASE CABLE TEXT OF  
PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS OF ALGERIAN DRAFT.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
DEP ATTORNEY GENERAL  
DEP P M AND CABINET

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

ACTION: IO OGAC  
AME

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)	
DPR	FAS(IOAME)	FAS(ECO)		FAS(LT)	GLT
IL	FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S		DIR-ADAB
FAS(BP)	FAS(PTO)	PDC	IOL		

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.GE49524 AMBR  
TOR 0518 21.02.81

O.GE49524 1750 20.2.81 CLA

TO.  
PP CANBERRA/4668

RP.  
RR PARIS EMB/1872 ALGIERS/100 UN NEW YORK/2834

FM. GENEVA / FILE 250/2/1/6

R E S T R I C T E D

CHR 37 : ITEM 9 WESTERN SAHARA

WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN AN ADVANCE COPY OF THE PROSPECTIVE ALGERIAN DRAFT ON WESTERN SAHARA, OPERATIVE PART OF WHICH IS SET OUT BELOW. WE FIND THE DRAFT ESSENTIALLY MODERATE IN TONE, BUT WE ARE DISTURBED BY THE APPEARANCE OF THE WORD "CONDEMNS" IN OP 2. ALGERIANS HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY VIEW THE PARAGRAPH AS JUSTIFIABLY CONDEMNING THE PERSISTENCE OF OCCUPATION AND NOT AS A CONDEMNATION OF MOROCCO ITSELF, BUT WE SAID THAT WE FELT THAT THE IMPLICATIONS WERE LIKELY TO BE SEEN BY YOU AS TOO DIRECT. THEY TOLD US THAT THEY WOULD TABLE THIS TEXT AS IT STANDS (EITHER TODAY OR ON MONDAY) BUT THAT WE SHOULD NOT REGARD THE MATTER AS CLOSED. IN RESPONSE TO THEIR REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN FINDING NEW WORDS WE THOUGHT THAT LANGUAGE FROM THE UNGA RESOLUTION 35/19 LIKE "DEEPLY CONCERNED" MIGHT BE ATTEMPTED.

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2. THE TEXT IS OTHERWISE UNEXCEPTIONABLE FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW AND WERE IT NOT FOR OP 2 WE WOULD NOT HESITATE IN RECOMMENDING A POSITIVE VOTE. GLAD YOUR VIEWS.

3. TEXT READS (OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS ONLY).

BEGINS -

1. UNDERLINES THE DETERMINATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY WITH A VIEW TO ENABLING THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY.

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2. CONDEMNS THE PERSISTING OCCUPATION OF WESTERN SAHARA BY MOROCCO, WHICH PREVENTS THE PEOPLE OF THAT TERRITORY FROM EXERCISING THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION INDEPENDENCE AND OTHER FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS.

3. DECIDES TO FOLLOW CLOSELY THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS SITUATION IN

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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THE LIGHT OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ITEM ENTITLED "THE RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND ITS APPLICATION TO PEOPLES UNDER COLONIAL OR ALIEN DOMINATION OR FOREIGN OCCUPATION" AT ITS THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION, AS A MATTER OF HIGH PRIORITY.

ENDS.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
DEP ATTORNEY GENERAL  
DEP P M AND CABINET

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ACTION: IO OGAC  
AME

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(EANZ)	FAS(DN)		
DPR	FAS(IOAME)	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	GLT	
IL	FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB	
FAS(BP)	FAS(PTO)	PDC	IOL		

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## INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.AL4607 MT00  
TOR 0745 24.02.81

O.AL4607 1400 21.2.81 CLA

TO.  
RR CANBERRA/3393RP.  
RR WASHINGTON/38 PARIS EMB/834 CAIRO/73  
BB AMMAN/02 DAMASCUS/14 JEDDAH/27  
BB TEHRAN/12 BAGHDAD/13 BEIRUT/13

FM. ALGIERS / FILE 841/1

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TUNISIA : FOREIGN POLICY

SUMMARY (UNDERLINE ONE)

THE TUNISIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAS TOLD THE AMBASSADOR OF TUNISIA'S CONCERN WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN LIBYA. MORE RESOURCES WOULD NOW NEED TO BE DEVOTED TO TUNISIA'S DEFENCE. SOVIET OPPORTUNISM IN AFRICA COMBINED WITH THE INACTIVITY OF THE WESTERN POWERS WOULD CREATE GREATER PROBLEMS FOR POORER THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. TUNISIA WAS ACTIVELY DEVELOPING ITS RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA AND MOROCCO. IT SAW NO CURRENT PROSPECT FOR A SOLUTION TO THE WESTERN SAHARA DISPUTE.

DURING AN HOUR LONG TALK WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BELKHODJA IN TUNIS LAST WEEK THE AMBASSADOR WAS GIVEN A PESSIMISTIC ACCOUNT OF THE VIEW TAKEN IN TUNIS OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS IN GENERAL AND TUNISIA'S CONCERNS WITH LIBYA IN PARTICULAR. BELKHODJA SAID THAT LIBYA WAS NOW SO COMMITTED TO THE EAST EUROPEANS FOR ASSISTANCE OF EVERY KIND THAT IT HAD BECOME VIRTUALLY A TOOL OF SOVIET POLICY IN AFRICA. A PARTICULAR CONCERN WAS THAT THE CURRENT GENERATION OF LIBYANS WERE ALL BEING TRAINED BY EAST EUROPEANS.

2. THE PROBLEM OF CHAD WAS COMPLEX AND COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT MANY EDUCATED CHADIANS, INCLUDING THE FOREIGN MINISTER, HAD SPENT MUCH OF THEIR LIVES IN LIBYA. TUNISIA SUPPORTED THE OAU CALL FOR LIBYAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND A REFERENDUM, BUT HE SAW NO PROSPECT LIBYANS WOULD NOW PULL BACK, ESPECIALLY FROM THOSE AREAS OF CHAD WHICH THEY HAD LONG COVETED. THE LARGE LIBYAN EXPENDITURE ON ARMS (TWO-THIRDS OF ITS OIL REVENUES ACCORDING TO ONE TUNISIAN OFFICIAL) AND THEIR USE IN CHAD WOULD HAVE THE RESULT THAT IN FUTURE TUNISIA WOULD BE OBLIGED TO DEVOTE MORE OF ITS SCARCE BUDGETARY RESOURCES TO DEFENCE. NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR CONCERN WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN LIBYA, TUNISIA WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD TO IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS. THE PRESENCE OF SOME FIFTY THOUSAND TUNISIAN WORKERS IN LIBYA WAS A PARTICULAR CAUSE FOR CONCERN. FOR THE MOMENT HOWEVER LIBYA APPEARED

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TO BE LOOKING TOWARDS THE EAST.

3. BELKHODJA CONTRASTED THE INCREASING SOVIET OPPORTUNISM IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE WITH WHAT HE SAW AS A MUCH WEAKER POSTURE OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOW INTERVENE TO PROTECT ITS INTERESTS ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD, EXCEPT PERHAPS IN THE CASE OF ARMED ATTACK IN WESTERN EUROPE. HE REFERRED TO THE DEMORALISED STATE OF ITALY, THE INCREASED PRESSURES ON GISCARD D'ESTAING AND THE FACT THAT EVEN CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT HAD NOW MUCH LESS ROOM TO MANOEUVRE IN POLICY TOWARDS THE EAST. HE WAS SCEPTICAL THAT THE ADVENT OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION COULD SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE BALANCE. IN A PERIOD OF INCREASING EAST/WEST TENSIONS, HE THOUGHT THAT THE NEEDS OF THE POORER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WOULD BE INCREASINGLY OVERLOOKED WHILE THEY WOULD BE FORCED TO DEVOTE MORE OF THEIR LIMITED RESOURCES IN LOOKING TO THEIR OWN DEFENCE.

4. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE THEN CURRENT VISIT OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF ALGERIA TO TUNISIA THE AMBASSADOR COMMENTED ON THE RAPID INCREASE IN CONTACTS BY THE TWO COUNTRIES IN RECENT MONTHS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT THE COUNTRIES IN TUNISIA'S POSITION HAD NO OPTION BUT TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH BOTH ALGERIA AND MOROCCO, WITH BOTH OF WHICH IT HAD CLOSE HISTORICAL, RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS TIES. HE SPOKE OF TUNISIA'S CURRENT EFFORTS TO REVIVE THE GREATER MAGHRE CONCEPT AND TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE MAGREB COUNTRIES. THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL THAT COULD BE DONE ON A PRACTICAL LEVEL (THOUGH HE DID NOT SAY SO AT LEAST ONE MOTIVATION APPEARS TO BE THE NEED TO DEVELOP A COMMON FRONT IN FACE OF AN EXPANDING EUROPEAN COMMUNITY A PARTICULAR CONCERN IS THAT THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS OF THE NEW MEMBERS WILL CREATE DIFFICULTIES FOR TRADITIONAL MAGHRE EXPORTS TO THE COMMUNITY.)

5. BELKHODJA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A BARRIER TO COOPERATION BETWEEN THE MAGHREB COUNTRIES WAS THE CONFLICT IN THE WESTERN SAHARA. HE SAW NO IMMEDIATE PROSPECT OF A SOLUTION. A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE IF ALGERIA WAS PREPARED TO ABANDON POLISARIO, WHICH IT COULD NOT DO, OR IF KING HASSAN WAS PREPARED TO ABANDON MOROCCO'S CLAIMS TO THE WESTERN SAHARA. THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO HASSAN. BELKHOUDA SAID THAT THE PROBLEM IN THE WESTERN SAHARA WAS MADE MORE DIFFICULT BY THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT OF LIBYA IN SUPPORT OF POLISARIO.

COMMENT (UNDERLINE ONE)

6. BELKHODJA'S COMMENTS ON THE WESTERN SAHARA APPEARED TO BE CONSISTENT WITH REPORTS WE HAVE HEARD THAT TUNISIA HAS DRAWN BACK FROM A POSITION WHICH INITIALLY WAS MORE FAVOURABLE TO THE MOROCCAN SIDE, TO TAKE A STAND WHICH IS MORE GENUINELY NEUTRAL. HIS REMARKS ALSO APPEAR TO CONFIRM THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR'S ASSESSMENT THAT

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TUNISIA, WHICH WAS PROBABLY BETTER PLACED THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY TO PLAY A MEDIATORY ROLE, WOULD ONLY CONSENT TO DO SO IF IT WAS CONVINCED OF A GENUINE DESIRE ON THE PART OF BOTH ALGERIA AND MOROCCO TO SEEK A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION.

7. IN SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS, THE BRITISH AND THE AMERICAN AMBASSADORS CONFIRMED THEIR ASSESSMENT OF TUNISIA'S CONCERN WITH LIBYA ALONG LINES SIMILAR TO THOSE OUTLINED BY KELKHODJA. WHILE THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S REMARKS MAY HAVE BEEN SOME WHAT EXAGGERATED FOR WESTERN EARS (AND THEY PROBABLY ALSO UNDERESTIMATE THE UNPREDICTABLE QUALITIES IN COLONEL GHADAFFI'S CHARACTER) THEY DO APPEAR TO REFLECT A GENUINE CONCERN.

8. THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR BOSWORTH SAID THAT WHILE THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WOULD NEED TIME TO DEVELOP ITS POLICIES, HE EXPECTED TO SEE OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS A SERIES OF DECISIONS REFLECTING THE UNITED STATES' CONCERN WITH DEVELOPMENTS SUCH AS HAD OCCURRED IN CHAD. WHILE THE LIKELIHOOD OF A DIRECT LIBYAN ATTACK ON TUNISIA WAS SLIGHT, THE RISK THAT LIBYA WOULD AGAIN SEEK TO PROVOKE INCIDENTS SUCH AS HAD OCCURRED HAD TO BE TAKEN SEIOUSLY. A CERTAIN NUMBER OF TUNISIAN WORKERS IN LIBYA WERE FINDING THEIR WAY INTO TRAINING CAMPS AND COULD BE EMPLOYED IN ANY LIBYAN TROUBLE MAKING INSIDE TUNISIA. BOSWORTH CONFIRMED THAT WHILE THE UNITED STATES WAS RUNNING DOWN ITS CIVIL AID PROGRAMS IN TUNISIA THERE WOULD BE A STEPPING UP IN ITS MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN+DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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ACTION: EUR JBBBC  
AME JAE

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)	
NUC	DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)		IO	
FAS(ECO)		FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)		FAREP-M	
FAREP-P		FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB			

ACCRA LONDON LUSAKA MADRID

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

935/28/2

## OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

O.CH942980 BOMA

O.CH942980 1641 12.2.81 UNC

TO.  
RR ALGIERS/7477

FM. CANBERRA / FILE 141/7/1

U N C L A S S I F I E D

SAHRAWI ARAB DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC: FIFTH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS

YOUR M.AL1658. WE AGREE YOU SHOULD NOT REPLY TO THE POLISARIO NOTE, AND THAT YOU SHOULD FOLLOW THE LINE OF RESPONSE PROPOSED IN YOUR PARA 2 TO ANY POLISARIO ENQUIRIES.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ACTION: AME

JBAAM

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(EANZ)		EUR	
FAS(DN)	DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)		IO	
FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)		FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M		
FAREP-P	FAREP-S					

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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DATE. 5 February 1981

## INFORMATION.

PARIS EMB.

ALGIERS

IN REPLY  
QUOTE

M.UN 6167

REGISTRY  
CODE

TO. CANBERRA

REF. M.

TO FILE.

FM. NEW YORK U.N.

## CLASSIFICATION.

RESTRICTED

FM. FILE. 103/3/4; 412/1

POST  
SEQUENCE  
NUMBER

5527

**SUBJECT.** UNGA 35 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 -  
QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

The question of Western Sahara was one of the substantive items of the Fourth Committee. Although the debate itself was largely a set-piece, the tactical cut-and-thrust between Algeria and Morocco resulted in some lively episodes. Algeria's draft on Western Sahara was adopted by a comfortable majority but Morocco's rival text was defeated albeit by the narrowest margin.

~~ENCLOSURES ATTACHED~~

Background

2. At UNGA 34 only one resolution (34/37) was adopted on Western Sahara. It was drafted by Algeria in consultation with Polisario. Although the resolution was supported by a large majority we made the comment, in our report, that it would not be likely to contribute to the bringing of the parties to the conflict into negotiations. Indeed, because of the strong criticism of Morocco there was a distinct risk that Rabat, feeling further isolated, would stand outside any international or regional endeavours to resolve the problems in Western Sahara.

3. In developments leading up to UNGA 35, Morocco gained some breathing space when it was able, on procedural grounds, to block Polisario's efforts at the 17th ordinary summit of the OAU to be admitted as the 51st member. At the same time, however, the Freetown Summit demonstrated that the OAU membership was perplexed about how to handle the question of Western Sahara. If Polisario had been admitted it might have resulted in Morocco's departure from the OAU followed, perhaps, by a number of other Africans. This undoubtedly was a major consideration in persuading the OAU's members to fall into line behind a Nigerian proposal to put the question of Polisario's admission "on ice" and to refer the matter of Western Sahara to

*Mr Buntingley*

① MENA Section

② RPS UNP  
for file.

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to the OAU Ad Hoc Committee on the Western Sahara (the body of Wise Men established in 1978 and composed of the Heads of State of Nigeria, Tanzania, Mali, Sudan and Guinea). Finally, the Freetown Summit adopted a resolution welcoming Morocco's willingness "to engage in discussions with all parties and participate in the work of the Committee". For the time being the OAU was able to avert a serious confrontation by this pretence at unity but it left unanswered the question of Morocco's genuine commitment to work within the OAU towards a peaceful solution of the dispute. The proceedings at UNGA 35, in this respect, were revealing.

Debate

4. At the start of the debate on Western Sahara, Morocco made it evident that it had decided to "stack" the list of petitioners with speakers who claimed to represent various groups or movements within the Sahara. The Moroccan Delegation defended these petitioners arguing that their appearance would make the truth known to the Fourth Committee unlike the Polisario which was not representative of the populations of the Sahara and had been created, organised and encouraged from "outside" after the decolonisation of Western Sahara had occurred. Algeria, while making it clear that it did not dispute the right of any petitioner to appear, pointed out that the petitioners in question would reflect positions identical to those of Morocco and refuse to discuss the problem of Western Saharan decolonisation.

5. The petitioners who supported Morocco's position argued that :

- (a) There was no Western Saharan problem as such because Morocco's legitimate sovereignty over the Territory had been re-established. This "re-integration" had been welcomed by the Saharan people who, historically had identified themselves with Morocco;
- (b) The conflict in Western Sahara was merely a continuation of the "machinations" of Algeria. The Frente Polisario was an amalgamated party indoctrinated by Algeria and armed and financed by Libya. It did not serve the interests of the Saharan people nor did it represent them. The only interests served by the war were those of Algeria and Libya;
- (c) It followed, from the preceding, that any resolutions which passed judgment on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of "Moroccan Sahara" should be rejected as null and void.

6. Morocco, in defending its policy, emphasised its traditional, historical links with Western Sahara which, it claimed, had been recognised internationally at the time of Spanish colonisation. When Spain decided, in November 1975, to withdraw entirely from the Territory, Morocco had taken appropriate steps to integrate Western Sahara within its own territory. Thus, for Morocco, the colonial era was over. Assessing the present situation, Morocco downgraded the relevance of the Polisario Front by asserting that all of Western Sahara was free of disturbance except for the border area of Tindorf where the "bands of mercenaries" had the use of Algerian bases. In fact, the conflict in Western Sahara was not really between Morocco and the Polisario Front because the problems originated in provocative actions by Algeria.

7. Morocco, in criticising the Algerian sponsored draft on Western Sahara, claimed that the carriage of the problem had to rest with the OAU's Ad Hoc Committee. Confining itself to this Committee's recommendations on a cease-fire and a free expression of the will of the people, Morocco stated that :-

- A cease-fire would not be a problem since it had never fired first but that it saw a danger of continuing provocation by Polisario from the Algerian border even after a cease-fire;
- It would co-operate with the OAU if it wished to satisfy itself that the Saharan people had made a free and genuine choice to integrate with Morocco. In general, Morocco maintained that it was essential, if the Ad Hoc Committee was to fulfil its mandate, that the General Assembly should give the OAU as much latitude as possible. During the debate Morocco circulated a press release which set out its position on Western Sahara.

8. The Polisario Front, in challenging the territorial claims of Morocco, declared that the latter had, in the past six years, attempted to recolonise the Territory even though the Saharan people were in favour of independence and did not wish to have ties with Morocco. Moreover, the refusal of Morocco to negotiate on the question of Western Sahara had prevented the implementation of various resolutions, especially that adopted at UNGA 34.

9. Algeria, supporting Polisario, said that both the OAU and the United Nations regarded Western Sahara as a case of impeded decolonisation. The OAU had laid down principles for a just and lasting solution to the question, including a process for free self-determination by the Saharan people. It

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was essential, however, that any political and negotiated settlement must include the Polisario Front. The central question was whether Morocco was ready to decolonise Western Sahara in accordance with the wishes of the people. But Morocco's attitude, stripped of procedural manoeuvring, had not changed. It had refused to offer any answers on specific points such as decolonisation, self-determination, and direct negotiations with the Polisario Front.

#### Resolutions

10. At UNGA 35 both Algeria and Morocco presented draft resolutions on Western Sahara. The Algerian draft, in its initial form, reaffirmed, in standard language, the right of the people of the Territory to self-determination and independence, welcomed efforts of the OAU to arrive at a just and definitive solution to the question, and urged Morocco and the Polisario Front to enter into direct negotiations. At the same time, the draft, in our opinion, contained some paragraphs which were too strongly worded or used unacceptable phrases. In particular, we did not agree with the references in operative paragraph 2 which criticised the refusal of Morocco to comply with resolution 34/37; the mention of the Polisario Front and Morocco as "belligerents" in paragraph 6; the specific identification of Morocco and Polisario as the only two disputants (thereby distancing Algeria from the conflict); and the reference to the Polisario Front as "the representative of the people of Western Sahara". Since the Algerians had approached us (as well as Austria and Sweden) to seek our support we were in a reasonable position to state our reservations to their draft. They promised to look at these paragraphs and to consider any alternative formulations we might have. Sweden and Austria also expressed reservations to Algeria focussing, like us, on paragraphs 2 and 6.

11. At the same time the Algerians worked assiduously to gather as many cosponsors of their draft as possible. The large cosponsorship bears proof of the success of their efforts.

12. Morocco's counter to Algeria was to circulate a draft of its own on Western Sahara although it did not decide immediately to table its text. This draft was carefully worded to take account of developments in the OAU but to avoid suggesting that the problem of Western Sahara was a colonial one. Nor was the commitment to consultations with the OAU whole-hearted. Instead, the draft, in preambular paragraph 3, referred to Article 33 of the Charter which deals with the settlement of international disputes. There was, throughout, no reference to self-determination for the Saharan people.

13. The Moroccans did face two problems : if it were to table its draft it would have to secure some credible cosponsors; additionally, it would run the risk that its draft

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might not win enough support to be carried. On 24 October, however, it tabled its draft resolution, which was cosponsored by Zaire, Senegal, Guinea, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Saudi Arabia. Australia, as well as a number of other Western countries, were asked by the Moroccans to support their draft.

14. About the same time Algeria produced a revised version of its draft which went a good distance towards meeting our objections as well as those of Austria and Sweden. Operative paragraph 10 (paragraph 8 of the first draft) still made specific reference, by name, to the Polisario Front and Morocco but the role of Polisario as "the representative of the people of Western Sahara" was modified by removing the definite article in front of "representative". The criticism of Morocco in operative paragraph 2 was deleted as was former paragraph 6 which spoke of Morocco and Polisario as "belligerents". In relaying these changes to us the Algerians made a pitch for us to abstain on the Moroccan draft and pointed to parts of the latter's text which had either rejected OAU initiatives or had taken the question out of the decolonisation context.

15. Within the African Group there was a half-hearted move to arrange the drafting of a single text but this came to nothing as a result of Morocco's inflexibility and Algeria's assertion that it had responded to a wide section of views among delegates in finalising its draft.

16. On instructions from Canberra we advised the Moroccans that we would have to abstain on their draft but would reconsider our position if they were prepared to include an operative paragraph referring to the Saharan people's right to self-determination. They, however, were not willing to accommodate us on this point. (Other Western delegations, especially Austria, Finland and Sweden had put a similar request to them).

#### Voting

17. On 30 October, the Fourth Committee proceeded to a vote on the two draft resolutions. The Chairman (Sinclair of Guyana) in announcing this, then gave the floor to those wishing to explain their vote before the vote. A number of delegations did so but Guinea-Bissau, on a point of order, opened up a procedural wrangle as to whether the meeting was, at that stage, subject to article 128 or 131 of the rules of procedure. After some attempts at clarification which only provoked further controversy, the Chairman suspended the meeting. On resuming he ruled in favour of article 128 thereby preventing Algeria from proposing a series of amendments which would have emasculated the Moroccan draft. The Algerian Permanent Representative (Bedjaoui) expressed strong disagreement at this interpretation but finally backed down when the Chairman

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18/6

insisted that he would have to challenge formally the ruling of the Chair if he (Bedjaoui) wished to insist on his point. Explanations of vote then continued.

18. The vote was taken on the Algerian draft (L.2/Rev.1) and the resolution adopted 88 (Australia, Austria, Finland, Sweden) - 6 (Guatemala, Guinea, Israel, Morocco, Senegal, Zaire) - 44 (EC 9, Canada, New Zealand, United States). The Chairman adjourned the meeting immediately after this vote.

19. When the meeting convened the next day (31 October), Bedjaoui, on a point of order, again mounted a challenge arguing that suspension of voting had created a legal situation in which article 131 and not 128 was binding and that this opened up the possibility of amendments to the Moroccan draft. Again the Chairman found himself in confrontation with the Algerian Delegation. He initially suggested that, since Algeria had appealed against his ruling a vote should be taken by the Committee to determine whether it endorsed the Algerian challenge. Senegal and Zaire, however, voiced dissent from the Chairman's suggestion. The Chairman then emphatically stated that article 128 still applied but sought the opinion of the Legal Counsel (Suy) who confirmed the correctness of the Chairman's ruling.

20. A recorded vote was then taken on the Moroccan draft (L.7) with the resolution being rejected 41 - 40 - 58 (Australia, Austria, Nordics, the Nine, New Zealand and Canada).

21. Australia, explaining its vote after the vote, said that the key to our policy towards the Western Saharan question was the right of the people to self-determination. Our inability to support the Moroccan draft was because of the lack of any direct reference to self-determination, territorial integrity and independence.

#### Plenary

22. Plenary adopted the draft resolution 88 (Australia) - 8 - 43. Although it was meant to be a recorded vote a machine failure prevented the actual printout of the result. The President on resumption of the Plenary in the afternoon (there had been a break over lunch) immediately called for a second vote on the same resolution which, given the absence of a number of delegations resulted in a much smaller vote for the resolution. Algeria challenged this call for a second vote arguing that a mechanical failure did not negate the first vote. The President, on establishing that the Plenary did not insist on a recorded vote, accepted Algeria's point.

#### Conclusion


23. Algeria's success in securing adoption of its draft

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resolution has further affirmed the support of a large number of countries for the right of the people of Western Sahara to exercise freely an act of self-determination. But given Morocco's near-success in having its own draft resolution adopted it cannot now be assumed that Algeria and the Polisario Front have won overwhelming endorsement of their position. Morocco, having started off during the debate assuming that it would be extremely difficult to pull off a success must subsequently have regretted that it did not adopt a more conciliatory approach in revising its draft. Nonetheless it has been encouraged by the support it received for its draft resolution. This does not augur well for future efforts to get Morocco involved in negotiations to solve the problems in Western Sahara. Indeed, having shown, at UNGA 35 that it came close to blunting Algeria's success it may be disposed to work more intensively to that end at UNGA 36.

Comment on Brief

24. Briefing was adequate although the unexpected manner in which this item developed required close consultations with Canberra at each step.



(Kenneth Chan)  
for the Delegation

Documents :-

A/35/23 (Part V), Chapter IX	Report of Committee of 24
A/C.4/35/L.2	Draft resolution of Algeria
A/RES/35/19	Resolution adopted
A/C.4/35/L.7	Draft resolution of Morocco

UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



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ORIGINAL: FRENCH

Thirty-fifth session  
FOURTH COMMITTEE  
Agenda item 18

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF  
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Burundi,  
Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia,  
Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya, Lao People's  
Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi,  
Mali, Mexico, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Panama, Rwanda, Sao Tome and  
Principe, Seychelles, Swaziland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda,  
United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, Zambia and  
Zimbabwe: revised draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Having considered in depth the question of Western Sahara,

Recalling the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in General Assembly resolution 1514(XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling its resolution 34/37 of 21 November 1979 on the question of Western Sahara,

Having considered the relevant chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1/

1/ A/35/23 (Part V), chap. IX.

Having heard the statements made on the subject of Western Sahara, including the statement of the representative of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro,

Bearing in mind the profound concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries regarding the decolonization of Western Sahara,

Also bearing in mind the deep concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries at the aggravation of the situation prevailing in Western Sahara because of the continued occupation of that Territory by Morocco,

Taking note of the decision on the question of Western Sahara adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its seventeenth ordinary session, held at Freetown from 1 to 4 July 1980, 2/

Recalling its resolution 34/21 of 9 November 1979 on co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the charter of the Organization of African Unity and the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and the legitimacy of their struggle to ensure the enjoyment of that right, as envisaged in the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity;

2. Deeply deplores the fact that its resolution 34/37, which sets forth the ways and means for a just and definitive political solution of the question of Western Sahara, has not been implemented;

3. Again declares that it is deeply concerned at the aggravation of the situation deriving from the continued occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and from the extension of that occupation to the part of Western Sahara which was the subject of the peace agreement of 5 August 1979 between Mauritania and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro; 3/

4. Reaffirms that a solution to the question of Western Sahara lies in the exercise by the people of that Territory of their inalienable rights, including their right to self-determination and independence;

5. Takes note of the decision on Western Sahara taken by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its seventeenth ordinary session.

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2/ A/35/463, annex II, decision AHG/Dec.118 (XVII).

3/ A/34/427-S/13503, annex I.

6. Takes note also of the conclusions of the fifth session of the Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity, held at Freetown from 9 to 11 September 1980.

7. Welcomes the efforts made by the Organization of African Unity and its Ad Hoc Committee, as well as the availability of the parties concerned and interested with a view to promoting a just and definitive solution to the question of Western Sahara in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity;

8. Reaffirms to this end the determination of the United Nations to co-operate fully with the Organization of African Unity with a view to enabling the people of Western Sahara to exercise their right to self-determination and independence in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and of the Organization of African Unity.

9. Reiterates the appeal contained in its resolution 31/37 whereby it urges Morocco to join in the peace process and to terminate the occupation of the Territory of Western Sahara.

10. To that end urges Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, the representative of the people of Western Sahara, to enter into direct negotiations with a view to arriving at a definitive settlement of the question of Western Sahara;

11. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to continue to consider the situation in Western Sahara as a matter of priority and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

12. Requests the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to keep the Secretary-General of the United Nations informed of the progress made in implementing the decisions of the Organization of African Unity on Western Sahara.

13. Invites the Secretary-General to follow closely the situation in Western Sahara with a view to the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

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ORIGINAL: FRENCH

Thirty-fifth session  
FOURTH COMMITTEE  
Agenda item 18

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF  
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Congo, Cuba,  
Democratic Yemen, Guinea-Bissau, Jamaica, Lao People's  
Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar,  
Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sao Tome and  
Principe, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet  
Nam, Yugoslavia, Zambia: draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Having considered in depth the question of Western Sahara,

Recalling the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling its resolution 34/37 of 21 November 1979 on the question of Western Sahara,

Having considered the relevant chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1/

Having heard the statements made on the subject of Western Sahara, including the statement of the representative of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro,

1/ A/35/23 (Part V), chap. IX.

Bearing in mind the profound concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries regarding the decolonization of Western Sahara,

Also bearing in mind the deep concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries at the aggravation of the situation prevailing in Western Sahara because of the continued occupation of that Territory by Morocco,

Welcoming the efforts made by the Organization of African Unity and its Ad Hoc Committee to promote a just and definitive political solution of the question of Western Sahara in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and of the Organization of African Unity,

Taking note of the decision on the question of Western Sahara adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its seventeenth regular session, held at Freetown from 1 to 4 July 1980, 2/

Recalling its resolution 34/21 of 9 November 1979 on co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the charter of the Organization of African Unity and the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and the legitimacy of their struggle to ensure the enjoyment of that right, as envisaged in the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity;

2. Deeply deplores the fact that its resolution 34/37, which sets forth the ways and means for a just and definitive political solution of the question of Western Sahara, has not been implemented owing to the refusal of Morocco to comply with the provisions thereof;

3. Again declares that it is deeply concerned at the aggravation of the situation deriving from the continued occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and from the extension of that occupation to the part of Western Sahara which was the subject of the peace agreement of 5 August 1979 between Mauritania and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro; 3/

4. Reaffirms that a solution to the question of Western Sahara lies in the exercise by the people of that Territory of its inalienable rights including its right to self-determination and independence;

5. Takes note of the decision on Western Sahara taken by the Assembly of

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2/ A/35/463, annex II, decision AHG/Dec.118 (XVII).

3/ A/34/427-S/13503, annex I.

Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its seventeenth regular session, held at Freetown from 1 to 4 July 1980;

6. Welcomes the efforts made by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Organization of African Unity to promote a just and definitive solution to the question of Western Sahara and stresses the necessity for negotiation between the two belligerents, the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro and Morocco with a view to creating an atmosphere conducive to the success of those efforts;

7. Reiterates the appeal contained in its resolution 34/37 whereby it urges Morocco to join in the peace process and to terminate the occupation of the Territory of Western Sahara;

8. To that end urges Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, the representative of the people of Western Sahara, to enter into direct negotiations with a view to arriving at a definitive settlement of the question of Western Sahara;

9. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to continue to consider the situation in Western Sahara as a matter of priority and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

10. Requests the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to keep the Secretary-General of the United Nations informed of the progress made in implementing the decisions of the Organization of African Unity on Western Sahara;

11. Invites the Secretary-General to follow closely the situation in Western Sahara with a view to the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

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ORIGINAL: FRENCH

Thirty-fifth session  
FOURTH COMMITTEE  
Agenda item 18

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF  
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Morocco,  
Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Zaire: draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of Western Sahara,

Recalling its resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960,

Recalling the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, which states that the settlement of international disputes should be sought by resort to regional agencies,

Considering the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its fifteenth ordinary session, held at Khartoum from 18 to 22 July 1978, to establish an ad hoc committee of Heads of State to consider all the data on the question of Western Sahara, 1/

Bearing in mind the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its seventeenth ordinary session, held at Freetown from 1 to 4 July 1980, 2/ requesting the Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State to continue its work with a view to reconciling the parties to the conflict and seeking a peaceful and lasting solution thereto,

1/ A/33/235 and Corr.1, annex II, resolution A/HG/Res.92 (XV).

2/ A/35/463 and Corr.1, annex II, decision A/HG/Dec.118 (VII).

Having heard the statements of the parties interested and concerned in the conflict in Western Sahara and of the organizations originating in the Territory which were heard at the fifth session of the Ad Hoc Committee, held at Freetown from 9 to 12 September 1980,

Recalling its resolution 34/21 of 9 November 1979, regarding co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its seventeenth ordinary session to request the Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State to continue its work with a view to reconciling the parties to the conflict and seeking a peaceful and lasting solution thereto;

2. Welcomes the full participation in the Ad Hoc Committee's work of all the parties interested and concerned in the conflict and of the organizations originating in Western Sahara;

3. Welcomes the peace process initiated by the fifth session of the Ad Hoc Committee;

4. Appeals to all States to refrain from any action that might impede the peace process and the reconciliation efforts of the Ad Hoc Committee;

5. Expresses its confidence in the Ad Hoc Committee and encourages it to fulfil the mandate given it by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, at its seventeenth ordinary session;

6. Requests the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to keep the Secretary-General of the United Nations informed of the results achieved by the Organization of African Unity on the subject of Western Sahara;

7. Invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to report on this subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

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DRAFT RESOLUTION ON WESTERN SAHARA

The General Assembly,

Having examined the question of Western Sahara,

Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960 and  
1541 (XV) of December 15, 1960,

Recalling the provisions of article 33 of the Charter of the Organization of the United Nations, which stipulate that settlement of international disputes should be sought by resorting to regional organizations,

Bearing in mind the decision adopted by the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its seventeenth ordinary session held in Freetown (Sierra Leone) from 1st to 4th July 1980, requesting the ad hoc Committee to continue its work with a view to reconciling the parties to the conflict and seeking a peaceful and lasting solution to this question,

Having heard the statements made by the organizations from the territory which had already been heard by the ad hoc Committee of the Organization of African Unity at its fifth session held in Freetown from September 9th to 11th, 1980,

Recalling its resolution 34/21 of 9th November 1979, regarding the co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the decision AHG/DEC.118 (XVII) of Heads of State and Government of the OAU at its 17th session held in Freetown from July 1st to 4th, 1980, requesting the ad hoc Committee to continue its work with a view to reconciling the parties to the conflict and seeking a peaceful and lasting solution to this question;
2. Welcomes the participation in the work of the ad hoc Committee of all the parties concerned, and especially the organizations from Western Sahara;
3. Welcomes the peace process initiated by the fifth session of the ad hoc Committee of the Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity held in Freetown from 9th to 12th September 1980;
4. Calls upon all States to abstain from any action which may impede this peace process or hamper the efforts of reconciliation undertaken by the ad hoc Committee of the Organization of African Unity;
5. Expresses its confidence in, and encourages the ad hoc Committee in carrying out the mandate intrusted to it by the 17th Summit Conference of the Organization of African Unity, held in Freetown in July 1980;
6. Requests the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity to inform the Secretary General of the United Nations of the results achieved by the OAU, regarding Western Sahara;
7. Invites the Secretary General of the United Nations to report thereon to the General Assembly at its 36th session.

THIRTY FIFTH SESSION

31/10/80 1:36 PM

4TH COMMITTEE MEETING NO. 22 VOTE NO. I ITEM NO. 18

SUBJECT: QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

A/C.4/35/L.7 DRAFT RESOLUTION

RECORDED VOTE

YES 40 NO 41 ABSTAIN 58 NOT ADOPTED

N	AFGHANISTAN	A	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	N	LESOTHO	Y	SAUDI ARABIA
	ALBANIA	A	Ecuador	Y	Liberia	Y	SENEGAL
N	ALGERIA	Y	EGYPT	N	LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA	N	SEYCHELLES
N	ANGOLA	Y	EL SALVADOR	A	LUXEMBOURG	.	SIERRA LEONE
Y	ARGENTINA	Y	EQUATORIAL GUINEA	N	MADAGASCAR	.	SINGAPORE
A	AUSTRALIA	N	ETHIOPIA	N	MALAWI	Y	SOLOMON ISLANDS
A	AUSTRIA	A	FIJI	Y	MALAYSIA	Y	SOMALIA
A	BAHAMAS	A	FINLAND	A	MALDIVES	.	SOUTH AFRICA
Y	BAHRAIN	A	FRANCE	A	MALI	A	SPAIN
Y	BANGLADESH	Y	GABON	.	MALTA	A	SRI LANKA
N	BARBADOS	Y	GAMBIA	A	MAURITANIA	Y	SUDAN
A	BELGIUM		GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REP.	Y	MAURITIUS	A	SURINAME
N	BENIN	A	GERMANY, FEDERAL REP. OF	N	MEXICO	N	SWAZILAND
A	BHUTAN	N	GHANA	A	MONGOLIA	A	SWEDEN
Y	BOLIVIA	A	GREECE	Y	MOROCCO	N	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
N	BOTSWANA	N	GRENADA	N	MOZAMBIQUE	Y	THAILAND
Y	BRAZIL	Y	GUATEMALA	A	NEPAL	.	TOGO
A	BULGARIA	Y	GUINEA	A	NETHERLANDS	N	TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
A	BURMA	N	GUINEA-BISSAU	A	NEW ZEALAND	A	TUNISIA
N	BURUNDI	N	GUYANA	N	NICARAGUA	Y	TURKEY
A	BYELORUSSIAN S.S.R.	N	HAITI	A	NIGER	N	UGANDA
A	CANADA	Y	HONDURAS	A	NIGERIA	A	UKRAINIAN S.S.R.
N	CAPE VERDE	A	HUNGARY	A	NORWAY	A	UNION OF SOVIET SOC. REP.
A	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	A	ICELAND	Y	OMAN	A	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
N	CHAD	A	INDIA	Y	PAKISTAN	A	UNITED KINGDOM
Y	CHILE	A	INDONESIA	A	PANAMA	A	UNITED REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON
	CHINA	N	IRAN	A	PAPUA NEW GUINEA	N	UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
Y	COLOMBIA	Y	IRAN	Y	PARAGUAY	Y	UNITED STATES
Y	COMOROS	A	IRELAND	A	PERU	Y	UPPER VOLTA
N	CONGO	A	ISRAEL	Y	PHILIPPINES	Y	URUGUAY
Y	COSTA RICA	A	ITALY	A	POLAND	A	VENEZUELA
N	CUBA	A	IVORY COAST	A	PORTUGAL	N	VIET NAM
N	CYPRUS	N	JAMAICA	Y	QATAR	A	YEMEN
A	CZECHOSLOVAKIA	A	JAPAN		ROMANIA	N	YUGOSLAVIA
Y	DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA	Y	JORDAN	N	RWANDA	Y	ZAIRE
N	DEMOCRATIC YEMEN	A	KENYA		SAINT LUCIA	N	ZAMBIA
A	DENMARK		KUWAIT		SAINT VINCENT - GRENADINES	N	ZIMBABWE
	DJIBOUTI	N	LAOS P.D.R.		SAMOA		
	DOMINICA	A	LEBANON	N	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPAL		

DAY-MONTH: 30-10 AGENDA ITEMS: 000 - 018 VOTE NO:01  
ADOPTED GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIRTY-FIFTH REGULAR SESSION ..... PLENARY MEETING 21st. MEETING OF .4. *th* COMMITTEE  
VOTE SUBJECT: A/c.4/35/L.2/REV  
NON RECORDED  
ROLL CALL > RECORDED  
0 0 0 YES 0 0 6 NO 0 4 4 ABSTAIN  
*Agreement of Negociation Committee*  
VOTE TIME: 18:44

MOROCCO'S ATTITUDE REGARDING THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT  
FREETOWN DURING THE 17th SUMMIT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF  
AFRICAN UNITY, CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA  
AND THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AD-HOC COMMITTEE ON  
THE SAME QUESTION, 9-12th SEPTEMBER 1980

Morocco accepts the decision of the Summit of the OAU, and expresses  
its satisfaction regarding the recommendations adopted by the ad-hoc  
Committee in Freetown.

In order to cast a light on the attitude of Morocco regarding the decision of OAU Summit Conference, and the recommendations of the ad-hoc Committee adopted in Freetown concerning Western Sahara, it is useful to refer to the declaration of His Majesty King Hassan II made on September 16th, 1980 on this matter, while receiving the Sahara delegations, who were heard by the ad-hoc Committee during its meeting in Freetown. His Majesty said :

"We are aware of the recommendations of the ad-hoc Committee convened in Freetown. Our aim is not to analyze these recommendations today, as we are still waiting that they will be communicated to us officially by the Secretary General of the OAU. However, we can as from now state that we have reasons to be highly satisfied, since we regard the meeting of Freetown as a great victory in comparison with the previous meeting of the ad-hoc Committee".

During a press conference held in New-York on October 7th, 1980, His Excellency Mr. M'Hamed Boucetta, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, made the following clarifications :

.../...

"With regards to the African Summit of Freetown, our Heads of State have adopted a much more constructive attitude by inviting the ad-hoc Committee to resume its mission with the concerned parties, with a view to reaching reconciliation and a lasting peace.

Despite the legitimate reservations which Morocco could have expressed regarding the serenity of certain members of the Committee who cannot be judges and parties at the same parties, Morocco has shown the proof of its good will, and will continue in the future to participate normally in the work of the ad-hoc Committee (Committee of wise men), and to contribute in the effort of peace in the best manner possible.

The ad-hoc Committee has issued recommendations based on two ideas : the first idea is the cease-fire. We have no problem with the cease-fire because, as I have already said, it is not Morocco who opens the fire, and it does nothing but to respond to the aggression emanating from the Algerian territory. The cease-fire for us, will be therefore, be established from the moment in which we will be no more attacked from outside.

The second idea of the ad-hoc Committee deals with the consultation of the population.

The ad-hoc Committee has heard, from among the parties concerned, ten movements and organizations of the Sahara, i.e. the movements and organizations who had actually fought against the colonialism in the Sahara. They were composed of the political parties of the region, the elected members of the Saharan provinces on all levels, the Army of Liberation, AOSARIO, and the representatives of the abducted in Tindouf, etc...

All those organizations have voiced their direct testimony which reaffirm, their Moroccan identity both during the struggle and after their liberation, and have demonstrated the authenticity of their free choice of joining the fatherland, Morocco.

If the OAU now would like to verify the genuine and free expression of their will, the Sahara is already opened, and the OAU can choose the means to do so".

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

93-7281

**INWARD BB MESSAGE**

O.PA085170 1020 23.1.81

TO.  
BB CANBERRA/176

RP.  
BB ALGIERS/71 UN NEW YORK/43

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE NO. 226/3/7

R E S T R I C T E D

WESTERN SAHARA

As foreshadowed in O.PA85170 of 23 January, following are the main points from Lincoln's discussions on Western Sahara in Rabat last week.

United States Visits to Tindouf Refugee Camps

2. On 15 January Holliday, Counsellor at the American Embassy, Rabat told Lincoln that the background to this visit had been that the United States official concerned had been about to make an appearance before the relevant sub-committee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee chaired by a representative who is opposed to United States arms sales to Morocco and is something of a supporter of the Polisario cause. The timing and the fact of the visit had thus been deliberately intended as a demonstration of American even-handedness. Holliday said firmly that, particularly under the incoming administration, the prospect of any further such American visits was remote. He noted that the visit had not been at Ambassadorial level. He further commented that, as the Americans had expected, Polisario had not complied with advance undertakings about minimising the publicity given to the visit, but had in fact used it for all it was worth.

Western Sahara Dispute

3. Holliday said that Morocco was having some success in pushing the line that Libya's current activities in North and Central Africa pose a threat to the region's stability, the idea being not only that Libya was using the Polisario as an instrument of its search for wider influence but also that, if countries such as France wished to have Morocco's support "on the other side" Morocco would need their support on the shape of a Western Sahara settlement.

4. Hard information was difficult to obtain, but there were many rumours, not all of which would be without substance, of serious Moroccan-Algerian contacts on some sort of compromise. The key question was how to arrive at an act of self-determination - i.e. a referendum or some other process of consultation with the Saharan population. The Lome OAU meeting had seen the Algerians

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finally espouse the principle of some such procedure, and Polisario had had to fall into line on this point.

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5. A very central question was that of determining who constituted the Saharan population. In this context, the question of the refugee camps in Algeria assumed added importance : the 100,000 or so refugees in them were claimed by Algeria and Polisario to be all of Saharan origin, and UNCHR had tended - perhaps without a close examination of the facts - to fall in line with this interpretation.

6. Morocco was currently engaged in establishing something of a fortified line around the North-Western part of Western Sahara, which contained the bulk of the area's population. This would have two effects. It would give the Moroccans a firm influence over these populations when the time for some referendum or consultation came : and it would enhance their capacity to continue to mount military actions against Polisario in the largely unpopulated and ungoverned areas beyond this fortified line.

7. Holliday, like other observers in Morocco with whom Lincoln spoke, confirmed the impression that the military balance at present seems to be in Morocco's favour. Polisario is having particular difficulties with replacing lost troops : it works of course from a much smaller population base, even if its recruitment pool extends beyond Western Sahara itself to include related tribal groups in Mauritania, Libya and Southern Algeria.

8. At the same time, in Holliday's assessment, King Hassan recognises that he cannot continue to wage war indefinitely. Holliday said it remained true that the Moroccan population was almost unanimously in favour of the Moroccan claim to Western Sahara, but Morocco as a third-world non-oil producer was suffering an increasingly serious economic situation in which the war could come to be blamed for some of the trouble. The business community in Morocco had already begun to echo some such sentiments.

9. Holliday recognised that there have been many false starts, particularly over the past year-and-a-half, towards a Western Saharan compromise, but he thought that the next few months might see the pace accelerated. He echoed observations made by the British Embassy that the Algerians had been holding back somewhat in their support for Polisario. This had applied at the political level - for example at the OAU Conference at Lome the Algerians had not pushed for OAU recognition of the "RASD" as the government of the Western Sahara, for which they would have had the votes. It was also apparent militarily - there was evidence that the Algerians were dissuading Polisario from direct attacks into Moroccan territory, including recent firm reports of action by Algerian fighter aircraft to turn back Polisario guerrillas who had crossed from Tindouf into Morocco. (Similarly Morocco has continued to refrain from any attacks on Polisario bases in the Tindouf region).

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10. Holliday also spoke off the recent seizure by the Moroccans of some 4 Soviet fishing trawlers of the coast of Western Sahara. There had been numerous such seizures of Spanish vessels. However the seizure of the Soviet vessels posed not only a financial problem (the Moroccans were demanding US\$250,000 for each) but also a political one, in that Soviet dealings with the Moroccan government on the question would imply recognition of Moroccan jurisdiction over Western Sahara.

Western Sahara Military Situation

11. Lincoln also discussed the situation on 16 January with Lt. Colonel de Planta de Wilderberg, Defence Attaché at the British Embassy. He, with other military attaches stationed at Rabat, had visited the war zone as guests of the Moroccan government early in December. This had been the first such visit organised by the Moroccans, a reflection of their growing confidence in the military situation. A somewhat more extensive bus tour had also been recently arranged by the Moroccans for journalists, again an innovation.

12. De Planta said that there could be little doubt about the fact of Moroccan control over the main population centres in Western Sahara. These included Dakhla in the south and the group of towns and villages in the north western corner of the territory being surrounded by the "cordon sanitaire" discussed by Holliday of the United States Embassy. De Planta said that this cordon was simply a trench surmounted by a mound. Its purpose was to make Polisario incursions into the protected area more difficult by necessitating a stop by their vehicles, while a ramp was built across the trench, thus increasing their chance of being spotted by Moroccan observer aircraft. Their seem~~l~~ little reason to believe that the Moroccans would not complete this line of defences. (One link that remained vulnerable to Polisario attacks, however, was the conveyer belt from the phosphate mine at Hausa to the coast : the Moroccans had not bothered to restore this to production, merely maintaining the mine in basic working order. The reason was the conveyer would be too vulnerable to guerrilla attacks, and that in any case the international economic slowdown meant that production from this mine was not required to meet Morocco's present export demands).

13. De Planta considered that the population of Moroccan-controlled Sahara was largely of indigenous origin, though there had been some immigration from Morocco proper. He was not prepared to hazard even a guess at a precise population figure. He thought on the other hand that very few of the occupants of the "Saharan" refugee camps in the Tindouf region of Algeria were of Western Saharan origin. As for present Polisario fighters, he thought that the Moroccan estimate that no more than one in ten of their present forces are of Saharan origins were probably not much of an exaggeration; the rest were Libyan, Mauritanian, Algerian etc. De Planta estimated

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Polisario fighting forces at between 6,000 and 9,000 : this is much less than the figure of 15,000 mentioned usually.

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14. Lincoln raised with Colonel de Planta the possibility of some sort of Australian official participation in a visit under Moroccan Government auspices to Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara. De Planta said that both the recent military attaches' visit and the journalists' visit had proved well-enough organised and had not involved any great personal risk, but he did not have any knowledge of any forthcoming such trips.

### The Military Prospect

15. Like other observers, de Planta saw the long-term military advantage as clearly lying with the Moroccans, essentially because of their 20 million population recruitment pool. Moreover the kind of war being fought at present involved relatively few Moroccan losses. Polisario units were making rapid assaults on Moroccan positions from which they withdrew immediately after their bombardments. Their claimed casualty figures were nonsensical - they had no opportunity to count casualties on the other side - and the real figures were probably slight. Polisario had no significant shortage of military equipment, but recruitment must become an increasingly sharp problem. Overall de Planta's assessment was that the Moroccans could now negotiate politically from a position of military strength, if they chose to.

16. On the question of whether (as is often the case in such situations) there was a different assessment from observers in Algeria, de Planta said that the British had no military attache at their Algiers Embassy. He noted that the recent visit to Polisario-controlled Western Sahara carried out by a group of French Parliamentarians as Polisario's guests seemed to be something of a trumped-up exercise : the French visitors had been taken to a village near the town of Basraa in the Moroccan-controlled north-west of the territory : this village was claimed to be under Polisario control and permanently populated, but in fact this seemed to have been a deserted village especially populated for the occasion.

17. De Planta said that he had been struck forcibly during his visit by the central importance of terrain in understanding the Western Saharan warfare. The territory involved was almost entirely arid but had a number of possibilities for concealing guerrilla fighters - rocky outcrops, hillocks etc. It was quite conceivable that a Polisario unit might be hidden within only a few kilometres from a Moroccan-controlled population centre. But such a Polisario presence, in de Planta's view, was meaningless. The Moroccans were confident in their increasing hold on the populated parts of the territory, and showed no signs of giving this up whatever the international political context.

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18. In another conversation Wright, First Secretary of the Danish Embassy (which also covers Mauritania from Rabat) observed that rumours had increased in recent times of an imminent overthrow of the present Mauritanian government. This could have implications for the Western Saharan situation : under the present regime, the military commandant in the northern part of Mauritania has been allowing Polisario virtually free range in his region, but this is apparently a somewhat peculiar situation resulting from family links between the commandant and Polisario leaders, and would probably not survive any Mauritanian change of government.

INWARD BP MESSAGE

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

0.CH937012 MT00

0.CH937012 1655 10.1.81 CLA FIRST

TO.  
PP PARIS EMB/9656 ALGIERS/7418  
  
RP.  
RR WASHINGTON/9683

FM. CANBERRA / FILE 141/7/1 REF 0.PA84752

C O N F I D E N T I A L

VISIT TO SAHARAN REFUGEE CAMPS

WE AGREE LINCOLN NEED NOT RAISE QUESTION OF A VISIT TO MOROCCAN-ADMINISTERED WESTERN SAHARA WHILE HE IS IN MOROCCO THIS TIME. (WE CAN SEE NO HARM HOWEVER IN HIS ASKING WHAT WOULD BE THE PROCEDURES SHOULD ONE WISH TO MAKE A PRIVATE VISIT E.G. TOURIST VISIT TO THE AREA).

2. WE NOTE THE ADVANTAGES IN ALGIERS DELAYING A REQUEST TO VISIT REFUGEE CAMPS IN ALGERIA UNTIL LINCOLN CAN REPORT ON HIS VISIT TO MOROCCO. ALGIERS SHOULD THEREFORE HOLD PLANNING FOR THE MOMENT.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DEP IMM ETH AFF  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN IMM ETH AFF  
MIN+DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
ASIO (C)  
JIO  
ASIO (M)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

2-O.CH937012

ACTION: AME

LF

CIP

JBBBA

LF

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(EANZ)		ANZ	EUR
FAS(DN)	DPR	FAS(IOAME)	IO	FAS(CIC)	
FAS(ECO)	FAREP-M	FAREP-P		FAREP-S	
DIR-ADAB	FAS(PTO)	PDC	IOL		

AMMAN BAGHDAD BEIRUT BONN CAIRO DAMASCUS GENEVA JEDDAH  
MOSCOW TEL AVIV TRIPOLI CLOSED UN NEW YORK

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935/28/2

## OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

O.CH936987 JCNI

O.CH936987 1842 9.1.81 CLA

TO.  
PP ALGIERS/7417 PARIS EMB/9651RP.  
RR WASHINGTON/9678

FM. CANBERRA / REF O.AL4483

C O N F I D E N T I A L

VISIT TO SAHARAN REFUGEE CAMPS

WE AGREE IN GENERAL WITH COMMENTS IN REFTEL

2. WE AGREE THERE COULD BE SOME ADVANTAGE IN LINCOLN EXPRESSING AN INTEREST IN VISITING THE MOROCCAN ADMINISTERED SAHARA ALTHOUGH HE NEED NOT NECESSARILY ARRANGE TO DO SO DURING HIS PRESENT VISIT TO MOROCCO. AS WE DO NOT RECOGNISE EITHER THE POLISARIO OR MOROCCO AS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE AREA, HOWEVER, ANY INTEREST HE EXPRESSES WOULD HAVE TO BE LOW KEY AND WOULD HAVE TO REFER STRICTLY TO AN UNOFFICIAL VISIT. WE WOULD NOT WISH LINCOLN TO SHOW SUDDEN INORDINATE INTEREST IN THE ISSUE NOR WOULD WE WISH HIM INVOLVED IN A CLEARLY OFFICIAL VISIT WHICH COULD BE USED AS INDICATING OUR SUPPORT FOR MOROCCO'S CLAIMS.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DEP IMM ETH AFF  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN IMM ETH AFF  
MIN+DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
ASIO (C)  
JIO  
ASIO (M)

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.CH936987

ACTION: AME LF  
CIP JBBBA  
LF

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(EANZ)		ANZ	EUR
FAS(DN)	DPR	FAS(IOAME)	IO	FAS(CIC)	
FAS(ECO)	FAREP-M	FAREP-P		FAREP-S	
DIR-ADAB	FAS(PTO)	PDC	IOL		

AMMAN BAGHDAD BEIRUT BONN CAIRO DAMASCUS GENEVA JEDDAH  
MOSCOW TEL AVIV TRIPOLI CLOSED UN NEW YORK

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935/28/2

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PA84752 JAMC  
TOR 0514 10.01.81

O.PA84752 1840 09.01.81 CLA FIRST

TO.  
PP CANBERRA/0997RP.  
RR ALGIERS/615

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 226/3/7 REF O.AL4483, O.CH936987

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

VISIT TO SAHARAN REFUGEES CAMPS AND TO MORACCAN-ADMINISTERED  
WESTERN SAHARA

OUR STRONG FEELING IS THAT ANY ENQUIRY BY LINCOLN IN RABAT NEXT WEEK ABOUT VISITING MOROCCAN-ADMINISTERED PARTS OF WESTERN SAHARA WOULD RUN AN UNNECESSARY RISK OF CREATING EXAGGERATED IMPRESSIONS OF OUR DEGREE OF INTEREST IN THE DISPUTE, WITH POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH BOTH THE ALGERIAN AND MOROCCAN SIDE, AS WELL AS PROBABLY PUBLICITY OR MISREPRESENTATION. AS YOU KNOW WE ARE CONCERNED THAT OUR UNGA VOTES ON THE WESTERN SAHARA RESOLUTIONS MAY HAVE AFFECTED OUR RELATIONS WITH THE MOROCCANS, CONTRIBUTING TO THE SITUATION IN RESPECT OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE AMBASSADOR'S CREDENTIAL. LINCOLN WILL PROBABLY MAKE SOME LOW KEY SOUNDINGS ON THIS POINT DURING HIS DISCUSSIONS IN RABAT. BUT THIS WOULD NOT/NOT, IN OUR VIEW, BE AN APPROPRIATE CONTEXT IN WHICH TO SHOW THE KIND OF CLOSE INTEREST IN THE WESTERN SAHARA ISSUE THAT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE INFERRED FROM SEEKING TO MAKE AN ACTUAL VISIT TO THE AREA.

2. IT IS INCREASINGLY OUR FEELING, PARTICULARLY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE AMERICAN VIEWS QUOTED IN THE ALGIERS REFTEL, THAT A CORRESPONDING RISK WOULD BE RUN IN PROCEEDING WITH VISITS FROM ALGIERS TO REFUGEE CAMPS IN ALGERIA. WE NOTE FROM PARA 2 OF THE ALGIERS REFTEL THAT THESE CAMPS ARE REGARDED ''FICTIONALLY'' AS PART OF THE POLISARIO-CONTROLLED WESTERN SAHARA. AS YOU HAVE INDICATED TO MALAININ (PARA 11 OF O.CH931401) ANY AUSTRALIAN ASSISTANCE TO SAHARAN REFUGEES IN ALGERIA WOULD BE CHANNELLED THROUGH INTERNATIONAL BODIES SUCH AS UNHCR. IT SEEMS ALMOST CERTAIN THAT VISIT BY AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS EITHER TO CAMPS IN ALGIERS OR TO MOROCCAN-CONTROLLED SAHARAN AREAS WOULD BE PRESENTED AS OFFICIAL VISITS INDICATING POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER, WITH INEVITABLE AND UNNECESSARY BAD EFFECTS ON EXISTING BILATERAL RELATIONS.

3. WE DO NOT SEE HOW A VISIT BY AN OFFICER FROM THE EMBASSY IN PARIS TO MOROCCAN-CONTROLLED SAHARAN AREAS COULD BE REFERRED TO

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## INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-O.PA84752

AS "UNOFFICIAL" (SECOND SENTENCE OF CANBERRA'S REFTEL), AND ALGIERS HAS MADE THE POINT (PARA 4 OF ITS REFTEL) THAT THERE COULD BE NO GUARANTEE THAT EITHER THE ALGERIANS OR POLISARIO WOULD NECESSARILY RESPECT ADVANCE AGREEMENTS ON "PARAMETERS" RELATING TO THE THEORETICALLY UNOFFICIAL AND A-POLITICAL NATURE OF VISITS FROM ALGIERS TO SAHARAN REFUGEE CAMPS. WHAT ACTUAL AUSTRALIAN INTEREST WOULD BE SERVED BY SUCH VISITS?

4. THERE IS THE ADDITIONAL POINT THAT, QUITE APART FROM THE WESTERN SAHARA PROBLEM, TINDOUF IS IN A BORDER REGION LONG IN DISPUTE BETWEEN MOROCCO AND ALGERIA: IN THE EYES OF THE MOROCCANS IT IS NOT AN UNDISPUTED PART OF ALGERIA.

5. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND WE WOULD NOT/NOT PROPOSE THAT LINCOLN RAISE THE QUESTION OF A VISIT WITH THE MOROCCANS, AND WE SUGGEST THAT ANY FIRM DECISION ON THE QUESTION OF VISITS FROM ALGIERS TO THE ALGERIAN CAMPS AT LEAST BE DELAYED UNTIL LINCOLN RETURNS FROM RABAT AND REPORTS ON MOROCCAN ATTITUDES.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DEP IMM ETH AFF T/T  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN IMM ETH AFF  
MIN+DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
ASIO (C)  
JIO  
ASIO (M)

ACTION: AME LF  
CIP JBBBA  
LF

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(EANZ)		ANZ	EUR
FAS(DN)	DPR	FAS(IOAME)	IO	FAS(CIC)	
FAS(ECO)	FAREP-M	FAREP-P		FAREP-S	
DIR-ADAB	FAS(PTO)	PDC	IOL		

AMMAN BAGHDAD BEIRUT BONN CAIRO DAMASCUS GENEVA JEDDAH  
MOSCOW TEL AVIV TRIPOLI CLOSED UN NEW YORK

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## INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.AL4483 JAMC  
TOR 0406 09.01.81

O.AL4483 1030 8.1.81 CLA

TO.  
PP CANBERRA/3298RP.  
PP PARIS EMB/824 WASHINGTON/34

FM. ALGIERS / FILE 862/98/1

C O N F I D E N T I A L

VISIT TO SAHARAN REFUGEE CAMPS

ROSS (AMERICAN DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION) GAVE BERRY BACKGROUND OF HIS RECENT VISIT TO SAHARAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN TINDOUF REGION OF SOUTH WEST ALGERIA. ROSS WAS AT THAT TIME CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AND ACCOMPANIED EDMUND HOOLE, ALGERIA DESK OFFICER IN STATE DEPARTMENT. ROSS SAID THE VISIT HAD BEEN IN RESPONSE TO INVITATION BY ALGERIA AND WAS ORGANISED BY ALGERIAN FOREIGN AND DEFENCE MINISTRIES. AN ARMY OFFICER WAS ASSIGNED TO ESCORT THEM. CONTACT WITH POLISARIO WAS LIMITED TO DISCUSSIONS HELD DURING THE VISIT ITSELF.

2. THE TEAM VISITED THREE REFUGEE CAMPS WHICH WERE FICTIONALLY REPRESENTED AS BEING PART OF THE LIBERATED ZONES OF THE WESTERN SAHARA. THIS SAME FICTION EXPLAINS PRESENCE OF MOROCCAN PRISONERS WAR ON ALGERIAN SOIL. KROSS, WHO SPENT THREE YEARS IN FEZ, WAS SATISFIED THAT THE 350 PRISONERS HE SAW WERE GENUINE. HE COMMENTED THEIR POOR PHYSICAL CONDITION.) THE REFUGEES THEY SAW WERE WELL CARE FOR, AND THE SUBJECT OF HUMANITARIAN AID WAS APPARENTLY NOT RAISED.

3. IN THE CONTEXT OF A POSSIBLE VISIT BY AMBASSADOR OR ANOTHER OFFICER OF THIS EMBASSY TO TINDOUF, ROSS WAS TROUBLED AT THE THOUGHT OF AN AMBASSADORIAL VISIT. EVEN AT A LOWER LEVEL, HE SUGGESTED THAT, DEPENDENT ON OUR PERCEIVED RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO, WE SHOULD AT LEAST CONSIDER SENDING SOMEONE TO THE MOROCCAN ADMINISTERED ZONES OF THE SAHARA. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE GROUND RULES FOR ANY VISIT TO THE REFUGEE CAMPS, ESPECIALLY IN WHAT SHOULD BE SAID DURING AND AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH POLISARIO OFFICIALS, SHOULD BE CAREFULLY ESTABLISHED BEFORE THE VISIT. HE FELT THAT THIS WOULD MOST EFFECTIVELY BE DONE THROUGH THE ALGERIANS, BUT OBSERVED THAT IN ANY CASE, EXAGGERATED REPORTS WOULD PROBABLY BE CIRCULATED BY POLISARIO.

COMMENT (UNDERLINE ONE)

4. THE AMERICANS' EXPERIENCE DURING THEIR OWN VISIT AND THEIR VIEWS

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## INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-O.AL4483

ON A POSSIBLE AUSTRALIAN VISIT ARE OF INTEREST. IT IS WORTH NOTING, HOWEVER, THAT THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN INHIBITED FROM VISITING TINDOUF AT THE LEVEL OF CHARGE D'AFFAIRES. MOREOVER, THEIR RECORD ON THE WESTERN SAHARA IS RATHER DIFFERENT FROM OURS. IN THIS RESPECT THE VISITS OF THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR AND THE SWEDISH CHARGE ARE DIRECTLY PERTINENT. THE DESIRABILITY OF ORGANISING A VISIT THROUGH THE ALGERIANS AND OF ESTABLISHING PARAMETERS FOR THE VISIT WITH BOTH THEM AND POLISARIO IS NOTED. (THERE IS, UNFORTUNATELY, NO GUARANTEE THAT THE PUBLISHED RESULT WILL NECESSARILY REFLECT ACCURATELY THE AGREED PARAMETERS.)

5. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND WE WOULD SEE SOME ADVANTAGE IN LINCOLN EXPRESSING AN INTEREST IN INCLUDING A VISIT TO THE MOROCCAN ADMINISTERED SAHARA DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO RABAT. IN THIS WAY WE COULD IF NECESSARY PRESENT THE EXERCISE AS A FACT FINDING ONE, CONDUCTED FROM THE ALGERIAN AND MOROCCAN SIDES. THE FACT THAT THE ALGERIAN VISIT ONLY WAS CONDUCTED AT HEAD OF MISSION LEVEL COULD, IF THE MATTER AROSE, BE EXPLAINED ON THE BASIS THAT AUSTRALIA SUPPORTED THE ALGERIAN SPONSORED UNGA RESOLUTION ON THE WESTERN SAHARA AND THE AMBASSADOR IN PARIS HAD NOT YET HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HIS CREDENTIALS IN RABAT (CONCEIVABLY THE MOROCCANS MIGHT EVEN TAKE THE POINT AND BE MORE FORTHCOMING ON ACCREDITATION.)

6. AMBASSADOR HAS IN MIND THAT BERRY SHOULD ACCOMPANY HIM ON VISIT WHICH WE WOULD SEEK TO ARRANGE DURING FEBRUARY.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DEP IMM ETH AFF T/T  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN IMM ETH AFF  
MIN+DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
ASIO (C)  
JIO  
ASIO (M)

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

3-0.AL4483

ACTION: AME LF  
CIP JBBBA  
LF

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(EANZ)		ANZ	EUR
FAS(DN)	DPR	FAS(IOAME)	IO	FAS(CIC)	
FAS(ECO)	FAREP-M	FAREP-P		FAREP-S	
DIR-ADAB	FAS(PTO)	PDC	IOL		

AMMAN BAGHDAD BEIRUT BONN CAIRO DAMASCUS GENEVA JEDDAH  
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**RESTRICTED***F***INWARD BB MESSAGE**

O.AL4475 1420 6.1.81 CLA

TO.  
BB CANBERRA/209RP.  
BB PARIS EMB/182 BAGHDAD/11 DAMASCUS/12  
BB JEDDAH/24 MALTA/06 WASHINGTON/19

FM. ALGIERS / FILE 801/2

**R E S T R I C T E D**

MONTHLY REPORT : TUNISIA, WESTERN SAHARA AND MAURITANIA

Tunisia

On 3 December, President Bourguiba announced a partial reshuffle of the Cabinet which marked the return to office of two former Ministers removed (in 1974 and 1977) for having criticised the lack of democracy in Tunisia. These were Beji Caid Essebsi and Tahar Belkhodja who have been named Minister assisting the Prime Minister and Minister for Information respectively. Their reappointment is seen as part of the continuing efforts of Prime Minister M'Zali to liberalise the Government.

2. These efforts, however, received a setback during the month, in the form of strikes against price rises in basic items. While attempting to blame these strikes on disgraced members of the former Executive of the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT), the Government subsequently announced the withdrawal of the price rises. At the same time, it was also decided that the elections to the new UGTT Executive, scheduled initially for January 1981 (and incidentally coinciding with the anniversary of the bloody riots of 1978), should be postponed to a date to be announced.

3. Maltese Prime Minister Dom Mintoff visited Tunisia for a week commencing 8 December, before proceeding to Algeria. In view of Malta's recent problems with Libya, the visit may be seen as a continuation of Mintoff's efforts to secure guarantees of Malta's neutrality from other Mediterranean powers, including Italy, Tunisia and Algeria.

4. Moroccan Prime Minister Bouabid visited Tunisia from 23-26 December. The timing of the visit may have been significant in view of the recent spate of rumours suggesting that Morocco and Algeria have been engaging in a series of exchanges aimed at bringing about negotiations to end the war in the Western Sahara. Tunisia has previously attempted to play a mediatory role in that conflict.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## **INWARD BB MESSAGE**

5. During the visit to Tunisia of South Australia's Minister for Agriculture and Forests, Mr Chapman (11-14 December), the Tunisian Minister for Agriculture (Mr Ben Osman) proposed that South Australia should undertake a demonstration project in erosion control and agro-pastoral techniques in the semi-arid zone 85 kms south of Tunis. It is clear that the Tunisians are looking for some Australian aid offers in relation to this project.

### Western Sahara

6. If sense can be made out of the mass of claims and counter-claims, the conflict in the Western Sahara may be entering a more critical phase. The Moroccans appear to be consolidating their position in a number of key towns which comprise the more valuable resource areas of the Western Sahara. For their part the Polisario Front have been continuing to make it clear that they will strike at Moroccan forces wherever they present a military target and are not limiting their activities to the Western Sahara proper. Allowing for the exaggerated claims of both sides, the scale of fighting appears to have increased somewhat recently.

7. There are persistent rumours that Algeria and Morocco are engaged in secret contacts aimed at finding a solution to the Western Sahara question. The fact that all of the leaks appear to be coming from Rabat is taken in some quarters here as indicating that King Hassan wishes to avoid political isolation by creating the impression that the negotiating situation is fluid. On the other hand, there is evidence that the Algerians are becoming increasingly irritated at Polisario activities inside "undisputed" Moroccan frontiers. A new area for speculation is whether the outcome of the Tchad affair may not give Khadaffi more time and resources to devote to extending Libyan influence over the Polisario Front. Given the modest size of the Polisario forces, a few serious setbacks could make further offers of Libyan assistance hard to resist.

8. Demonstrations by Polisario sympathisers protesting the Moroccan occupation were reported to have occurred in the principal towns of the Western Sahara on 1 and 26 December.

9. On 17 December, Polisario released the 35 Spanish fishermen it had been holding prisoner since May. During negotiations for their release, Spain took an intransigent line and refused Polisario demands that the Spanish-Moroccan fisheries agreement be denounced. The final communique issued on the release of the prisoners reaffirmed Spain's support of independence for its former territory. This is in contrast to the terms secured by Polisario for the release of Portuguese fishermen, which amounted to de facto recognition by Portugal of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic.

**RESTRICTED**

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

**INWARD BB MESSAGE**

10. The Algerian Desk Officer in the State Department, Edmund Hoole, visited Saharan refugee camps around Tindouf in south western Algeria on 2-3 December, in the company of the United States Chargé d'Affaires. Apart from visiting the camps the team also spoke with Moroccan prisoners of war. Subsequently former Ambassador Andrew Young paid his second visit to the camps. While praising the United States for making such visits, Polisario subsequently criticised them for allowing the United States military attache in Rabat to participate in a Moroccan-sponsored visit to zones in the Western Sahara.

Mauritania

11. Mauritania's President, Lt-Col Ould Haidalla, reshuffled his Government on 15 December to give it a more civilian cast. Apart from himself, only one representative of the military is left in the Cabinet. It was also announced that a new Constitution would soon be submitted to a referendum. As an unwelcome concomitant of Mauritania's policy of taking aid wherever it can find it, there were reported to be a number of clashes in the capital, Nouakchott, between students influenced by Iraqi Ba'athist principles and those fallen under the Libyan spell.

**RESTRICTED**

## DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## INWARD BB MESSAGE

2-0.AL4475

ACTION: AME

JEA

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)	
DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)	IO	FAS(CIC)	
FAS(ECO)	EO	EP	OEE	FAS(LT)	
FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S		DIR-ADAB	
FAS(BP)	PPR	PAAP	SEAP	FAS(PTO)	
PDC	IOL				

ACCRA ANKARA BELGRADE BONN BRUSSELS CAIRO DAR ES SALAAM  
LAGOS LONDON MOSCOW NAIROBI NEW DELHI NICOSIA PEKING  
PRETORIA TEHRAN TEL AVIV THE HAGUE UN NEW YORK VIENNA

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

## DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## INWARD BB MESSAGE

93.72812

O.AL4475 DRHA  
TOR 2026 15.01.81

O.AL4475 1420 6.1.81 CLA

TO.  
BB CANBERRA/209RP.  
BB PARIS EMB/182 BAGHDAD/11 DAMASCUS/12  
BB JEDDAH/24 MALTA/06 WASHINGTON/19

FM. ALGIERS / FILE 801/2

R E S T R I C T E D

MONTHLY REPORT : TUNISIA, WESTERN SAHARA AND MAURITANIA

(TEXT)

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

FOREIGN MINISTER	DEP PRIMARY IND
DEP DEFENCE	DEP TDE AND RSCS
DEP FINANCE	DEP TRANSPORT
DEP IMM ETH AFF	DEP TREASURY
DEP INDY COMM	JIO
DEP NAT DEV + ENERGY	ASIO (M)
DEP P M AND CABINET	

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

935/28/2

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

0.PA84598 JAMC  
TOR 0357 06.01.81

0.PA84598 1630 05.01.81 CLA

TO.  
RR ALGIERS/610

RP.  
RR CANBERRA/0871

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 226/3/7, 226/5/1 REF 0.AL4462

R E S T R I C T E D

POLISARIO FRONT - PARIS EMBASSY VISIT TO MOROCCO

LINCOLN WILL BE IN MOROCCO FROM 10 TO 19 JANUARY.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN+DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
JIO

RESTRIC~~TED~~

RESTRIC~~TED~~

ACTION: AME JAE

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)	
NUC	DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)		IO	
FAS(ECO)		FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)		FAREP-M	
FAREP-P		FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB	FAS(BP)		PAAP
SEAP		FAS(PTO)				

ACCRA CAIRO JEDDAH LAGOS LUSAKA MADRID

~~EE~~  
~~AB GR~~  
035/22/2

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

# OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

0.CH935640 MJDE

0.CH935640 1737 31.12.80 CLA

TO.  
RR ALGIERS/7399

RP.  
RR PARIS EMB/9498

FM. CANBERRA / FILE 141/7/1 REF 0.AL4447 0.PA84513

R E S T R I C T E D

POLISARIO FRONT

WE DO NOT RECALL ANY MENTION BY MALAININ OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT BY THE AMBASSADOR "THE SAHARA". THERE WAS HOWEVER A REFERENCE AT THE END OF HIS CALL TO HIS MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH THE EMBASSY ON HIS RETURN.

2. WE WOULD SEE VALUE IN THE AMBASSADOR OR ANOTHER EMBASSY OFFICER VISITING THE POLISARIO REFUGEE CAMPS INSIDE ALGERIA. HOWEVER, WE WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT WISH THE AMBASSADOR TO VISIT THE WESTERN SAHARA UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE POLISARIO SINCE THIS COULD LATER BE DEPICTED AS RECOGNITION OF THE SADR EVEN IF CONFIDENTIALITY IS PROMISED. (MALAININ REFERRED TO THE AUSTRIAN AND SOUTH YEMEN AMBASSADORS AS HAVING BEEN RECEIVED BY THE SADR WITHIN THE WESTERN SAHARA). WE WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT WISH ANY OTHER OFFICER TO DO SO EITHER AT PRESENT SINCE, ALTHOUGH UNLIKELY, THERE COULD BE PERSONAL DANGER (AND EMBARRASSMENT IF CAPTURED BY MOROCCANS) AS WELL AS THE POSSIBILITY OF UNNECESSARILY IRRITATING MOROCCO IF VISIT BECAME KNOWN.

3. IF A VISIT TO REFUGEE CAMPS IS ARRANGED YOU SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO AVOID ANY INDICATION THAT AUSTRALIA WILL CHANGE ITS POLICY OF GIVING REFUGEE AID THROUGH CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNHCR AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN+DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
JIO

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.CH935640

ACTION: AME

JAE

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)	
NUC	DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)		IO	
FAS(ECO)		FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)		FAREP-M	
FAREP-P		FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB			

ACCRA CAIRO JEDDAH LAGOS LUSAKA MADRID

RESTRICTED

*AB* ✓  
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

935/28/2

O.PA84513 ELPR  
TOR 0453 31.12.80

O.PA84513 1736 30.12.80 CLA

TO.  
RR CANBERRA/0805

RP.  
RR ALGIERS/609

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 226/3/7 REF O.AL4447

R E S T R I C T E D

POLISARIO FRONT

PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE RESPECTABLE COMPANY FOR EMBASSY VISITS FROM ALGIERS TO POLISARIO-CONTROLLED AREAS IN WESTERN SAHARA (PARA 3 OF REFTEL), WE AGREE WITH ALGIERS THAT THERE NEED BE NO HARM IN THE SORT OF VISIT PROPOSED. WE NOTE THAT MALAININ IN HIS DISCUSSIONS IN CANBERRA GAVE SOME EMPHASIS TO THE QUESTION ON AID TO SAHARAN REFUGEES, AND THE VISIT COULD PERHAPS USEFULLY FOCUS ON THIS POSSIBILITY.

2. IT MIGHT BE AS WELL FOR THE VISIT TO BE TIMED AFTER LINCOLN'S 11-19 JANUARY VISIT TO MOROCCO.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN+DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
J10

RE  
STRICTED

RE  
STRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-O.PA84513

ACTION: AME JAE

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)	
NUC	DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)		IO	
FAS(ECO)		FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)		FAREP-M	
FAREP-P		FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB			

ACCRA CAIRO JEDDAH LAGOS LUSAKA MADRID

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

935/28/2  
AB/CH

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.AL4447 BOMA  
TOR 1658 30.12.80

O.AL4447 1230 29.12.80 CLA

TO.  
RR CANBERRA/3273RP.  
RR PARIS EMB/817

FM. ALGIERS / FILE 862/98/1 REF O.CH931401

R E S T R I C T E D

POLISARIO FRONT

HABIBALLAH, DEPUTY SENIOR POLISARIO FRONT REPRESENTATIVE IN ALGIERS CALLED, AT HIS OWN REQUEST, ON AMBASSADOR AND SECOND SECRETARY ON 22 DECEMBER. APART FROM OUTLINING GENERAL SITUATION IN THE REGION ALONG LINES THAT WILL BE FAMILIAR TO YOU, HE ALSO REFERRED TO RECENT VISIT TO AUSTRALIA BY MALAININ. HE SAID THAT THE LATTER HAD RAISED WITH THE DEPARTMENT THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT BY THE AMBASSADOR TO "THE SAHARA". MALAININ REPORTED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED NO ADVERSE REACTIONS FROM THE OFFICIALS HE SAW. WE HAVE NOT AS YET SEEN ANY REFERENCE TO SUCH A SUGGESTION FROM YOU. WE TOLD HABIBALLAH THAT WE WOULD SEEK FURTHER CLARIFICATION FROM YOU.

2. IT WAS CLEAR THAT POLISARIO WOULD BE PLEASED TO ORGANISE SUCH A VISIT UNDER ANY TERMS WE WOULD CARE TO IMPOSE, SUCH AS CONFIDENTIALITY, AREAS TO BE VISITED ETC. WE WOULD ALSO IMAGINE THAT A VISIT BY AN OFFICER OF LOWER LEVEL THAT THE AMBASSADOR MIGHT BE ARRANGED.

3. FOR YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION, THE AUSTRIAN, SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE AMBASSADORS TO ALGIERS HAVE VISITED THE SAHARA AS GUESTS OF POLISARIO IN THE PAST TWO MONTHS (ALTHOUGH THE LATTER TWO VISITS WERE IN CONNECTION WITH THE CASE OF FISHERMEN HELD PRISONER BY POLISARIO.) SWEDISH AND AMERICAN CHARGES HAVE ALSO RECENTLY VISITED POLISARIO REFUGEE CAMPS WITHIN ALGERIAN TERRITORY. LATTER DID SO IN COMPANY OF A STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL, EDMUND HOOL, HEAD OF THE MAGHREB SECTION.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-O.AL4447

ACTION: AME JAE

SFC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(FANZ)	FAS(DN)	NUC		DEF	DPR	
FAS(10AME)	IO	FAS(CIC)		FAS(ECO)		
FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)					

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

935/28/2

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

0.PM9022 0800 15.12.80 UNC

0.PM9022 R100  
TOR 0906 15.12.80TO.  
RR CANBERRA/6685RP.  
RR ALBIERS/001 PARIS EMB/402 UN NEW YORK/451  
BB WELLINGTON/028 HONIARA/049 SUVA/037  
BB MADRID/001

FM. PORT MORESBY / FILE 840/175

U N C L A S S I F I E D

PNG : POLISARIO FRONT

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT ISSUED BY DIAT ON 2 DECEMBER FOLLOWING SADIK'S INTERVIEW WITH SECRETARY MATANE.

BEGINS:

PNG GIVES SUPPORT (UNDERLINED)

PAPUA NEW GUINEA WILL GIVE MORAL SUPPORT TO THE POLISARIO FRONT LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN ITS STRUGGLE FOR WESTERN SAHARA'S INDEPENDENCE FROM ITS NORTH AFRICAN NEIGHBOUR MOROCCO.

THE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, MR PAULIAS MATANE, LAST WEEK HELD TALKS IN PORT MORESBY WITH A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE SAHRAWI ARAB DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE GOVERNMENT IN EXILE OF THE MINERAL-RICH WESTERN SAHARA.

MR MATANIN SADIK, A MEMBER OF THE SADR POLITBURO AND HEAD OF THE ASIA-OCEANIA DEPARTMENT, HAS JUST COMPLETED A TOUR OF SOUTH PACIFIC NATIONS SEEKING SUPPORT FOR THE POLISARIO INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT WHICH SEEKS TO END THE FIVE-YEAR OCCUPATION OF THE WESTERN SAHARA BY MOROCCO.

DURING A 30 MINUTE MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, MR SADIK EXPLAINED THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE DECOLONISATION OF THE WESTERN SAHARA.

HE SAID THE GOVERNMENTS OF FIJI, SOLOMON ISLANDS, WESTERN SAMOA AND VANUATU HAD EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE FREE DETERMINATION OF THE SAHRAWI PEOPLE.

MR MATANE TOLD MR SADIK THAT PAPUA NEW GUINEA HAD A CLEAR POLICY SUPPORTING DECOLONISATION.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

**INWARD CABLEGRAM**

2-0.PM9022

PAPUA NEW GUINEA WOULD CONTINUE TO USE ITS VOICE IN THE UNITED NATIONS TO SEEK AN END TO COLONIAL RULE IN ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD INCLUDING THE WESTERN SAHARA.

GM'.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DNA

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN+DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
J10

935/28/2

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PA83783 JAMC  
TOR 0852 05.12.80

O.PA83783 1736 4.12.80 CIA

TO.  
RR CANBERRA/0168

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 226/3/1 226/5/1 REF O.CH931276

C O N F I D E N T I A L

VISIT TO MOROCCO

IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE ARE POSTPONING LINCOLN'S VISIT, AND NOW PROPOSE THAT HE VISIT MOROCCO FROM 12-16 JANUARY. THANK YOU FOR THE DETAILS IN O.CH931401 OF THE DEPARTMENT'S DISCUSSIONS WITH MALAININ. IF THE QUESTION IS RAISED WITH LINCOLN, OR IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT IT COMES UP WITH THE MOROCCAN EMBASSY HERE, WE SHALL STRESS THE LIMITED NATURE OF HIS OFFICIAL CONTACTS IN AUSTRALIA.

2. WE DID CONSIDER PROCEEDING WITH THE VISIT NEXT WEEK, WITH THE THOUGHT THAT "BUSINESS AS USUAL" WOULD BE BEST, AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT SEEM TO THE MOROCCAN'S TO FEEL THAT WE HAVE ANYTHING TO BE ASHAMED OF IN OUR DECISION ON THE UNGA VOTE OR FOR THAT MATTER THE MALAININ VISIT. WE SUGGEST, HOWEVER, THAT WE OUGHT TO GIVE SOME THOUGHT TO AVOIDING THE IMPRESSION THAT WE HAVE BECOME PARTICULAR "FRIENDS" OF POLISARIO; AND WONDER WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE A USEFUL STEP NOW TO MAKE SOME CONTACT WITH THE MOROCCANS IN NEW YORK TO SHOW GOODWILL AND MODERATE THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF OUR UN VOTE FOLLOWED BY THE MALAININ VISIT. UNLESS SOME CONTACT IS MADE, THE ATMOSPHERE MAY DETERIORATE RATHER THAN IMPROVE.

| *Bud*  
| *Send*  
| *me*  
| *word*  
| *want*

3. LINCOLN HAD BEEN GRANTED A VISA FOR THE 5-11 DECEMBER VISIT. WE SHALL NOW ADVISE THE MOROCCAN EMBASSY THAT THE VISIT HAS BEEN POSTPONED ("DUE TO REQUIREMENTS IN PARIS") AND ASK THAT THE VALIDITY OF HIS TWO-WEEK VISA BE EXTENDED TO COVER THE PROPOSED DATES IN JANUARY.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SECRET//REL TO USA

*AB*  
*DC*  
*AP*  
*F*

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0. PA83783

ACTION: AME

JAF

SFC	DPSECS	PPL	IA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(FANZ)	FAS(DN)	NUC	DFF	DPR	CIP	
FAS(IOAME)	IO	FAS(CIC)	ICR			
FAS(ECO)	FAS(1T)	FAS(MFS)	PFR			

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

**RESTRICTED**

File No. 141/7/1

# DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Record of Conversation with Mr Sadik-Bachir Malainin, "Special Envoy" of the Polisario Front to Asia and Oceania  
on 3 December 1980

Officers Present Mr C.A. Edwards, Assistant Secretary, AME Branch  
Mr G.K. Miller, Head, MENA Section  
Mr M.E. Otago, MENA Section

MAIN SUBJECTS (S): STATUS AND STRUCTURE OF SADR, PHOSPHATES, AUSTRALIAN AID,  
MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER

Further to his call on 2 December, Mr Malainin called again to deliver the message to the Prime Minister which he had not brought with him on 2 December.

2. Mr Malainin expanded his arguments on the status of the SADR. He said that it was incorrect to say that Polisario or SADR constituted a "government in exile". This was because Polisario and the "government" of SADR were not synonymous and because the SADR "government" was in any case not in exile. He explained that the Assembly set up by the Spanish, the Jema'a, had dissolved itself in 1975 and a new Assembly, the National Council, had been constituted. Half the members of the Council, which had "extensive legislative powers", were elected by the Sahrawi people and half by the Polisario Front General Congress, which met every four years. The General Congress also elected the Political Bureau (21 members) and the Executive Committee (9 members) which until independence was synonymous with the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). Mr Malainin said that all administration in the "liberated areas" of Western Sahara was carried out by Polisario.

3. Mr Edwards asked if political movements other than Polisario would be permitted in Western Sahara. Mr Malainin said that the only representative of the Sahrawi people was Polisario. Other political movements set up by Spain prior to 1976 and Morocco since 1976 were mere fronts. This included the ten groups Morocco regularly sent to OAU and UN deliberations on Western Sahara. However, the existence of other political forces after independence would be up to the Sahrawi people, who would express their will through elections.

4. Mr Malainin also explained that the independence of Western Sahara had been declared on the territory of Western Sahara.

Headquarters of SADR had been set up in the war-damaged village of Haousa in 1978. Ambassadors, including those of Austria and South Yemen had been received there. Otherwise business was conducted through the Polisario office in Algiers. There was also a large office

DISTRIBUTION: in Tripoli, Libya.

Secretary	EUR
Dep. Sec. A	FAS SEP
Dep. Sec. B	PSP
Dep. Sec. C	EXEC
FAS IOAME	PRO
AME	
→ IO	ONA
FAS EANZ	JIO
	PM&C

935/28/2

Report prepared by *M. E. Otago*

(M.E. Otago)

**RESTRICTED**

Wellington  
Madrid  
Geneva

Port Moresby  
Algiers

Apia  
Paris Emb

Honiara  
Suva

UN New York  
Jeddah

*Mr B. K. Miller  
Mr T. G. Miller  
Mr T. G. Miller*

*Mr R. H. Smith  
Mr R. H. Smith*

**RESTRICTED**

5. Mr Malainin said that administration in Moroccan-held areas was carried out almost entirely by Moroccans, not Sahrawis. Since 1976, Morocco had tried to bring Moroccans to settle in Western Sahara but this had not been successful. Sahrawis were forbidden by Morocco to move to or from Moroccan-held territory in Western Sahara.

6. Mr Malainin said that Morocco had "stolen" 200,000 tonnes of phosphate since 1976. However, production and transport of phosphate had stopped since Polisario had destroyed parts of the Bou Craa-El Aioun conveyor belt in 1977 and attacked the convoys of lorries which had then been used to transport phosphate.

7. Mr Malainin reiterated his request for Australian aid to Sahrawi refugees in Algeria. He pointed out that while aid had been forthcoming from UNHCR, this had not arrived until October 1980. Some governments, including some in the EC, had decided to give aid more directly through non-government organisations. He urged the Australian Government to consider similar action. Mr Edwards said it was Australian policy to channel funds through UNHCR and it was unlikely that there would be a special program for Sahrawi refugees.

8. Mr Malainin handed over a message from Polisario addressed to the Prime Minister. He said moral support was important for Polisario and he was sure Australia would in time support Polisario. Mr Edwards said that the message would be considered. He said Australia had a long-established policy not to recognise liberation fronts as the sole representatives of a people, but this did not mean Australia was not able sympathetically to follow events in countries seeking self-determination. Australia could look forward to recognising a Government in Western Sahara which was an expression of the will of the Sahrawi people.

✓ |

**RESTRICTED**

935/28/2

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

O.CH931276 BOMA

O.CH931276 1215 3.12.80 CLA

TO.

PP PARIS EMB/8861

FM. CANBERRA / FILE 182/10/1 REF O.PA83623

R E S T R I C T E D

VISIT TO MOROCCO

RESTRICTED

WE AGREE THAT A VISIT TO MOROCCO BY AN EMBASSY POLITICAL OFFICER IS OVERDUE AND WOULD BE USEFUL, BUT WONDER IF THE TIMING OF THE VISIT IS OPPORTUNE. MALAININ, THE POLISARIO 'SPECIAL ENVOY' (O.CH930011 REFERS) IS NOW IN CANBERRA AND HIS VISIT MAY PRODUCE PRESS COVERAGE WHICH COULD BE PICKED UP BY THE MOROCCANS WHILE LINCOLN IS MAKING HIS VISIT. THIS IS A MATTER WHICH YOU ARE BEST PLACED TO JUDGE, BUT IT SEEMS TO US THAT MOROCCAN OFFICIALS COULD BE AGGRESSIVELY UNCOOPERATIVE AND IT MAY BE BETTER TO POSTPONE LINCOLN'S VISIT UNTIL THE NEW YEAR.

2. WE WILL FORWARD DETAILS OF MALAININ'S DISCUSSIONS HERE AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE SO THAT LINCOLN IS FULLY BRIEFED ON THE POLISARIO VISIT SHOULD YOU DECIDE TO PROCEED WITH THE VISIT AS PLANNED.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RESTRICTED

*Mr. Delaney*

ACTION: AME

JAE

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(EANZ)	FAS(DN)	NUC	DEF	DPR	CIP	
FAS(IOAME)	IO	FAS(CIC)	ICR			
FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)	PER			

935/28/2

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

O.CH931401 MJWO

O.CH931401 1810 3.12.80 CLA

TO.  
PP PARIS EMB/8881

RP.  
RR ALGIERS/7355 UN NEW YORK/3577 WELLINGTON/661  
BB HONIARA/5416 SUVA/5522 PORT MORESBY/5528  
BB MADRID/5130

FM. CANBERRA / FILE 141/7/1 REF O.CH931276

R E S T R I C T E D

VISIT TO AUSTRALIA BY MEMBER OF POLISARIO FRONT

MALAININ CALLED INFORMALLY ON DEPARTMENTAL OFFICERS ON 2 AND 3 DECEMBER. HE SAID HIS AIM IN TOURING THE SOUTH PACIFIC WAS TO MAKE DIRECT CONTACT WITH GOVERNMENTS AND INFORM THEM OF THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WESTERN SAHARA.

2. MALAININ THANKED AUSTRALIA FOR ITS "SUPPORT OF POLISARIO" IN THE U.N. AND INDICATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD AUSTRALIA'S POSITION ON THE WESTERN SAHARA AS EXPLAINED TO HIM (INCLUDING ADVICE THAT MINISTERS WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO RECEIVE HIM BECAUSE WE DO NOT RECOGNISE THE "SADR"). HE ANSWERED QUESTIONS FREELY AND WAS ANXIOUS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION. HE LEFT WITH US A MESSAGE HE HAD HOPED TO PRESENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER. HE ADVISED THAT HE HOPED TO HAVE SOME CONTACT WITH "POLITICAL FORCES" AND THE MEDIA HERE BUT WE DO NOT KNOW IF HE DID SO.

3. ON THE MILITARY SITUATION MALAININ SAID THAT MOROCCAN FORCES WERE NOW CONFINED TO DAKHLA AND A TRIANGLE AROUND SMARA AND EL AIOUN. ALL OTHER PARTS OF THE WESTERN SAHARA AND PARTS OF SOUTHER MOROCCO WERE UNDER POLISARIO CONTROL. POLISARIO HAD NO DESIGN ON MOROCCAN TERRITORY BUT WAS "OBLIGED" TO HARRASS THE MOROCCAN SUPPLY LINES TO WESTERN SAHARA.

4. MALAININ MAINTAINED THAT MOROCCAN PUBLIC OPINION WAS TURNING AGAINST THE WAR BECAUSE OF ITS COST (DLRS 1 MILLION/DAY) AND HIGH MOROCCAN CASUALTIES. KING HASSAN HAD A HISTORY OF USING EXTERNAL MATTERS FOR INTERNAL PURPOSES, HENCE HIS PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST POLISARIO.

5. REGARDING OAU EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE WESTERN SAHARA PROBLEM, MALAININ SAID THAT THE OAU HAD TRIED TO PUSH MOROCCO TO ACCEPT OAU RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS ON THE WESTERN SAHARA AND THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF "WISE MEN" HAD NOW RECOMMENDED A SIX-POINT PLAN. THE

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## OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

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COMMITTEE'S DELIBERATIONS WERE THE FIRST IN WHICH MOROCCO HAD AGREED TO TAKE PART, AND THIS WAS A GOOD SIGN. HOWEVER, MOROCCO HAD REJECTED THE PLAN. POLISARIO HAD TAKEN PART IN ALL OAU INITIATIVES AND WAS READY TO ACCEPT THE PLAN. MALAININ ADDED THAT HE EXPECTED "SADR" TO BE ADMITTED TO THE OAU AT THE 1981 SUMMIT.

6. MALAININ COMMENTED ON SENEGAL'S ACTIVE OPPOSITION TO POLISARIO WITHIN THE OAU AND SPECULATED THAT ONE REASON FOR THIS MIGHT BE THAT SENEGAL REGARDED POLISARIO AS RACIST BECAUSE OF STORIES THAT BLACK SOLDIERS WERE THE MAIN TARGETS WHEN POLISARIO WAS FIGHTING MAURITANIA.

7. MALAININ SHOWED SOME SENSITIVITY TO SUGGESTIONS THAT POLISARIO WAS DEPENDENT ON OR WAS INFLUENCED BY ALGERIA. HE SAID ALGERIA AND POLISARIO WERE MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE BUT THAT APART FROM HUMANITARIAN AID AND SOME MILITARY SUPPLIES FROM ALGERIA, POLISARIO ACTED INDEPENDENTLY. HE ADDED THAT THE WESTERN SAHARA WAS A DECOLONISATION PROBLEM AND NOT A MOROCCO-ALGERIA PROBLEM.

8. WHEN ASKED WHY POLISARIO DID NOT PLEAD ITS CAUSE WITH THE ARAB LEAGUE, MALAININ SAID THAT POLISARIO PERCEIVED THAT THERE WOULD BE A LACK OF AGREEMENT IN THE LEAGUE OVER THE WESTERN SAHARA. THIS WAS ALSO THE CASE WITH THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

9. MALAININ SAID THAT POLISARIO'S RELATIONS WITH SPAIN HAD FLUCTUATED RECENTLY. POLISARIO HAD WANTED TO DEVELOP RELATIONS, GIVEN THE CENTURY-LONG ASSOCIATIONS OF SPAIN AND WESTERN SAHARA, BUT HAD WITHDRAWN ITS REPRESENTATIVE FROM MADRID FOLLOWING SPAIN'S ABSTENTION ON VOTES ON THE WESTERN SAHARA. HOWEVER POLISARIO AND SPAIN WERE NOW HOLDING DISCUSSIONS ON FISHING RIGHTS IN THE WATERS OFF WESTERN SAHARA.

10. ON POLISARIO'S RELATIONS WITH TUNISIA, MALAININ SAID THAT TUNISIA HAD ADOPTED A NEUTRAL POSITION FOR REGIONAL REASONS AND BECAUSE OF IMPORTANT POSITIONS IT HAS HELD IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS. HOWEVER, TUNISIA HAD SAID IN THE OAU THAT THE WESTERN SAHARA PROBLEM WAS AN ALGERIA-MORROCO MATTER AND POLISARIO HAD OBJECTED TO THIS.

11. MALAININ APPEALED FOR AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AID FOR THE 145,000 SAHRAWI REFUGEES IN SOUTHERN ALGERIA. HE SAID THAT ALL THE DAILY NEEDS OF THE REFUGEES HAD TO BE MET FROM OUTSIDE AID. ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNHCR HAD NOT EVENTUATED UNTIL OCTOBER THIS YEAR. HE WAS TOLD THAT AUSTRALIA CHANNELLED FUNDS THROUGH UNHCR AND ACCEPTED THIS ARRANGEMENT WAS APPROPRIATE BUT POINTED OUT THAT OTHER COUNTRIES - EG NETHERLANDS - HAD MADE MORE DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

3-0.CH931401

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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ACTION: AME

JAE

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
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FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)					

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File No. 141/771

# DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Record of Conference with

Mr Sadik-Bachir Malainin, "Special Envoy" of the Polisario Front to Asia and Oceania on 2 December 1980

Officers Present

Mr C.R. Ashwin, First Assistant Secretary, IOAME Division;  
Mr C.A. Edwards, Assistant Secretary, AME Branch;  
Mr G.K. Miller, Head, MENA Section;  
Mr M.E. Otago, MENA Section.

MAIN SUBJECTS (S):

WESTERN SAHARA PROBLEM: MOROCCAN POSITION;  
OAU INITIATIVES; REFUGEES

Barney?

Mr Malainin called at his request, and began by expressing appreciation for the opportunity he had been given to visit Canberra for the first time. He said he brought salutations from the Polisario Front and the "Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic" (SADR) and their thanks for Australia's vote in the United Nations "in support of Polisario". His own aim in touring the South Pacific was to make the first direct contacts with governments in the region, to inform them of the latest developments in the Western Sahara problem and to deliver to them a message from SADR. He was head of the Oceania and Asia Branch of Polisario and was also "Ambassador-Designate" to Iran. He had not yet presented his credentials as Iran at present had no Foreign Minister.

Mr Ashwin said that he was sure Mr Malainin was aware of Australia's position on the Western Sahara problem. Australia supported the concept of self-determination in the Western Sahara but did not recognise the SADR. It had been therefore recommended to the Foreign Minister that Ministers should not receive Mr Malainin. Australia also did not accept Polisario as sole representative of the people of the Western Sahara, but did accept it as a representative with a role to play in any settlement of the Western Sahara problem. It had therefore been considered proper that officers of the Department of Foreign Affairs should have contact with Mr Malainin.

Mr Ashwin asked Mr Malainin for his views on the general situation in the Western Sahara dispute, especially with regard to the military situation, the strength of feeling in Morocco in support of Morocco's claim and the present status of OAU attempts to resolve the problem.

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AME	ONA	MADRID		
IO	JIO	ALGIERS		
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ACTION:

Report prepared by M. E. Otago  
(M.E. Otago)

Good stuff

~~Mr Billingsley  
Mr Tippins~~

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Mr Yeomans

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Mr Malainin said that since the Mauritanian withdrawal from the Western Sahara, Polisario had concentrated their attacks on Morocco. Moroccan forces were now confined to Dakhla (Villa Cisneros) and a triangle around Smara and El Aioun. All other parts of Western Sahara and some parts of southern Morocco were under Polisario control. Polisario had been obliged to extend the battle to southern Morocco in order to attack the military bases and supply lines from which Moroccan forces went to Western Sahara.

Mr Ashwin asked if Polisario's attacks into Morocco had made the Moroccan population more aware of the conflict.

Mr Malainin replied that after Polisario had penetrated 700 km into Morocco in one of their actions, King Hassan had announced in the Parliament that this was a challenge to Morocco. The King had the support of political parties for the war, but the Moroccan people were a different matter. The war was costing \$1 million per day, and Moroccan forces had suffered heavy casualties - 15,000 killed and 2000 taken prisoner. There were 50,000 men committed to the conflict, 30,000 in southern Morocco and 20,000 in the "triangle". All this inevitably affected the population, and public opinion was turning against the war, though it could not be said that Moroccans were sympathetic to Polisario. This was understandable, as they had been allowed no information on the war since 1976.

Mr Malainin said that it was Polisario practice to gather people together during their forays in Southern Morocco and explain to them that Morocco's prosecution of the war in Western Sahara was unjust. This was to counter Moroccan claims that Polisario was composed of foreigners and terrorists. This tactic had been successful in Mauritania before 1979, where it had helped change opinion on the war within the Mauritanian army. However, King Hassan was politically clever. He had a long history of using external problems for internal purposes and in this case he was using the conflict in the Western Sahara to play off political parties in Morocco against the army. Hence his propaganda campaign against Polisario. The King also forced army personnel who were against the war to serve on active duty in the Western Sahara. If the King did decide to have peace, the people would support him and the political parties, who were pushing the war to create problems for the King, would be the scapegoats.

Turning to the OAU efforts to resolve the Western Sahara problem, Mr Malainin said that the OAU had tried to push Morocco to accept its resolutions and decisions. The Committee of "Wise Men" had now come up with a very precise six-point plan (attached). Morocco's decision to take part in the deliberations of the Committee for the first time was a good sign, as it broke the psychological block the Moroccan government had in discussing the issue. However, Morocco had rejected the recommendations of the Committee and refused to negotiate directly with Polisario. Polisario for its part had attended all OAU deliberations on the Western Sahara and was ready to accept the Committee's decisions. Mr Malainin added that SADR had not been admitted to the OAU at the 1980 Freetown Summit, despite gaining a majority in favour of admission, but expected to be admitted at the next OAU Summit in February 1981.

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Mr Ashwin said there seemed to be a division within the [redacted] on the Western Sahara issue. He had attended the Womens' Conference in Copenhagen and had noted that opposition to an Algerian resolution on Western Sahara was led not by Morocco but by Senegal. Mr Malainin said that there was no real division within the OAU on the issue. Senegal was the only country actively opposing Polisario, though some African countries (Gabon, Zaire, Guinea and the Comoros Is) had voted against the Algerian resolution in the U.N. Mr Malainin speculated that there might be several reasons for Senegal's opposition: one was the possibility that because President Senghor's opposition in Senegal supported Polisario, Senghor opposed Polisario; another was the claim by Senegal that Polisario was a racist movement, based on false allegations that black soldiers were the main targets when Polisario was fighting Mauritania. One further possibility was that Senghor wanted to help France, which had used Senegal as a base for intervention in the Western Sahara through Mauritania.

Mr Ashwin said he was interested in two aspects of the general role of Algeria in the Western Sahara. One was the suggestion that King Hassan was ready to accept an independent Western Sahara but was prevented by his belief that he was in fact fighting Algeria, and the other was the possibility that an independent Western Sahara would in fact be dependent on and influenced by Algeria.

In answer to the first point, Mr Malainin stressed that the Western Sahara problem was one of decolonisation and was not a Morocco-Algeria problem. All international organisations recognized the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination. Polisario had been in existence since before the Spanish left Western Sahara, had fought the Spanish and had negotiated with the Spanish in 1976 in coordination with the U.N. Secretary-General.

Mr Malainin said that Polisario had first developed relations with Algeria after the visit of the U.N. Mission to Western Sahara in 1975. Algeria had agreed to accept Sahrawi refugees in 1976, and had helped Polisario with aid for the refugees. Other international organisations had also helped. Algeria had aided Polisario with military supplies, but so had Angola, Libya and Mozambique. The aid from all these countries had helped Polisario establish more independence. Relations with Algeria were clearly defined: they were mutually supportive and respectful. Polisario would hardly abandon the principles of independence it was fighting for and which were written into the constitution of SADR.

Mr Malainin maintained that Polisario and SADR were not against cooperation with Morocco. If Morocco had not invaded the Western Sahara in 1976, SADR would have sought cooperation with Morocco. The Western Sahara was a small country with few resources and would need assistance from outside. Polisario had moved to develop relations with Mauritania after the latter's withdrawal from Western Sahara. Mauritania had invited Polisario to open an office in Nouakchott, and Polisario had released Mauritanian prisoners as a sign of goodwill.

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Mr Ashwin asked why Polisario did not press its case with the Arab League. Was this because it would be a divisive and embarrassing issue? Mr Malainin confirmed that this was one reason. The Western Sahara had never been on the agenda of an Arab League Summit. This was also the case with the Islamic Conference. He cited Saudi Arabia's financing of Morocco's weapons purchases to the extent of half a billion dollars as an example of potentially divisive alignments on the issue. He said Polisario had sent delegations to individual Arab States (Kuwait and North Yemen) but had not pressed its case in the Arab League. The main arena for Polisario's efforts remained the OAU.

Mr Ashwin asked what was Tunisia's position on the Western Sahara dispute. Mr Malainin said that Tunisia adopted a neutral position. This was for regional reasons and because of the important positions held by Tunisians in international organisations. *Cheab*. Tunisia had for the first time intervened on the issue in the 1980 OAU Summit, and its intervention was not favourable to Morocco. However, Tunisia had said that Western Sahara was an Algeria-Morocco problem and Polisario had objected to this.

Mr Ashwin asked about Polisario's relations with Spain. Mr Malainin said Spain had been associated with the Western Sahara for a century. In 1976 Spain had withdrawn and left the Western Sahara with nothing. However, because of the cultural affinity with Spain, Polisario had attempted to develop relations after Morocco and Mauritania had partitioned Western Sahara. This had been given impetus by Mr Suarez's visit to Algiers in 1978. However, following Spain's abstention on pro-Polisario resolutions in the U.N., Polisario had withdrawn its representative from Madrid in astonishment and waited for an explanation. Relations had fluctuated since then. Since 4 November, Spain and Polisario had been discussing fishing rights off Western Sahara. Polisario had developed naval forces and had captured foreign fishing vessels, including Spanish vessels. Mr Malainin added that the lack of close relations with Spain meant that Sahrawi students had to be sent to Spanish-speaking countries in Central America for education. Polisario now also sent students to Arab and European countries. The first doctor had graduated this year, and plans had to be made for the development of expertise in mining and agriculture in anticipation of independence.

Mr Ashwin asked Mr Malainin for an assessment of his visits to Pacific countries. Mr Malainin said that following his visit to Vanuatu and his discussions with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Affairs Secretary, that country had recognised SADR on 26 November. In Western Samoa he had met the Prime Minister and in the Solomon Islands and Fiji, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. In New Guinea he had met Matane, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and heads of the Africa, Middle East, United Nations and other branches in the Foreign Ministry. He had delivered to each government a memorandum to the Prime Minister setting out Polisario's case. Many of the governments had expressed support for Polisario, and had said they would release statements.

In answer to a question from Mr Ashwin, Mr Malainin said he was very happy with the results of his visits. Moral support was very important for Polisario. His trip had been an occasion to make valuable direct contacts. Polisario had doubts about the

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position of some countries on the Western Sahara issue in the U.N. and such direct contact was important. Mr Ashwin commented that while he felt some countries abstained on votes on the Western Sahara in the U.N. in order not to take sides, others did so because of lack of knowledge on the issue. Mr Malainin agreed and said his trip had been very positive in that regard.

Mr Malainin said that he wished to ask for Australian aid for the 145,000 Sahrawi refugees in southern Algeria. The Australian Ambassador in Algiers had been approached on the matter. All the daily needs of the refugees had to be met from outside aid, schools and hospitals had to be built. Non-government organisations from some countries had helped, as had UNHCR. Mr Ashwin recalled that there had been discussion of the question at the Executive Board of UNHCR. The Australian Government was aware of the refugee problem in Africa as a whole and was a major contributor to UNHCR. He could not at present say if Australia would contribute directly.

Mr Malainin thanked those present for the opportunity to present his case.

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The OAU Ad Hoc Committee's six-point plan calls

for:

- (i) a fair and general referendum in the Western Sahara;
- (ii) a ceasefire by December 1980;
- (iii) the parties to be asked to leave their forces in their bases and barracks during the ceasefire;
- (iv) UN peacekeeping troops to be entrusted with ensuring the effectiveness of the ceasefire;
- (v) the OAU with the assistance of the UN to organise the referendum and
- (vi) the Secretary-General of the OAU to inform the parties of the decisions taken by the Committee.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

VISIT TO MOROCCO

AS IT IS NOW A YEAR SINCE A POLITICAL OFFICER LAST VISITED MOROCCO, I PROPOSE THAT LINCOLN (FIRST SECRETARY) GO THERE FROM 5-11 DECEMBER. IN ADDITION TO CALLS AT THE MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, PROTOCOL AND PACIFIC BRANCHES HE WOULD CALL ON THE BRITISH, AMERICAN AND FRENCH EMBASSIES FOR COMMENTS ON THE INTERNAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION AND THE DIRECTION OF THE WESTERN SAHARAN WARFARE. HE WOULD ALSO MAKE CONTACT WITH BRITISH CONSULAR OFFICERS.

2. PLEASE ADVISE OF ANY POINTS IN ANY OF THESE AREAS YOU WOULD WISH HIM TO TAKE UP. ON THE CONSULAR SIDE, WE HAVE NOTED THAT THE LOAD HAS LIGHTENED SOMEWHAT OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS. PISCHNER (FIRST SECRETARY, IMMIGRATION) MADE A VISIT DURING MARCH IN WHICH HE WAS ABLE TO UP-DATE THE BRITISH ON OUR MIGRATION PROCEDURES.

3. ON THE WESTERN SAHARA AND OUR UNGA VOTE I WOULD NOT PROPOSE THAT LINCOLN INITIATE ANY DISCUSSION, BUT THAT IF THE MOROCCAN'S WERE TO RAISE THE QUESTION HE WOULD DISCUSS IT IN TERMS OF OUR EXPLANATION OF VOTE (O.CH924774). AS TO THE QUESTION OF MY PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS, HE MIGHT USE HIS DISCRETION AS TO HOW FAR TO PURSUE IT.

...ROWLAND

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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ACTION: AME

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## FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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DATE 26 November 1980

INFORMATION. GENEVA

DOCUMENT  
REFERENCE

MCHU91468

SUBJECT  
CATEGORY  
CODE


CLASSIFICATION. UNCLASSIFIED

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SUBJECT. UNGA 35 : WESTERN SAHARA

Attached for you is a copy of M.AL 1582  
which reports the "vibrant homage" rendered to Australia  
by Polisario for its voting at UNGA 35 on this question.

  
(C.L. Lamb)  
UN Political

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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U N C L A S S I F I E D

WESTERN SAHARA - ALGERIAN COMMENT

ASKED ABOUT THE WESTERN SAHARA DISPUTE AND ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN RELATIONS AFTER A LUNCHEON SPEECH TO EMBASSY PRESS OFFICERS ON 20 NOVEMBER, THE ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE, M. MOHAMAD SAHNOUN REPLIED AS FOLLOWS: (OUR TRANSLATION)

"IT WAS MOROCCO THAT BROKE OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA, BUT THERE IS NO TOTAL RUPTURE BETWEEN US: THERE IS NO FUNDAMENTAL ANIMOSITY BUT DIFFERENCES OVER A DECOLONISATION PROBLEM."

2. HE CONTINUE BY RESTATING ALGERIA'S CONSISTENT COMMITMENT TO SUPPORTING THE RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION.

COMMENT

3. THE CONCILIATORY TONE OF THE AMBASSADOR'S COMMENTS MAY CONTRIBUTE TO THE ATMOSPHERE OF COMPROMISE (REFTEL), ALTHOUGH THERE CONTINUES TO BE NO HARD DETAIL ON THE SHAPE OF A POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN+DEP DEFENCE  
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JIO

*Mr Morris*

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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ACTION: AME

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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FM. ALGIERS / FILE 862/98/1

R E S T R I C T F D

WESTERN SAHARA - VISA REQUEST

FROM CHARGE.

A MEMBER OF THE POLISARIO FRONT "EMBASSY" IN ALGIERS CALLED ON ME TODAY WITH A REQUEST FOR A VISA TO BE ISSUED TO SADIK MAAELAININE, (UNDERLINE ONE) A MEMBER OF THE FRONT'S POLITICAL BUREAU RESPONSIBLE FOR ASIA AND OCEANIA. MAAELAININE IS AT PRESENT IN HONIARA AND LEAVES THERE FOR PORT MORESBY ON 26 NOVEMBER. HE IS APPARENTLY ON A MISSION TO CERTAIN OCEANIC STATES, EXPLAINING THEIR STRUGGLE AND, PRESUMABLY, SETTING THE SCENE FOR FUTURE SUPPORT BY THE PACIFIC STATES. HE SPEAKS ENGLISH.

2. THE REQUEST WAS, PREDICTABLY, PUT IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR RECENT VOTE IN THE UNITED NATIONS, AND OUR PAST RECORD OF SIMILAR VOTES. IT WAS STRESSED THAT, IF A VISA WAS GRANTED, MAAELAININE WOULD WISH TO ESTABLISH INFORMAL (UNDERLINE ONE) CONTACT WITH RELEVANT DEPARTMENTS, AS WELL AS WITH THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS IN AUSTRALIA.

3. I NOTED THAT OUR VOTES IN INTERNATIONAL BODIES WAS CONSISTENT WITH OUR GENERAL POLICY ON SELF-DETERMINATION AND THAT POLISARIO WAS AWARE (AS THEY ARE) OF OUR FIXED POLICY IN RELATION TO LIBERATION ORGANISATIONS. IN THAT CASE, I SAID THAT I COULD PROMISE NOTHING EXCEPT TO CONVEY THE REQUEST IMMEDIATELY TO YOU, ADDING THAT IT WAS TO RECEIVE A DETAILED EXAMINATION. YOUR URGENT ADVICE WOULD THEREFORE BE APPRECIATED.

4. ON ANOTHER MATTER, GRATEFUL ANY ASSISTANCE YOU MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE IN OBTAINING COPY OF "SIXTY MINUTES" PROGRAM ON WESTERN SAHARA MADE EARLIER THIS YEAR. OLISARIO WOULD APPRECIATE BEING ABLE TO MAKE COPY (WHICH WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE SHOWN ALSO ON ALGERIAN TELEVISION AND BE EXTREMELY USEFUL TO OUR POSITION HERE). YOU WILL ALSO BE AWARE THAT WE WILL SOON BE OBTAINING VIDEO CASSETTE PLAYER AND IT WOULD SEEM THAT SUCH A PROGRAM WOULD BE VALUABLE PART

.../2

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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OF FUTURE CASSETTE LIBRARY.

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ACTION: AMF ICAA  
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FAS(MFS)	TEC	DIR-ADAR	FAS(BP)	FAS(PTO)	

935/28/2



UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



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GENERAL

A/RES/35/19  
17 November 1980

Thirty-fifth session  
Agenda item 18

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

On the report of the Fourth Committee (A/35/596)

35/19. Question of Western Sahara

The General Assembly,

Having considered in depth the question of Western Sahara,

Recalling the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling its resolution 34/37 of 21 November 1979 on the question of Western Sahara,

Having considered the relevant chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1/

Having heard the statements made on the question of Western Sahara, in particular the statement of the representative of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, 2/

Bearing in mind the profound concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries regarding the decolonization of Western Sahara,

AB  
JG

1/ A/35/23 (Part V), chap. IX.

2/ A/C.4/35/SR.19, paras. 3-14.

Also bearing in mind the deep concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries at the aggravation of the situation prevailing in Western Sahara because of the continued occupation of that Territory by Morocco,

Taking note of the decision on the question of Western Sahara adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its seventeenth ordinary session, held at Freetown from 1 to 4 July 1980, 3/

Recalling its resolution 34/21 of 9 November 1979 on co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and the legitimacy of their struggle to ensure the enjoyment of that right, as envisaged in the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity;

2. Deeply deplores the fact that its resolution 34/37, in which are set forth the ways and means for a just and definitive political solution of the question of Western Sahara, has not been implemented;

3. Again declares that it is deeply concerned at the aggravation of the situation deriving from the continued occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and from the extension of that occupation to the part of Western Sahara which was the subject of the peace agreement concluded on 10 August 1979 between Mauritania and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro; 4/

4. Reaffirms that a solution to the question of Western Sahara lies in the exercise by the people of that Territory of their inalienable rights, including their right to self-determination and independence;

5. Takes note of the decision on the question of Western Sahara adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its seventeenth ordinary session:

6. Takes note also of the conclusions of the fourth session of the Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, held at Freetown from 9 to 12 September 1980;

7. Welcomes the efforts made by the Organization of African Unity and its Ad Hoc Committee, as well as the availability of the parties concerned and interested, with a view to promoting a just and definitive solution to the question of Western Sahara in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity;

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3/ A/35/463 and Corr.1, annex II, decision AHG/Dec.118 (XVII).

4/ A/34/427-S/13503, annex I. For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fourth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1979.

8. Reaffirms to this end the determination of the United Nations to co-operate fully with the Organization of African Unity with a view to enabling the people of Western Sahara to exercise their right to self-determination and independence in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity;

9. Reiterates the appeal contained in its resolution 34/37 whereby it urged Morocco to join in the peace process and to terminate the occupation of the Territory of Western Sahara;

10. Urges, to that end, Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, representative of the people of Western Sahara, to enter into direct negotiations with a view to arriving at a definitive settlement of the question of Western Sahara;

11. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to continue to consider the situation in Western Sahara as a matter of priority and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session:

12. Requests the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to keep the Secretary-General of the United Nations informed of the progress achieved in implementing the decisions of the Organization of African Unity on the question of Western Sahara;

13. Invites the Secretary-General to follow closely the situation in Western Sahara with a view to the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

56th plenary meeting  
11 November 1980

# FOREIGN AFFAIRS


*CENTRAL REGISTRY*  
INFORMATION PARIS EMBASSY D.F.A. IN REPLY QUOTE

DATE 17 November 1980

INFORMATION	PARIS EMBASSY	D.F.A.	IN REPLY QUOTE	M. AL1582	REGISTRY CODE
		Nov 25 10 40 AM '80	TO		
			REF.	CANBERRA : FOREIGN AFFAIRS	
			FM	TO FILE <i>400/100</i>	
			FM. FILE	ALGIERS	POST SEQUENCE NUMBER <i>935728/2</i>
CLASSIFICATION		UNCLASSIFIED	FM. FILE	862/98/1	1049

SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA : UNGA VOTE

You will be interested, no doubt, to learn that we have received a Note from the Mission of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic in Algiers asking us to pass a message to "Sir Zelman Cowen, A.K., K.C.M.G., Q.C., President of Australia" from Mohamed Abdelaziz, Secretary General of the Polisario Front and President of the SADR. The message raises Australia to the level of a "fraternal country" and renders us a "vibrant homage" for the vote we made at UNGA 35 "without hesitation" in support of the "inalienable rights of our people and rejecting categorically the expansionist claims of Morocco to our country".



(K.B. Berry)  
Charge d'Affaires a.i.



Copied 15  
UNNY

GE

MENA

C  
25/11

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

935/28/2

O.PA82946 AEWA  
TOR 0852 13.11.80

O.PA82946 2037 12.11.80 CLA

TO.  
RR CANBERRA/9433

RP.  
RR ALGIERS/604 UN NEW YORK/1049 GENEVA/1873

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 226/3/7 226/5 REF O.CH922446 O.PA82538

C O N F I D E N T I A L

MOROCCO : ACCREDITATION

DESPITE REMINDERS THE MOROCCANS HERE HAVE FAILED TO RESPOND TO MY REQUEST FOR AN INTERVIEW WITH THE AMBASSADOR TO DISCUSS THE UNRESOLVED QUESTION OF THE PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS IN RABAT. I THINK WE MAY TAKE IT THAT THEIR SILENCE IS DELIBERATE AND THAT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD BE BEST NOT TO PRESS THEM FURTHER BUT TO ALLOW THE MATTER TO LAPSE. THAT WOULD MEAN THAT THE EMBASSY REMAINS ACCREDITED UNDER TROTTER AS CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, ENABLING US TO CONTINUE TO CONDUCT ANY CURRENT BUSINESS.

...ROWLAND

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
DEP P M AND CABINET

*bxr o/r*

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

2-0.PA82946

ACTION: PRO  
AME

JBAAE

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(FANZ)	ANZ	EUR	
FAS(DN)	NUC	DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)		IO
FAS(FCO)	FAS(LT)		FAS(MFS)	PER	FAREP-M	
FAREP-P	FAREP-S					

ACCRA CAIRO JEDDAH LAGOS MADRID TRIPOLI

93572812

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PA82781 MT00  
TOR 0603 06.11.80

O.PA82781 1900 5.11.80 CLA

TO.  
RR CANBERRA/9288RP.  
RR ALGIERS/602

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 226/3/7

**RESTRICTED**

R E S T R I C T E D

WESTERN SAHARA DISPUTE

THE POLISARIO PUBLISHED A STATEMENT IN PARIS ON 3 NOVEMBER REITERATING ITS CALLS ON MOROCCO TO NEGOTIATE : THE STATEMENT REFERRED TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION CALLING ON MOROCCO TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS "FROM OUR COUNTRY" AND TO NEGOTIATE DIRECT WITH POLISARIO.

2. WHILE THIS FORMAL ACTION REPEATS POLISARIO'S ESTABLISHED POSITION IN FAVOUR OF DIRECT MOROCCAN-POLISARIO TALKS, PRESS SPECULATION ON MOVES TOWARDS MOROCCAN-ALGERIAN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE WESTERN SAHARA DISPUTE HAS REVIVED IN RECENT DAYS. A REFERENCE IN ALGERIAN PRESIDENT CHADLI'S 30 OCTOBER INDEPENDENCE DAY SPEECH TO MOROCCAN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AS NOT BEING IN QUESTION IN THE WESTERN SAHARA DISPUTE IS BEING TAKEN AS AN INDIRECT CRITICISM OF POLISARIO ATTACKS INSIDE MOROCCAN BORDERS.

3. THERE ARE ALSO RENEWED SUGGESTIONS OF ALGERIAN CONCERN AT GROWING LIBEYAN INFLUENCE ON POLISARIO, AND OF AN ALGERIAN DESIRE TO SHIFT THE FOCUS OF POLISARIO ACTIVITY TO MAURITANIA - WHICH WOULD ACCORD WITH PREVIOUS VEILED MOROCCAN SUGGESTION THAT POLISARIO MIGHT SEEK TO SATISFY ITS POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS WITHIN MAURITANIA.

COMMENT

4. THERE HAVE BEEN MANY FALSE STARTS ON A WESTERN SAHARA PEACE PROCESS AND NOT TOO MUCH SHOULD BE READ INTO THE CURRENT REVIVAL OF PRESS INTEREST. AT THE SAME TIME, MOROCCO'S CONTINUING ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES IN SUSTAINING THE WARFARE AND ITS POLITICAL REVERSE AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, IF COMBINED WITH ANY ALGERIAN LOSS OF INTEREST IN THE POLISARIO CAUSE OR A DESIRE TO CUT BACK ON THE SCOPE OF POLISARIO'S ACTIVITIES, COULD POSSIBLY POINT THE WAY TOWARDS A BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS.

**REF ID: A12345**

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-O.PA82781

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN+DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
JIO

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

ACTION: AME JAE

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)	
NUC	DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)		IO	
FAS(ECO)		FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)		FAREP-M	
FAREP-P		FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB			

ACCRA CAIRO JEDDAH LAGOS LUSAKA MADRID

935/28/2

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

**FACSIMILE MESSAGE**

Precedence: **PP**

**F. UN 104**

Date / Time of Lodgement: **1615 31.10.80**

**CSN 124**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

TO **CANBERRA**

FM **UN NEW YORK**

For Information:

FM FILE **103/3/4  
4/12/1**

TO FILE

REF.

NO. OF PAGES

**3**

Subject Heading or Summary of Text: **UNGA 35: FOURTH COMMITTEE: ITEM 18 -  
WESTERN SAHARA**

FOLLOWING ARE RESULTS OF VOTING ON  
L2/REV.1 (ALGERIAN TEXT) AND L.7 (MOROCCAN TEXT).

Nov 3 06 04 80

*QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA*

DAY-MEETING: 38-18 AGENDA ITEMS: 800 - 016 VOTE NO:21  
ADOPTED

ACCEPTED

... .CLMII.111

VOTE SUBJECT

A/C.4/35/L.2/REV 1

THIRTY FIFTH SESSION

07/10/80 11:36 PM

4TH COMMITTEE MEETING NO. 22 VOTE NO. 1 ITEM NO. 19

SUBJECT: QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

A/C.4/38/L.7 DRAFT RESOLUTION

RECORDED VOTE

YES 40 NO 41 ABSTAIN 58

NOT ADOPTED

N AFGHANISTAN	A DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	N EQUATORIAL GUINEA	T SAUDI ARABIA
A ALBANIA	A ECUADOR	Y LIBERIA	V SENEGAL
N ALGERIA	Y EGYPT	N LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA	N SEYCHELLES
N ANGOLA	Y FIJI YUNNAN	A LIECHTENSTEIN	M MPAWA FEDN
Y ARGENTINA	Y EQUATORIAL GUINEA	N MADAGASCAR	S SINGAPORE
A AUSTRALIA	N ETHIOPIA	N MALAWI	T SOLOMON ISLANDS
A AUSTRIA	A FIJI	Y MALAYSIA	Y SOMALIA
A BAHAMAS	A FINLAND	A MALDIVES	SOUTH AFRICA
/ BAHRAIN	A FRANCE	A MALI	A SPAIN
Y BANGLADESH	Y GABON	A MALTA	A SRI LANKA
N BARBADOS	Y GAMBIA	A MAURITANIA	Y SUDAN
A BELGIUM	GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REP.	Y MAURITIUS	H SURINAME
N BENIN	A GERMANY, FEDERAL REP. OF	N MEXICO	N SWITZERLAND
A BHUTAN	N GHANA	A MONGOLIA	A SWEDEN
Y BOLIVIA	A GREECE	Y MOROCCO	N SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
N BOTSWANA	N GRENADA	N MOZAMBIQUE	Y THAILAND
V BRAZIL	Y GUATEMALA	A NEPAL	TOGU
A BULGARIA	Y GUINEA	A NETHERLANDS	N TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
A BURMA	N GUINEA-BISSAU	A NEW ZEALAND	A TRINIDAD
N BURUNDI	N GUYANA	N NICARAGUA	Y TURKEY
A BYELORUSSIAN S.S.R.	N HAITI	A NIGER	N UGANDA
A CANADA	Y HONDURAS	A NIGERIA	A UKRAINIAN S.S.R.
N CAPE VERDE	A HUNGARY	A NORWAY	A UNION OF SOVIET SOC. REP.
A CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	A ICELAND	Y OMAN	A UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
N CHAD	A INDIA	Y PAKISTAN	A UNITED KINGDOM
Y CHILE	A INDONESIA	A PANAMA	A UNITED REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON
CHINA	N IRAN	A PAPUA NEW GUINEA	N UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
Y COLOMBIA	Y IRAN	Y PARAGUAY	Y UNITED STATES
Y COMOROS	A IRELAND	A PERU	Y URUGUAY
N CONGO	A ISRAEL	Y PHILIPPINES	A VENEZUELA
Y COSTA RICA	A ITALY	A POLAND	N VIET NAM
N CUBA	A IVORY COAST	A PORTUGAL	A YEMEN
N CYPRUS	N JAMAICA	Y QATAR	N YUGOSLAVIA
A CZECHOSLOVAKIA	A JAPAN	ROMANIA	Y ZAIRE
Y DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA	Y JORDAN	N RWANDA	N ZAMBIA
N DEMOCRATIC YEMEN	A KENYA	SAINT LUCIA	N ZIMBABWE
A DENMARK	KUWAIT	SAINT VINCENT - GRENADINES	
DJIBOUTI	N LAO P.D.R.	SANDIA	
BONINICA	A LENNON	N SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	

93512812

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.LH80891 BOMA  
TOR 0613 31.10.80

O.LH80891 1831 30.10.80 UNC

TO.  
RR CANBERRA/673

FM. LONDON /

U N C L A S S I F I E D

ROYAL VISIT TO MOROCCO

IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS YESTERDAY (29 OCTOBER) MR LUCE (UNDER-SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS) SAID:

"I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SAY THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO QUESTION OF ANY INSULT BEING SHOWN TO HER MAJESTY. ON THE CONTRARY, I AM INFORMED THAT SHE ENJOYED HERSELF DURING HER VISIT TO MOROCCO".

2. WHEN ASKED ON 29 OCTOBER WHETHER MR HURD (MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS ACCOMPANYING THE QUEEN ON THE ROYAL VISIT TO MOROCCO) HAD MADE ANY PROTEST TO THE MOROCCAN AUTHORITIES ABOUT THE QUEEN'S TREATMENT THE FCO SPOKESMAN REFERRED QUESTIONERS TO BUCKINGHAM PALACE AND ADDED THAT MR HURD HAD MADE NO (REPEAT NO) PROTEST.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DEP P M AND CABINET T/T

ACTION: PA  
EUR

LBBD  
FFH

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	PRO	EX
FAS(EANZ)	FAS(DN)		FAS(10AME)	AME	
FAS(CIC)	FAS(ECO)		FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)	
FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S		DIR-ADAB	

Thank God.  
Otherwise it would have  
to be war.  
Yes Mr Morris  
(F) w Sabine

RM for  
935/28/2

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.UN19465 BOMA  
TOR 1246 31.10.80

O.UN19465 1945 30.10.80 CLA

TO.  
PP CANBERRA/8619

RP.  
RR PARIS EMB/915 ALGIERS/105

FM. UN NEW YORK / FILE 103/3/4 412/1 REF O.CH924774

R E S T R I C T E D

UNGA 35 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : WESTERN SAHARA

AT THE BEGINNING OF TODAYS MEETING GUINEA ANNOUNCED ON BEHALF OF THE COSPONSORS OF L7, THAT PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH 3 HAD BEEN DELETED AND JAMAICA, AS A COSPONSOR OF L2, STATED THAT THE TROUBLESOME "THE" IN OPERATIVE PARA 10 WAS A TYPEOGRAPHICAL ERROR.

2. WE SPOKE AGAIN TO THE MOROCCAN DELEGATION DURING THE MEETING, AS INSTRUCTED IN PARA 1 OF YOUR REFTEL, BUT THE LATTER REITERATED THAT IT WAS NOT ABLE TO MAKE THE CHANGES WE SOUGHT. WE CONCERTED CLOSELY WITH AUSTRIA, FINLAND AND SWEDEN WHICH ALSO MADE FURTHER APPROACHES TO MOROCCO AND WERE EQUALLY SENSITIVE ABOUT APPEARING ANTI-MOROCCAN.

3. AT THE END OF THE GENERAL DEBATE THE CHAIRMAN ANNOUNCED THAT THE COMMITTEE WOULD PROCEED TO THE VOTING ON THE TWO DRAFT RESOLUTIONS. SUDAN, TOGO, BANGLADESH, NORWAY, ARGENTINA, SWEDEN AND SURINAM HAD EXPLAINED THEIR VOTE BEFORE THE VOTE WHEN GUINEA-BISSAU, ON A POINT OF ORDER OPENED THE WAY FOR A LONG PROCEDURAL WRANGLE ON WHETHER THE MEETING, AT THAT STAGE, WAS SUBJECT TO ARTICLE 128 OR 131 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE.

4. AFTER A SUSPENSION OF THE MEETING THE CHAIRMAN FINALLY RULED IN TERMS OF ARTICLE 128, THUS PREVENTING ALGERIA FROM PRESENTING A SERIES OF AMENDMENTS AIMED AT EMASCULATING THE MOROCCAN DRAFT. THE CHAIRMAN INSISTED THAT ALGERIA WOULD HAVE FORMALLY TO CHALLENGE HIS RULING IF IT WISHES TO PERSIST AND BEDJAOUI (ALGERIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE) WAS FORCED WITH CONSIDERABLE ILL GRACE TO BACK DOWN.

5. L2 REV 1 WAS THEN ADOPTED 88 (AUSTRALIA) - 6 - 44. AS THE PROCEDURAL DEBATE HAD TAKEN SEVERAL HOURS, THE CHAIRMAN ADJOURNED THE MEETING IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE VOTE, THUS, HIMSELF, VIOLATING ARTICLE 128. EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE AFTER THE VOTE INCLUDING OUR OWN WILL BE GIVEN TOMORROW WHEN THE VOTING ON L7 WILL ALSO TAKE PLACE.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-O.UN19465

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN+DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
JIO

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

ACTION: IO OGBAAF

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS (SEP)	FAS (NSA)	FAS (EANZ)			FAS (DN)	
DEF	DPR	FAS (IOAME)	AME		FAS (ECO)	
FAS (LT)	IL	FAS (MFS)	FAREP-M		FAREP-P	
FAREP-S						

ZCZC HA003 NH002  
OO HCA

D

SAHARA 10-31  
UNITED NATIONS, OCT. 30 (UPI) -- THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S  
COMMITTEE ON DECOLONIZATION ADOPTED A RESOLUTION THURSDAY CENSORING  
MOROCCO'S CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF THE WESTERN SAHARA AND  
RECOGNIZING THE POLISARIO INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT AS THE REPRESENTATIVE  
OF THE SAHARAN PEOPLE.

ADOPTED BY A VOTE OF 88-6, WITH 44 ABSTENTIONS OVER STRONG  
MOROCCAN OBJECTIONS, THE RESOLUTION AFFIRMED THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE  
IN THE FORMER SPANISH TERRITORY TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND  
INDEPENDENCE.

THE LENGTHY RESOLUTION ALSO ASKED MOROCCO TO LEAVE THE SECTION OF  
THE WESTERN SAHARA WHICH WAS SUBJECT TO A PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN  
MAURITANIA AND THE FREnte POPULAR PARA LA LIBERACION DE SAGUA  
EL-HAMRA Y DE RIO DE ORO, GENERALLY KNOWN AS POLISARIO.  
IT WELCOMED THE PEACE EFFORTS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY  
AND URGED MOROCCO AND THE POLISARIO TO ENTER INTO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS  
ON A FINAL SETTLEMENT.

MOROCCO HAS CLAIMED THE WESTERN SAHARA AS ITS TERRITORY SINCE  
SPAIN VACATED IT FOUR YEARS AGO.

THE ASSEMBLY'S PLENARY WILL HAVE TO CONFIRM THE RESOLUTION, WHICH  
IS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION SINCE ALL U.N. MEMBERS ARE REPRESENTED IN  
THE COMMITTEE.

UPI OO:14 GMT

=10310018

12/28/72

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten signature]*

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM 935/28/2

O.CH924774 DBKE

O.CH924774 1525 30.10.80 CLA

TO.

PP UN NEW YORK/3208

RP.

RR PARIS EMB/7994 ALCIERS/7306

FM. CANBERRA / FILE 935/28/2 REF O.CH924565 O.PA82538

C O N F I D E N T I A L

UNGA 35 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 - WESTERN SAHARA

HAVING NOW HAD THE BENEFIT OF O.PA82538, WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO ENSURE, BEFORE THE DRAFTS COME TO THE VOTE, THAT THE MOROCCAN DELEGATION UNDERSTANDS THAT WE WOULD MUCH PREFER TO BE IN A POSITION WHICH WOULD ALLOW US TO SUPPORT THE MOROCCAN DRAFT. IF MOROCCO IS ABLE TO MAKE CHANGES WHICH WOULD OVERCOME THE DIFFICULTY OF PRINCIPLE WHICH THE ABSENCE OF REFERENCE TO SELF DETERMINATION CAUSES US WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THEIR DRAFT. YOU SHOULD ALSO EXPLAIN TO AUSTRIA, FINLAND AND SWEDEN THAT WE DO NOT/WISH MOROCCO TO OBTAIN THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WESTERN SUPPORTERS OF THE ALGERIAN DRAFT ARE ADOPTING AN ATTITUDE WHICH OTHERS WOULD CONSTRUE AS ANTI-MOROCCAN. YOU SHOULD EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THEY TOO MIGHT SEE VALUE IN SUPPORTING BOTH DRAFTS IF CHANGES COULD BE MADE.

2. IN THE EVENT THAT THE MOROCCAN DRAFT IS NOT CHANGED, YOU SHOULD MAINTAIN OUR ABSTENTION ON IT BUT YOUR MORE INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO REPHRASE THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE EOF IN O.CH924565 TO READ AS FOLLOWS :

"MY DELEGATION FOUND MUCH WITH WHICH IT WAS ABLE TO AGREE IN THE DRAFT CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT L.7, BUT WE WERE UNABLE TO SUPPORT IT BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF A REFERENCE TO THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO SELF DETERMINATION. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE OAU ACTIVITY, WHICH IS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THIS RESOLUTION, INVOLVES (AMONG OTHER THINGS) THE SEARCH FOR WAYS AND MEANS TO PERMIT AN EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT, WE SOUGHT TO PERSUADE THE SPONSORS OF THE NEED FOR A MORE DIRECT REFERENCE. THIS WAS, REGRETTABLY, NOT POSSIBLE IN THE TIME AVAILABLE. NEVERTHELESS AUSTRALIA FERVENTLY HOPES THAT THE PARTIES INVOLVED WILL BE SUCCESSFUL IN THEIR EFFORTS TO ARRANGE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THIS DISPUTE WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT ALL RELEVANT FACTORS.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.CH924774

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN+DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
JIO

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

ACTION: IO OGBAAF

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)		FAS(NSA)	FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)	
DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)	AME		FAS(ECO)	
FAS(LT)	IL	FAS(MFB)	FAREP-M		FAREP-P	
FAREP-S						

935728/2

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PA82538 SC09  
TOR 0635 30.10.80

O.PA82538 1900 29.10.80 CLA FIRST

TO.  
PP CANBERRA/9073 UN NEW YORK/1045RP.  
RR ALGIERS/598

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 226/3/7 REF O.UN19389 O.UN19421

CONFIDENTIAL

UNGA 35 FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 - WESTERN SAHARA

WE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY IN A DISCUSSION ON 29 OCTOBER WITH MOLINARI, HEAD OF THE WESTERN SAHARA/MOROCCAN SECTION IN THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY, TO DISCUSS THE TEXTS OF THE RESOLUTIONS COMING UP FOR DEBATE IN NEW YORK TOMORROW. ACCORDING TO HIM, TWO ASPECTS OF THE ALGERIAN TEXT WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR FRANCE TO VOTE IN FAVOUR, I.E. THE MENTION OF THE "OCCUPATION" BY MOROCCAN TROOPS, AND THE CALL ON MOROCCO TO NEGOTIATE DIRECT WITH POLISARIO. IN THE FRENCH VIEW, THESE WERE SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT COUNTRIES CLAIMING TO BE NEUTRAL ON THE WESTERN SAHARA DISPUTE FROM VOTING IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION. MOLINARI DESCRIBED THE MOROCCAN TEXT AS "MORE UNEXCEPTIONABLE": IT WAS FRAMED IN GENERAL LANGUAGE AND CALLED FOR A SETTLEMENT TO THE DISPUTE IN TERMS THAT CONFORMED WITH TRADITIONAL UN USAGE, AT THE SAME TIME, IT WAS, OF COURSE, UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ALGERIANS. THERE WAS SOME INCLINATION ON FRANCE'S PART TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE MOROCCAN TEXT BUT, IN ORDER TO PRESERVE ITS NEUTRALITY, FRANCE WOULD PROBABLY END UP ABSTAINING ON BOTH RESOLUTIONS. THE ALTERNATIVE OF VOTING IN FAVOUR OF BOTH WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH NEUTRALITY, BUT THIS WOULD IMPOSE A NEED FOR A COMPLICATED EXPLANATION OF VOTE IN THE CASE OF THE ALGERIAN TEXT. SUCH EXPLANATIONS, WHATEVER THEIR GOOD INTENTIONS, TENDED SOON TO BE FORGOTTEN.

Quintet

2. ACCORDING TO MOLINARI, THE OTHER EEC COUNTRIES ARE THINKING ALONG THE SAME LINES. (THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH PARA 3 OF SECOND REFTEL).

3. IT IS OF INTEREST THAT THIS CAUTIOUS FRENCH APPROACH TO THE ALGERIAN TEXT COMES AT A TIME WHEN FRANCE HAS BEEN TAKING PAINS TO BUILD INCREASINGLY CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE ALGERIANS OVER A WIDE RANGE OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES. WE KNOW FROM OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH MOLINARI AND OTHER FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS THAT THERE IS NO PREDISPOSITION ON THE FRENCH PART IN ANY WAY TO TAKE MOROCCO'S SIDE ON THE WESTERN SAHARA DISPUTE - IF ANYTHING FRANCE'S INTERESTS IN NORTH AFRICA MIGHT TEND TO TIP IT IN THE OTHER DIRECTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

## DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.PA82538

4. THE FOREGOING MAY BE OF INTEREST IF, AS WE ASSUME, YOU WISH TO MAINTAIN AN ATTITUDE OF NEUTRALITY - UNLESS, ON THE OTHER HAND, YOU SHOULD REGARD THE WESTERN SAHARA ISSUE AS ONE ON WHICH YOU FEEL WE CAN DEMONSTRATE READINESS TO TAKE A MORE RADICAL POSITION, WITH- OUT TOO MUCH CONCERN ABOUT OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO.

5. IN THAT CONNEXION, THE MOROCCANS HERE HAVE NOT YET RESPONDED TO THE AMBASSADOR'S REQUEST FOR AN INTERVIEW TO DISCUSS THE UNRESOLVED QUESTION OF THE PRESENTATION OF HIS CREDENTIALS (O.CH922446) THOUGH THEY HAVE HAD SOME TIME IN WHICH TO DO SO.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN+DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: 10 OGBAAF

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)	
DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)		AME	FAS(ECO)	
FAS(LT)	IL	FAS(MFS)		FAREP-M	FAREP-P	
FAREP-S						

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.UN19442 MJWO  
TOR 1127 30.10.80

O.UN19442 1910 29.10.80 CLA

TO.  
PP CANBERRA/8597

RP.  
RR PARIS EMB/913 ALGIERS/104

FM. UN NEW YORK / FILE 412/1 REF O.CH924565

R E S T R I C T E D

UNGA 35 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18: WESTERN SAHARA

THANK YOU FOR YOUR REFTEL.

2. WE SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED TO THE MOROCCANS WHO REPLIED THAT OTHERS HAD APPROACHED THEM IN SIMILAR TERMS AND THAT THEY WOULD DISCUSS OUR COMMENTS WITH THE OTHER COSPONSORS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ONLY CHANGES HOWEVER, ENVISAGED BY MOROCCO WOULD BE THE ADDITION OF THE FULL TITLE OF RES 1514 IN PREAMBULAR PARA TWO AND SOME MODIFICATION OF PREAMBULAR PARA THREE. THESE CHANGES WOULD NOT MEET OUR NEEDS.

3. IN THE GENERAL DEBATE TODAY BEDJAQUI, ALGERIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE, EMPHASISED THAT WESTERN SAHARA WAS A COLONIAL SITUATION AND NOT A CONFLICT BETWEEN STATES. HE REFERRED TO THE "HARMONY OF APPROACH" BY THE U.N. AND THE O.A.U., "WHICH SHARED RESPONSIBILITY ON THE ISSUE". BEDJAQUI REFERRED TO MOROCCO AS THE "OCCUPYING POWER" WHICH USED "PROCEDURAL ARTIFICES" TO MAINTAIN ITS INTRANSIGENCE.

4. ZENTAR, MOROCCAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE, BEGAN BY REFERRING TO THE LONG HISTORY OF "ATTEMPTS AT DISMEMBERMENT" OF MOROCCO BUILDING UP ARTIFICIAL BORDERS ON ITS TERRITORY AND DREW HEAVILY ON THE I.C.J. ADVISORY OPINION NO. 128. ZENTAR SAID THAT MOROCCO HAD NOT OCCUPIED BUT HAD LIBERATED WESTERN SAHARA, GIVING ITS PEOPLE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE DEMOCRATIC LIFE OF MOROCCO. HE ACCUSED ALGERIA OF HEGEMONISM AND OF SENDING ITS OWN TROOPS INTO THE TERRITORY. HE LIMITED HIS REFERENCES TO THE O.A.U. AD-HOC COMMITTEE TO ITS ACTIVITIES BEFORE IT PRODUCED ITS REPORT LAST MONTH. IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS THE MOROCCAN MISSION IS CLAIMING THAT IT WOULD BE UNAPPROPRIATE TO REFER TO THE REPORT SINCE MOROCCO HAS NOT OFFICIALLY RECEIVED A COPY.

REDACTED

REDACTED

.../2

BKA

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.UN19442

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN+DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
JIO

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

ACTION: IO  
AME OGBAAF

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)	
DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)		FAS(ECO)		FAS(LT)
IL						

## DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

O.CH924565 AEW

O.CH924565 1631 29.10.80 CLA FIRST

TO.  
PP UN NEW YORK/3191RP.  
RR PARIS EMB/7950 ALGIERS/7302  
FM. CANBERRA / FILE 935/28/2 REF O.UN19389

C O N F I D E N T I A L

UNGA 35 - FOURTH COMMITTEE - ITEM 18 WESTERN SAHARA

WE AGREE THAT THE REVISIONS TO THE ALGERIAN TEXT GO A  
CONSIDERABLE WAY TO MEETING OUR CONCERNs. YOU SHOULD, ACCORDINGLY,  
VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE TEXT.

2. THE MOROCCAN TEXT IS MORE DIFFICULT. AS WE HAVE INDICATED,  
VOTING COMPANY IS AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION FOR US, AND WE NOTE THAT  
SWEDISH, FINNISH AND AUSTRIAN DELEGATIONS PROPOSE TO ABSTAIN. OUR  
UNDERSTANDING IS THAT MOST OTHER WEO'S WILL ABSTAIN (NEW ZEALANDERS  
HAVE ADVISED US OF THEIR INTENTION TO DO SO). BUT, OF COURSE, THE  
CONSIDERATIONS OF THESE COUNTRIES ARE DIFFERENT FROM OURS; THEIR  
ABSTENTIONS WILL ''BALANCE'' A SIMILAR VOTE ON THE ALGERIAN TEXT.

3. WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO ADVISE THE MOROCCANS THAT, AS THEIR TEXT  
STANDS, WE WOULD BE OBLIGED TO ABSTAIN ON IT. YOU SHOULD REMIND THEM  
OF YOUR PRELIMINARY RESERVATION RELATING TO THE LACK OF A SPECIFIC  
REFERENCE TO SELF-DETERMINATION (O.UN19372 REFERS), AND SUGGEST THAT  
IF AN APPROPRIATE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH COULD BE INCLUDED IN THEIR TEXT  
(I.E. AFFIRMING THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA TO SELF  
DETERMINATION (IN STANDARD UN TERMS)) WE WOULD RECONSIDER OUR  
POSITION. WHILE WE WOULD NOT EXPECT MOROCCO TO AGREE TO THIS, THE  
PURPOSE OF THE EXERCISE IS TO INDICATE TO THEM THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO  
BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE, BUT OF COURSE WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF OUR  
POLICY.

4. WE ASSUME THAT THE TEXTS WILL BE VOTED ON ONE AFTER THE OTHER.  
AFTER VOTING HAS CONCLUDED YOU SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING EXPLANATION;

''A CENTRAL ELEMENT OF AUSTRALIA'S POLICY TOWARDS THE WESTERN  
SAHARA ISSUE IS OUR SUPPORT FOR THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO SELF  
DETERMINATION. EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT MUST OF COURSE BE IN  
CONFORMITY WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE RELEVANT  
U.N. DECISIONS.

A MORE GENERAL CONCERN OF AUSTRALIA IS THAT THE CONFLICT SHOULD

.../2

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## DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

2-O.CH924565

BE RESOLVED BY PEACEFUL MEANS. WE HAVE FOLLOWED WITH INTEREST THE EFFORTS OF THE OAU AND IN PARTICULAR THOSE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN, WHO HAVE SOUGHT TO PROVIDE THE BASIS OF A SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES CONCERNED. WE HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGED BY THEIR MOST RECENT EFFORTS.

AUSTRALIA'S VOTE ON THE TWO RESOLUTIONS ON WESTERN SAHARA REFLECT ESSENTIALLY THE CONCERNS I HAVE MENTIONED. WITH REGARD TO L.2. I MUST STATE THAT WHILE WE RECOGNISE THE MAJOR ROLE WHICH THE POLISARIO FRONT, AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA ENGAGED IN THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE, NEEDS TO PLAY IN THE PEACE PROCESS, OUR VOTE IS A REAFFIRMATION OF THE RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION OF THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA AS A WHOLE.

OUR VOTE ON L.3 DOES NOT RELATE TO WHAT IS SAID IN THE RESOLUTION. RATHER IT EXPRESSES OUR REGRET THAT AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT - A AFFIRMATION OF THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA TO SELF DETERMINATION - IS NOT CONTAINED IN THE TEXT. HAD THE RESOLUTION NOT HAD THIS DEFECT, WE COULD HAVE SUPPORTED IT.'

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN+DEF DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: IO OGAAFA

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)	
DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)	AME		FAS(ECO)	
FAS(LT)	IL					

F  
935/28/2

28 October 1980

FOR INCLUSION IN REPLY TO ALGIERS ANNUAL REVIEW

Mr Miller  
MENA Section

The Western Sahara issue is one of interest to us and we continue to appreciate your reporting on it. We are interested in particular in the involvement of Algeria in, and its influence on, the RASD and would like to be kept informed of the growing international support for the RASD.

2. As you are aware, the Sahara issue is one on which our views and those of Algeria find some congruence. The most recent exposition of our policy to Western Sahara is contained in O.CH 923808, a copy of which was repeated to you on 24 October 1980. As you have noted, Algeria appreciates Australia's support for the essentially pro-Algerian/Polisario resolution adopted each year at the United Nations General Assembly. ~~It is likely that our support will be maintained at UNGA 35. We will maintain our support @ UNOA 35.~~

(R.S. Morris)  
UN Political

935/28/2

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.UN19421 RLOP  
TOR 1050 29.10.80

O.UN19421 1815 28.10.80 CLA

TO.  
PP CANBERRA/8577

RP.  
RR PARIS EMB/912 ALBIERS/103

FM. UN NEW YORK / FILE 412/1

C O N F I D E N T I A L

UNGA 35: FOURTH COMMITTEE: ITEM 18 - WESTERN SAHARA

CONFIDENTIAL

THE ALGERIAN SPONSORS HAVE PROTESTED TO THE SECRETARIAT ABOUT THE INCLUSION OF THE DEFINITE ARTICLE BETWEEN "POLISARIO" AND "REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA" IN OPERATIVE PARA 10 POINTING OUT THAT THERE WAS NO ARTICLE IN THE ORIGINAL FRENCH TEXT. THE SECRETARIAT SAID THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO CHANGE THE ENGLISH VERSION OF THE FOURTH COMMITTEE DRAFT AT THIS STAGE BUT WILL EXAMINE WITH THE ALGERIANS HOW THE ARTICLE COULD BE OMITTED IN THE TEXT SUBMITTED TO PLENARY.

2. THE AFRICAN GROUP MET THIS MORNING AND THERE WAS A HALF-HEARTED MOVE TO ARRANGE THE DRAFTING OF A SINGLE TEXT. THE INITIATIVE BROKE DOWN IN THE FACE OF MOROCCO'S INFLEXIBILITY AND ALGERIA'S CLAIM THAT IT HAD BEEN RESPONSIVE TO THE VIEWS OF A WIDE CROSS SECTION OF MEMBER COUNTRIES IN FINALIZING ITS DRAFT.

3. WE HAVE CANVASSED OTHER WEOS AND NONE EXCEPT POSSIBLY TURKEY ARE LIKELY TO SUPPORT THE MOROCCAN TEXT. APART FROM THE GROUP REFERRED TO IN REFTEL, THE OTHER WEOS ANTICIPATE RECEIVING INSTRUCTIONS TO ABSTAIN ON BOTH TEXTS.

4. VOTING IS NOW LIKELY TO TAKE PLACE ON 30 OCTOBER.

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ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
ONA

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN+DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
JIO

## DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.UN19421

ACTION: IO

OGBAAFA

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)		
DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)	AME	FAS(ECO)		
FAS(LT)	IL	FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M	FAREP-P		
FAREP-S						

## **CONDAMNÉ**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Mr. Kins*  
*Pl. let me see*  
*unseen*  
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

*Mr. Mohib*  
*As informed*

## INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.UN19389 RLOP  
TOR 1224 28.10.80

O.UN19389 1920 27.10.80 CLA

935/28/2

TO.  
PP CANBERRA/8546

RP.  
RR PARIS EMB/911 ALGIERS/101

FM. UN NEW YORK / FILE 412/1 REF O.CH924092

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UNGA 35 : FOURTH COMMITTEE : ITEM 18 - WESTERN SAHARA

THANKS YOUR REFTEL.

2. THE ALGERIANS HAVE NOW PRODUCED A REVISED DRAFT (TEXT BY FAX TO CANBERRA) WHICH GOES A GOOD WAY TOWARDS MEETING OUR CONCERNS. FORMER OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 8 (NOW RENUMBERED 10) STILL CALLS ON MOROCCO AND THE POLISARIO TO ENTER INTO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AND THE ENGLISH TEXT STILL REFERS TO THE LATTER AS "THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA", ALTHOUGH THE ARTICLE IS OMITTED IN THE FRENCH TEXT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE EXPLICIT AND CRITICAL REFERENCE TO MOROCCO IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 HAS BEEN DELETED AND FORMER OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 6 (WHICH IDENTIFIED MOROCCO AND THE POLISARIO AS "THE BELLIGERENTS") HAS BEEN DROPPED ALTOGETHER.

3. BEDJAQUI (ALGERIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE) ASKED TO SEE THE AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING 27 OCTOBER TO OUTLINE THE CHANGES MADE IN HIS TEXT AND TO URGE THAT AUSTRALIA ABSTAIN ON THE MOROCCAN DRAFT. BEDJAQUI ARGUED THAT PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE LATTER WITH ITS REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 33 WOULD TAKE THE ISSUE OUT OF THE DECOLONISATION FIELD INTO THE FIELD OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THAT PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH 6 WOULD PUT THE STATEMENTS OF THE MOROCCAN PETITIONERS ON AN EQUAL FOOTING WITH THE STATEMENTS OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED (SCARCELY A POINT OF SUBSTANCE), AND THAT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 WHICH "WELCOMES THE PEACE PROCESS INITIATED BY THE FIFTH SESSION OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE" IS BELIED BY MOROCCO'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE COMMITTEE'S CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WOULD REPORT THESE COMMENTS TO YOU.

4. WE MET SUBSEQUENTLY WITH SWEDISH, FINNISH AND AUSTRIAN COLLEAGUES TO DISCUSS THE TWO DRAFTS. ALL ARE RECOMMENDING A VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE REVISED ALGERIAN TEXT. THEY SAID THAT THEY WOULD PROBABLY HAVE VOTED FOR THE INITIAL ALGERIAN TEXT, BUT WERE STRENGTHENED IN THEIR DECISION BY ALGERIAN WILLINGNESS TO SEEK MODERATE WESTERN VIEWS AND TO MODIFY THE TEXT ACCORDINGLY OVER THE STRONG OBJECTIONS OF SOME OF THE MORE RADICAL COSPONSORS.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-O.UN19389

5. BY CONTRAST, THEY SHARED SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE MOROCCAN DRAFT, REFERRED TO BY BEDJAQUI, IN PARTICULAR PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH 3 AND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3. FINLAND, SWEDEN AND AUSTRIA SAID THAT THEY PROPOSED RECOMMENDING ABSTENTION.

6. WE ALSO DISCUSSED THE SUPPORT EACH DRAFT WAS LIKELY TO RECEIVE. THE ALGERIAN DRAFT WILL PROBABLY BE ADOPTED WITH SOME 80-90 VOTES IN FAVOUR. IT IS MORE DIFFICULT TO JUDGE THE SUPPORT FOR THE MOROCCAN DRAFT IF IT IS PUT TO VOTE. IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT MOROCCO WILL PERSIST GIVEN THE LIKELIHOOD OF ITS DRAFT OBTAINING NO MORE THAN SOME FORTY POSITIVE VOTES.

7. WE RECOMMEND THAT WE VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE ALGERIAN DRAFT. A CASE COULD BE MADE FOR VOTING IN FAVOUR OF THE MOROCCAN TEXT ALSO ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT AT LEAST PAYS LIP SERVICE TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THROUGH THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE OAU AND THAT THE TWO TEXTS COULD BE REGARDED AS COMPLEMENTARY. ON THIS BASIS WE VOTED FOR BOTH THE ALGERIAN AND MOROCCAN TEXTS IN 1978. ON THE OTHER HAND WE ARE INCLINED TOWARDS JOINING AUSTRIA, FINLAND AND SWEDEN IN ABSTAINING ON THE MOROCCAN DRAFT, WHICH APART FROM BEDJAQUI'S COMMENTS REFERS ONLY INDIRECTLY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION (PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH 2) AND IS A RATHER TRANSPARENT ATTEMPT TO BLUNT THE IMPACT OF THE ALGERIAN TEXT.

8. VOTING MAY TAKE PLACE ON WEDNESDAY 29 OCTOBER.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DNA

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN+DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

3-0.UN19389

ACTION: IO

0GBAAFA

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)		FAS(EANZ)		FAS(DN)	
DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)	AME		FAS(ECO)	
FAS(LT)	IL					

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

## DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## FACSIMILE MESSAGE

Precedence: PP

Date / Time of Lodgement: 1345 27.10.80

F. WADDELL

CSN 093

UNCLASSIFIED

For Information:

TO CanberraFM U.N.N.Y.FM FILE 421 TO FILE 935/28/2REF.  NO. OF PAGES 1

Subject Heading or Summary of Text:

U.N.G.A. 35: Fourth Committee: Western Sahara

Following is text of revised Algerian draft resolution

Draft Resolution on Western Sahara

Taking account of the position of all the States

which have submitted their views on the question of independence in accordance with the principles which it believes

United Nations and its General Assembly consider in favour of a peaceful

settlement of the question in the spirit of a pronouncement made by the

and Peoples,

Draft Resolution on Western Sahara

Taking account of the relevant views of the States

which have submitted their views on the question of independence in accordance with the principles which it believes

United Nations and its General Assembly consider in favour of a

settlement of the question in the spirit of a pronouncement made by the

and Peoples,

A/35/13 (Part II), para 17

AO 23801

9016  
27.10.80

Date

Signature &amp; Date

Dept/Section

Phone No.

No. of copies to be



UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
LIMITED

A/C.4/35/L.2/Rev.1  
24 October 1980  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

Thirty-fifth session  
FOURTH COMMITTEE  
Agenda item 18

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF  
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Burundi,  
Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia,  
Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya, Lao People's  
Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi,  
Mali, Mexico, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Panama, Rwanda, Sao Tome and  
Principe, Seychelles, Swaziland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda,  
United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, Zambia and  
Zimbabwe: revised draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Having considered in depth the question of Western Sahara,

Recalling the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and  
independence in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the  
United Nations and in General Assembly resolution 1514(XV) of 14 December 1960,  
containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries  
and Peoples,

Recalling its resolution 34/37 of 21 November 1979 on the question of  
Western Sahara,

Having considered the relevant chapter of the report of the Special Committee  
on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the  
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1/

1/ A/35/23 (Part V), chap. IX.

Having heard the statements made on the subject of Western Sahara, including the statement of the representative of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro,

Hearing in mind the profound concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries regarding the decolonization of Western Sahara,

Also bearing in mind the deep concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries at the aggravation of the situation prevailing in Western Sahara because of the continued occupation of that Territory by Morocco,

Taking note of the decision on the question of Western Sahara adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its seventeenth ordinary session, held at Freetown from 1 to 4 July 1980, 2/

Recalling its resolution 34/21 of 9 November 1979 on co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the charter of the Organization of African Unity and the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and the legitimacy of their struggle to ensure the enjoyment of that right, as envisaged in the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity;

2. Deeply deplores the fact that its resolution 34/37, which sets forth the ways and means for a just and definitive political solution of the question of Western Sahara, has not been implemented;

3. Again declares that it is deeply concerned at the aggravation of the situation deriving from the continued occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and from the extension of that occupation to the part of Western Sahara which was the subject of the peace agreement of 5 August 1979 between Mauritania and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro; 3/

4. Reaffirms that a solution to the question of Western Sahara lies in the exercise by the people of that Territory of their inalienable rights, including their right to self-determination and independence;

5. Takes note of the decision on Western Sahara taken by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its seventeenth ordinary session;

2/ A/35/463, annex II, decision AHG/Dec.118 (XVII).

3/ A/34/427-S/13503, annex I.

6. Takes note also of the conclusions of the fifth session of the Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity, held at Freetown from 9 to 11 September 1980.

7. Welcomes the efforts made by the Organization of African Unity and its Ad Hoc Committee, as well as the availability of the parties concerned and interested with a view to promoting a just and definitive solution to the question of Western Sahara in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity.

8. Reaffirms to this end the determination of the United Nations to co-operate fully with the Organization of African Unity with a view to enabling the people of Western Sahara to exercise their right to self-determination and independence in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and of the Organization of African Unity.

9. Reiterates the appeal contained in its resolution 34/37 whereby it urges Morocco to join in the peace process and to terminate the occupation of the Territory of Western Sahara;

10. To that end urges Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, the representative of the people of Western Sahara, to enter into direct negotiations with a view to arriving at a definitive settlement of the question of Western Sahara;

11. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to continue to consider the situation in Western Sahara as a matter of priority and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

12. Requests the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to keep the Secretary-General of the United Nations informed of the progress made in implementing the decisions of the Organization of African Unity on Western Sahara.

13. Invites the Secretary-General to follow closely the situation in Western Sahara with a view to the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

O.CH924092 RLOP

O.CH924092 1813 27.10.80 CLA

TO.

PP UN NEW YORK/3165

RP.

RR PARIS EMB/7875 ALGIERS/7300

FM. CANBERRA / FILE 935/28/2

C O N F I D E N T I A L

UNGA 35 - FOURTH COMMITTEE - ITEM 18 - WESTERN SAHARA

FOR THE PURPOSES OF DISCUSSION WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT WE ARE INCLINED TO SUPPORT THE ALGERIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION ON WESTERN SAHARA. WE CONTINUE TO HOPE, OF COURSE, THAT OUR CONCERNS PREVIOUSLY NOTED, CAN BE MET.

2. GIVEN MOROCCO'S REJECTION OF SEVERAL KEY POINTS IN THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE OAU'S AD HOC COMMITTEE, THEIR DRAFT APPEARS TO BE LITTLE MORE THAN A SIMPLE EXERCISE TO COUNTER THE POLITICAL CAPITAL THE POLISARIO AND ALGERIA WILL ACHIEVE BY THE ADOPTION OF THEIR TEXT. SUCH A JUDGEMENT CANNOT, HOWEVER, EASILY BE MADE HERE AND IF WE WERE TO TAKE A DECISION NOW BASED ON THE APPARENT MERITS OF THE TEXT WE WOULD INCLINE TO SUPPORT IT TOO. OUR FINAL DECISION WILL BE INFLUENCED BY COMPANY - SWEDEN, AUSTRIA AND FINLAND WOULD BE SUFFICIENT - AND BY ANY OTHER FACTORS YOU MAY DEEM RELEVANT.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DNA

PRIME MINISTER  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
MIN+DEP DEFENCE  
DEP P M AND CABINET  
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

2-O.CH924092

ACTION: IO

OGBAAFA

SEC FAS(SEP)	DEPSECS DPR	PPU FAS(NSA) FAS(IOAME)	LA FAS(EANZ)	EX AME	MCO FAS(DN) FAS(ECO)	PA
FAS(LT)	IL					

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UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



935/28/2



Distr.  
LIMITED

A/C.4/35/L.2/Rev.1  
24 October 1980  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

Thirty-fifth session  
FOURTH COMMITTEE  
Agenda item 18

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mexico, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Panama, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Swaziland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, Zambia and Zimbabwe: revised draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Having considered in depth the question of Western Sahara,

Recalling the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling its resolution 34/37 of 21 November 1979 on the question of Western Sahara,

Having considered the relevant chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1/

1/ A/35/23 (Part V), chap. IX.

Having heard the statements made on the subject of Western Sahara, including the statement of the representative of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro,

Bearing in mind the profound concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries regarding the decolonization of Western Sahara,

Also bearing in mind the deep concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries at the aggravation of the situation prevailing in Western Sahara because of the continued occupation of that Territory by Morocco,

Taking note of the decision on the question of Western Sahara adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its seventeenth ordinary session, held at Freetown from 1 to 4 July 1980, 2/

Recalling its resolution 34/21 of 9 November 1979 on co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the charter of the Organization of African Unity and the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and the legitimacy of their struggle to ensure the enjoyment of that right, as envisaged in the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity;

2. Deeply deplores the fact that its resolution 34/37, which sets forth the ways and means for a just and definitive political solution of the question of Western Sahara, has not been implemented;

3. Again declares that it is deeply concerned at the aggravation of the situation deriving from the continued occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and from the extension of that occupation to the part of Western Sahara which was the subject of the peace agreement of 5 August 1979 between Mauritania and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro; 3/

4. Reaffirms that a solution to the question of Western Sahara lies in the exercise by the people of that Territory of their inalienable rights, including their right to self-determination and independence;

5. Takes note of the decision on Western Sahara taken by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its seventeenth ordinary session;

2/ A/35/463, annex II, decision AHG/Dec.118 (XVII).

3/ A/34/427-S/13503, annex I.

6. Takes note also of the conclusions of the fifth session of the Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity, held at Freetown from 9 to 11 September 1980;

7. Welcomes the efforts made by the Organization of African Unity and its Ad Hoc Committee, as well as the availability of the parties concerned and interested with a view to promoting a just and definitive solution to the question of Western Sahara in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity;

8. Reaffirms to this end the determination of the United Nations to co-operate fully with the Organization of African Unity with a view to enabling the people of Western Sahara to exercise their right to self-determination and independence in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and of the Organization of African Unity;

9. Reiterates the appeal contained in its resolution 34/37 whereby it urges Morocco to join in the peace process and to terminate the occupation of the Territory of Western Sahara;

10. To that end urges Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, the representative of the people of Western Sahara, to enter into direct negotiations with a view to arriving at a definitive settlement of the question of Western Sahara;

11. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to continue to consider the situation in Western Sahara as a matter of priority and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

12. Requests the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to keep the Secretary-General of the United Nations informed of the progress made in implementing the decisions of the Organization of African Unity on Western Sahara;

13. Invites the Secretary-General to follow closely the situation in Western Sahara with a view to the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

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FOURTH COMMITTEE  
Agenda item 18

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF  
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Morocco,  
Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Zaire: draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of Western Sahara,

Recalling its resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960,

Recalling the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, which states that the settlement of international disputes should be sought by resort to regional agencies,

Considering the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its fifteenth ordinary session, held at Khartoum from 18 to 22 July 1978, to establish an ad hoc committee of Heads of State to consider all the data on the question of Western Sahara, 1/

Bearing in mind the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its seventeenth ordinary session, held at Freetown from 1 to 4 July 1980, 2/ requesting the Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State to continue its work with a view to reconciling the parties to the conflict and seeking a peaceful and lasting solution thereto,

1/ A/33/235 and Corr.1, annex II, resolution AHG/Res.92 (XV).

2/ A/35/463 and Corr.1, annex II, decision AHG/Dec.118 (XVII).

Having heard the statements of the parties interested and concerned in the conflict in Western Sahara and of the organizations originating in the Territory which were heard at the fifth session of the Ad Hoc Committee, held at Freetown from 9 to 12 September 1980,

Recalling its resolution 34/21 of 9 November 1979, regarding co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its seventeenth ordinary session to request the Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State to continue its work with a view to reconciling the parties to the conflict and seeking a peaceful and lasting solution thereto;

2. Welcomes the full participation in the Ad Hoc Committee's work of all the parties interested and concerned in the conflict and of the organizations originating in Western Sahara;

3. Welcomes the peace process initiated by the fifth session of the Ad Hoc Committee;

4. Appeals to all States to refrain from any action that might impede the peace process and the reconciliation efforts of the Ad Hoc Committee;

5. Expresses its confidence in the Ad Hoc Committee and encourages it to fulfil the mandate given it by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, at its seventeenth ordinary session;

6. Requests the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to keep the Secretary-General of the United Nations informed of the results achieved by the Organization of African Unity on the subject of Western Sahara;

7. Invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to report on this subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

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**UNITED NATIONS**  
**GENERAL**  
**ASSEMBLY**



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935/28/2



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Agenda item 18

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF  
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

QUESTION OF WESTERN SAHARA

Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Congo, Cuba,  
Democratic Yemen, Guinea-Bissau, Jamaica, Lao People's  
Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar,  
Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sao Tome and  
Principe, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet  
Nam, Yugoslavia, Zambia: draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Having considered in depth the question of Western Sahara,

Recalling the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling its resolution 34/37 of 21 November 1979 on the question of Western Sahara,

Having considered the relevant chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1/

Having heard the statements made on the subject of Western Sahara, including the statement of the representative of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro,

1/ A/35/23 (Part V), chap. IX.

Bearing in mind the profound concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries regarding the decolonization of Western Sahara,

Also bearing in mind the deep concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries at the aggravation of the situation prevailing in Western Sahara because of the continued occupation of that Territory by Morocco,

Welcoming the efforts made by the Organization of African Unity and its Ad Hoc Committee to promote a just and definitive political solution of the question of Western Sahara in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and of the Organization of African Unity,

Taking note of the decision on the question of Western Sahara adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its seventeenth regular session, held at Freetown from 1 to 4 July 1980, 2/

Recalling its resolution 34/21 of 9 November 1979 on co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the charter of the Organization of African Unity and the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and the legitimacy of their struggle to ensure the enjoyment of that right, as envisaged in the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity;

2. Deeply deplores the fact that its resolution 34/37, which sets forth the ways and means for a just and definitive political solution of the question of Western Sahara, has not been implemented owing to the refusal of Morocco to comply with the provisions thereof;

3. Again declares that it is deeply concerned at the aggravation of the situation deriving from the continued occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and from the extension of that occupation to the part of Western Sahara which was the subject of the peace agreement of 5 August 1979 between Mauritania and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagüia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro; 3/

4. Reaffirms that a solution to the question of Western Sahara lies in the exercise by the people of that Territory of its inalienable rights including its right to self-determination and independence;

5. Takes note of the decision on Western Sahara taken by the Assembly of

2/ A/35/463, annex II, decision AHG/Dec.118 (XVII).

3/ A/34/427-S/13503, annex I.

Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its seventeenth regular session, held at Freetown from 1 to 4 July 1980;

6. Welcomes the efforts made by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Organization of African Unity to promote a just and definitive solution to the question of Western Sahara and stresses the necessity for negotiation between the two belligerents, the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro and Morocco with a view to creating an atmosphere conducive to the success of those efforts;

7. Reiterates the appeal contained in its resolution 34/37 whereby it urges Morocco to join in the peace process and to terminate the occupation of the Territory of Western Sahara;

8. To that end urges Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, the representative of the people of Western Sahara, to enter into direct negotiations with a view to arriving at a definitive settlement of the question of Western Sahara;

9. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to continue to consider the situation in Western Sahara as a matter of priority and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

10. Requests the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to keep the Secretary-General of the United Nations informed of the progress made in implementing the decisions of the Organization of African Unity on Western Sahara;

11. Invites the Secretary-General to follow closely the situation in Western Sahara with a view to the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

1/ Following the resolution 34/37 of 31 October 1979 on the situation in Western Sahara.

2/ The report of the Special Committee on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1/

3/ Specific documents submitted made to the subject of Western Sahara, including the message of the representative of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro.

1/ African Charter VI, para. 17.

CSA

UNITED NATIONS

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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE  
TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

Question of Western Sahara

Report of the Secretary-General

1. At its thirty-fourth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 34/37 of 21 November 1979 concerning the question of Western Sahara. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the resolution read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

...

"9. Requests the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to keep the Secretary-General of the United Nations informed of the progress achieved with regard to the implementation of the decisions of the Organization of African Unity concerning Western Sahara;

"10. Invites the Secretary-General to follow closely the situation in Western Sahara and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session."

2. On 30 September 1980, the Executive Secretary of the Organization of African Unity to the United Nations addressed the following letter to the Secretary-General:

"In pursuance of paragraph 9 of United Nations General Assembly resolution 34/37 adopted on 21 November 1979, I have been instructed by the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to transmit to you the text of decision AHG/DEC.118 (XVII) on the question of Western Sahara which was adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU meeting at its seventeenth ordinary session in Freetown from 1 to 4 July 1980 (see annex)."

"In accordance with paragraph 4 of the decision, the Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State on Western Sahara met at Freetown from 9 to 12 September 1980. The Committee's recommendations are being forwarded to the heads of State and Government of OAU.

"I would be grateful if you would include this information in your report to the General Assembly."

3. At its thirty-fifth session, the General Assembly will have before it the working paper on the item prepared by the Secretariat (A/AC.109/621), which the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples decided to transmit to the Assembly in order to facilitate the consideration of the item by the Fourth Committee.

4. During the year, the Secretary-General has continued to follow closely the situation with regard to Western Sahara as well as the related efforts of OAU to arrive at a solution of the problem. Further, the Secretary-General has maintained close contacts with the parties concerned and will continue to extend his full co-operation to them in the search for a solution, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations.

ANNEX

Decision AHG/DEC.118 (XVII), adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, at its seventeenth ordinary session

Question of Western Sahara

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity meeting, at its seventeenth ordinary session in Freetown, Sierra Leone, from 1 to 4 July 1980,

Having reviewed the report of the third session of the Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State on Western Sahara,

Taking cognizance of the views expressed on the report by various delegations,

1. Takes note of the report of the third session of the Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State on Western Sahara;

2. Agrees that the Committee, under the chairmanship of the current Chairman, H.E. Dr. Siaka Stevens, should continue its work with a view to reconciling the parties to the conflict and seeking a peaceful and lasting solution thereto;

3. Welcomes the willingness of the Kingdom of Morocco to engage in discussions with all interested parties and to participate fully in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee;

4. Decides that the Ad Hoc Committee shall convene in Freetown, Sierra Leone, within the next three months.

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FILE REGISTRATION FORM

935/28/2

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
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